Differentiated Durable Goods Monopoly PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Differentiated Durable Goods Monopoly PDF full book. Access full book title Differentiated Durable Goods Monopoly by Francesco Nava. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Francesco Nava Publisher: ISBN: Category : Durable goods, Consumer Languages : en Pages : 46
Book Description
The paper analyzes a durable good monopoly problem in which multiple varieties can be produced and sold. A robust Coase conjecture establishes that the market eventually clears, that profits exceed static optimal market-clearing profits, and that profits converge to this lower bound in all stationary equilibria when prices can be revised instantaneously. In contrast to the one-variety case though, equilibrium pricing is neither efficient nor minimal (that is, equal to the maximum between marginal cost an the minimal value). Conclusions apply even when products can be scrapped albeit at possibly smaller mark-ups. If so, a novel motive for selling high cost products naturally emerges. Moreover, with positive marginal costs, cross-subsidization arises as a result of equilibrium pricing. The online appendix delivers insights on product design.
Author: Francesco Nava Publisher: ISBN: Category : Durable goods, Consumer Languages : en Pages : 46
Book Description
The paper analyzes a durable good monopoly problem in which multiple varieties can be produced and sold. A robust Coase conjecture establishes that the market eventually clears, that profits exceed static optimal market-clearing profits, and that profits converge to this lower bound in all stationary equilibria when prices can be revised instantaneously. In contrast to the one-variety case though, equilibrium pricing is neither efficient nor minimal (that is, equal to the maximum between marginal cost an the minimal value). Conclusions apply even when products can be scrapped albeit at possibly smaller mark-ups. If so, a novel motive for selling high cost products naturally emerges. Moreover, with positive marginal costs, cross-subsidization arises as a result of equilibrium pricing. The online appendix delivers insights on product design.
Author: Lisa N. Takeyama Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper considers a novel and strategic use of quality as a means for solving the durable-goods time inconsistency problem. It demonstrates how durable-goods producers can exploit the cannibalization of high-quality markets by low-quality goods. Relative to the static product line solution, this strategic dimension of quality choice implies higher quality levels of low-end goods and the production of some low-end products that would not otherwise be produced. In some cases, low-end goods may rationally be sold below cost. The paper, therefore, offers a purely Coasian explanation for vertical product differentiation.
Author: Francesco Nava
Author: Francesco Nava
Author: Lisa N. Takeyama
Author: Ronald W. Anderson
Author: Joel Sobel
Author: Joseph Emmett Harrington
Author: Joseph Emmett Harrington
Author: Trond E. Olsen
Author: David W. Majerus
Author: Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences
Author: Giuseppe Colangelo