Empirical Analysis of Strategic Behavior in Oligopoly PDF Download

Author: Steven Lawrence Puller
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 216

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Book Description

Author: Kazuhiro Ohnishi
Publisher: Bentham Science Publishers
ISBN: 1681086255
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 298

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Book Description
This volume of the series features 14 chapters covering theoretical and empirical research on strategic decision making of monopolistic and oligopolistic organizations. Topics covered in this volume include strategic behavior of different types of firms, identifying insiders in organizations, the relationship of employees’ green behavior with environmental sustainability, the relationship between firm size and export-intensities of manufacturing firms in India in a discriminating oligopoly model, and how industrial economics modeling can be particularly useful to analyze development issues in a context of food safety regulations. This volume is suitable for academics, students and professionals studying firm behavior in the fields of economics, business administration, policymaking and engineering.

Author: Marco Wulff
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783899638349
Category : Unternehmenskooperation - Forschung und Entwicklung - Marktzugang - Strategisches Management
Languages : en
Pages : 232

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Book Description

Author: Kosin Isariyawongse
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Oligopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 204

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Book Description
This dissertation addresses issues of strategic behavior of firms in oligopoly markets. In the first study we analyze how generic advertising affects brand advertising and firm profits in differentiated oligopoly markets. We develop two models, one with vertical differentiation and another with horizontal differentiation. In the case of vertical differentiation, we amend Crespi's (2007) model to show that only the high quality firm will use brand advertising. We also show that when differentiation is horizontal, the equilibrium is likely to be more symmetric in terms of each firm's profits, spending on brand advertising, and response to generic advertising. We also demonstrate that generic advertising will increase expenditures on brand advertising when firms play a supermodular game. In the second study, we analyze the interaction between generic advertising, brand advertising, and firm profits when products are differentiated either vertically or horizontally and brand advertising is purely informative. That is, brand advertising lowers consumer search costs of identifying brand characteristics. The model demonstrates that firms can benefit from investing in brand advertising that lowers consumer search costs as well as from brand advertising that is purely persuasive. In addition, the results demonstrate that whether brand advertising is persuasive or informative, the outcome is more likely to be symmetric with horizontal differentiation than with vertical differentiation. This study shows that brand advertising is a strategic complement when persuasive and a strategic substitute when informative. In the third study, we allow the choice of strategic variable, output and price, to be endogenous to the firm. We consider the case where one firm chooses output and the other firm chooses price, which we call a Cournot-Bertrand model. We provide a real world example of this "Cournot-Bertrand" behavior and show that the outcome can be a Nash equilibrium. Allowing the timing of play (early or late) as well as the strategic variable (output or price) to be endogenous, we demonstrate an outcome where one firm competes in output and the other firm competes in price can be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

Author: Roger Sherman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 232

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Book Description

Author: Xavier Vives
Publisher: MIT Press (MA)
ISBN: 9780262220606
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 446

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Book Description
Applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. The text relates classic contributions to the field of modern game theory and discusses basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, paying particular attention to developments in the theory of supermodular games.

Author: Kazuhiro Ohnishi
Publisher: Bentham Science Publishers
ISBN: 1681082535
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 301

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Book Description
This is the second volume of the book series featuring empirical research conducted on business decision making policies of oligopolistic organizations. This volume brings together 11 chapters that cover economic and mathematical models to illustrate strategic decision making among different organizations. Topics covered in this volume include, the theory of firm behavior, the Bertrand model of an incumbent and a potential industrial entrant, strategic interactions in vertically related industries, financial losses of enterprises caused by breaks of information security systems and the association of certain funding choices with efficiency in small medium enterprises. Thus the volume encompasses a fresh collection of works on firm behavior and industrial economics.

Author: Andrew F. Daughety
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521361761
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 455

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Book Description
This volume focuses on the properties and uses of Cournot's model of competition among the few.

Author: Alexander Steinmetz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 306

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Book Description

Author: Leslie Neubecker
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540295577
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 237

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Book Description
Dynamic oligopolistic competition has implications both for the strategic management of firms and for the design of an effective competition policy. Consequently, the present book considers the issue from a private and social perspective. It discusses the potential pro- and anticollusive effects of long-term business strategies, especially for cooperation and reinvestment in production, financing and management compensation, in markets with fluctuating demand. The method of supergame theory is applied to integrate long-run decisions and different types of demand into the analysis. Aside from its contributions to the theoretical literature, the book provides valuable insights into the design of competition policy. The observed development of prices is an indicator of the extent of collusion in the market and can thereby be used to assess antitrust regulation in certain business areas, and to focus the resources of competition authorities on markets where conditions are conducive to collusion.