Author: Jonathan H. HamiltonPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Games
Author: Jonathan H. HamiltonPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Endogenous Timing in Multi-stage Duopoly Games
Author: Toshihiro MatsumuraEndogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Information
Author: Hans-Theo NormannPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Decision making
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Book Description
Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Formation
Author: Hans-Theo NormannEndogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplet Informationa
Author: Hans-Theo NormannMaking Sense of the Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Markets
Author: Luís Santos-PintoPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 30
Book Description
The prediction of asymmetric equilibria with Stackelberg outcomes is clearly the most frequent result in the endogenous timing literature. Several experiments have tried to validate this prediction empirically, but failed to find support for it. By contrast, the experiments find that simultaneous-move outcomes are modal and that behavior in endogenous timing games is quite heterogeneous. This paper generalizes Saloner's (1987) and Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) endogenous timing games by assuming that players are averse to inequality in payoffs. We explore the theoretical implications of inequity aversion and compare them to the empirical evidence. We find that this explanation is able to organize most of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing games. However, inequity aversion is not able to explain delay in Hamilton and Slutsky's endogenous timing games.
Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Endogenous Vertical Differentiation
Author: Lin LiuPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We consider a game of endogenous timing with observable delay in a mixed duopoly with endogenous vertical differentiation in the context of sequential quality and price choice. We find that a simultaneous play in the first opportunity at each stage turns out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.
Endogenous Timing in Cournot Duopoly
Author: Toshihiro MatsumuraEndogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence
Author: Miguel A. FonsecaEndogenous Timing and the Choice of Quality in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
The endogenous choice of timing is discussed in a vertically differentiated duopoly where quality improvement requires a fixed convex cost. The timing decision concerns the quality stage. Using an extended game with observable delay, it is shown that only simultaneous equilibria can arise. This puts into question the ability of Stackelberg games to describe the entry process.