Counterinsurgency PDF Download

Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Counterinsurgency PDF full book. Access full book title Counterinsurgency by Steven Metz. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.

Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency PDF Author: Steven Metz
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428914293
Category : Counterinsurgency
Languages : en
Pages : 39

Book Description
Dr. Steven Metz argues that the way the Department of Defense and U.S. military spend the time when counterinsurgency support is not an important part of American national security strategy determines how quickly and easily they react when policymakers commit the nation to such activity. If analysis and debate continues, at least at a low level, the military is better prepared for the reconstitution of capabilities. If it ignores global developments in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would be more difficult.

Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency PDF Author: Steven Metz
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428914293
Category : Counterinsurgency
Languages : en
Pages : 39

Book Description
Dr. Steven Metz argues that the way the Department of Defense and U.S. military spend the time when counterinsurgency support is not an important part of American national security strategy determines how quickly and easily they react when policymakers commit the nation to such activity. If analysis and debate continues, at least at a low level, the military is better prepared for the reconstitution of capabilities. If it ignores global developments in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would be more difficult.

Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability

Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability PDF Author: Steven Metz
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781480125063
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40

Book Description
Counterinsurgency is seemingly not of great concern to the U.S. Army today. This may represent a period of remission rather than the apparent abandonment of the mission. It is possible that the U.S. military may again become engaged in counterinsurgency support in the future. In this study, Steven Metz argues that the way the Department of Defense and U.S. military spend the time when counterinsurgency support is not an important part of American national security strategy determines how quickly and easily they react when policymakers commit the nation to such activity. If analysis and debate continues, at least at a low level, the military is better prepared for the reconstitution of capabilities. If it ignores global developments in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would be more difficult. Today, there is no pressing strategic rationale for U.S. engagement in counterinsurgency but history suggests that if the United States remains involved in the Global South, one may emerge. American counterinsurgency strategy has unfolded in a distinct pattern over the past 50 years. At times, policymakers saw a strategic rationale for engagement in counterinsurgency. When they did, the military and Department of Defense formed or reconstituted counterinsurgency doctrine, concepts, and organizations. When the strategic rationale faded, these capabilities atrophied. This pattern may be repeated in the future. During the last decade of the Cold War, the U.S. military developed an effective approach to insurgency and implemented it in El Salvador, but this focused on one particular type of insurgency: Maoist "people's war." The El Salvador model may not apply to post-Cold War forms of insurgency. Moreover, many of the basic assumptions of American counterinsurgency strategy appear obsolete. Trends such as ungovernability, the routinization of violence, and the mutation of insurgency change the costs/benefits calculus that undergirded Cold War-era strategy and doctrine. During the current period of remission in insurgency, the Army should use its intellectual resources to analyze ongoing mutations in insurgency and to open a debate on the nature of a cogent post-Cold War counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy should expand its conceptual framework and stress three principles: selectivity, multilateralism, and concentration on secondary support functions including indirect or second-tier engagement. Such efforts will pave the way for the reconstitution of American counterinsurgency should it be required.

Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability

Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability PDF Author: Steven Metz
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781482301199
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 46

Book Description
The insurgents of the world are sleeping. Few new old-style insurgencies have emerged since the end of the Cold War and many old ones, from the Philippines to Peru, from Mozambique to El Salvador, from Northern Ireland to the West Bank and Gaza are lurching or inching toward settlement. But sleep is not death-- it is a time for rejuvenation. Since the means and the motives for protracted political violence persist, it will prove as attractive to the discontented of the world in the post-Cold War global security environment as it did before. Eventually insurgency will awaken. When it does, the United States will be required to respond. Since the late 1940s, the importance American policymakers attached to supporting friendly states facing guerrilla threats has ebbed and flowed. Often counterinsurgency was not considered strategically significant and the defense community paid it little attention. When the president did decide that insurgency posed a threat, the military and the defense community had to craft or update an appropriate conceptual framework, organization and doctrine. Like a phoenix, American counterinsurgency capability periodically died, only to be reborn from the ashes. And always, how the period of remission was spent shaped the process of rebirth. When the military and defense community maintained a cadre of counterinsurgency experts to ponder past efforts and analyze the changing nature of insurgency, the reconstitution of understanding and capability was relatively easy. Today there is no pressing strategic rationale for U.S. engagement in counterinsurgency but history suggests one may emerge if the United States remains involved in the Global South.This is the time, then, for introspection, assessment, and reflection--for keeping the intellectual flame burning, even if at a very low level. Just as conventional combat units train after an operation in order to prepare for future ones (while hoping they never occur), the U.S. military and other elements of the defense community must mentally train for future counterinsurgency. This entails both looking backward at previous attempts to reconstitute counterinsurgency capabilitiesand looking forward to speculate on future forms of insurgency and the strategic environment in which counterinsurgency might occur. To do this now will shorten the period of learning and adaptation should counterinsurgency support again become an important part of American national security strategy.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response PDF Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428910352
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 51

Book Description
Insurgency has existed throughout history but ebbed and flowed in strategic significance. Today the world has entered another period when insurgency is common and strategically significant. This is likely to continue for at least a decade, perhaps longer. As the United States confronts this threat, extrapolating old ideas, strategies, doctrine, and operational concepts is a recipe for ineffectiveness. Reconceptualization is needed. The strategic salience of insurgency for the United States is higher than it has been since the height of the Cold War. But insurgency remains challenging for the United States because two of its dominant characteristics--protractedness and ambiguity-- mitigate the effectiveness of the American military. Furthermore, the broader U.S. national security organization is not optimized for counterinsurgency support. Ultimately, a nation is only as good at counterinsurgency support as its weakest link, not its strongest. Existing American strategy and doctrine focus on national insurgencies rather than liberation ones. As a result, the strategy stresses selective engagement; formation of a support coalition if possible; keeping the American presence to a minimum level to attain strategic objectives; augmenting the regime's military, intelligence, political, informational, and economic capabilities; and, encouraging and shaping reform by the regime designed to address shortcomings and the root causes of the insurgency. The key to success is not for the U.S. military to become better at counterinsurgency, but for the U.S. military (and other elements of the government) to be skilled at helping local security and intelligence forces become effective at it.

COIN of the Realm

COIN of the Realm PDF Author: Ralph Wipfli
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Counterinsurgency
Languages : en
Pages : 4

Book Description
Participants at the seminar developed these key insights: Regardless of whether counterinsurgency (COIN) will be the dominant form of military activity in the future or simply one of several, the United States needs an effective national strategy which explains when, why, and how the nation should undertake it. The basic assumptions of the current approach need revisited, especially those dealing with the role of the state, the strategic framework for American involvement, and the whole-of-government approach. Given the demands placed upon the armed forces by the current campaigns, most of the effort has been on tactics, training, and doctrine. Ultimately strategic transformation is at least as important, if not more so. Rather than thinking of counterinsurgency and warfighting as competing tasks, the military and other government agencies must pursue ways to integrate them, thus assuring that the United States can address the multidimensional threats which characterize the contemporary security environment.

The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency

The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency PDF Author: William Rosenau
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 48

Book Description
Modern-day advocates of the Phoenix Program argue that it was devastatingly effective against the Viet Cong infrastructure during the Vietnam War, but detractors condemn it as a merciless assassination campaign. The authors provide a fresh assessment of the program and identify aspects that are relevant for contemporary counterinsurgency.

The Role and Limitations of Technology in U.S. Counterinsurgency Warfare

The Role and Limitations of Technology in U.S. Counterinsurgency Warfare PDF Author: Richard W. Rubright
Publisher: Potomac Books, Inc.
ISBN: 1612346758
Category : Fiction
Languages : en
Pages : 293

Book Description
"Richard W. Rubright addresses the limits and constraints of technology in enhancing American military capability. Analyzing the confines and self-imposed restrictions on the use of technology as well as current military doctrine, he develops a new rubric for guiding the military in modern warfare... This book is the first to address the role of technology in counterinsurgency operations within operational, tactical and strategic contexts"--Dust jacket.

Strategic Challenges for Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terrorism

Strategic Challenges for Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terrorism PDF Author: Williamson Murray
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Counterinsurgency
Languages : en
Pages : 320

Book Description
"In March 2006, President George W. Bush signed a new National Security Strategy that he refers to as a "wartime national security strategy." He also states in the introduction that to follow the path the United States has chosen, we must "maintain and expand our national strength." One way to do this is to study and propose solutions to the complex challenges the United States faces in the 21st century. At the U.S. Army War College, the students have embraced this challenge and spend a year developing their intellectual strength in areas that extend well beyond the familiar operational and tactical realm to which they are accustomed. This collection of essays written by students enrolled in the U.S. Army War College Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP) reflects the development of their strategic thought applied to a wide range of contemporary issues. The ASAP is a unique program that offers selected students a rigorous course of instruction in theater strategy. Solidly based in theory, doctrine, and history, the program provides these students a wide range of experts both in and out of the military, staff rides, and exercises to develop them as superb theater strategists. ASAP graduates continue to make their mark throughout the military to include in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commands."--STINET web site.

Counterinsurgency: An American Political and Military Weakness

Counterinsurgency: An American Political and Military Weakness PDF Author: Duane P. Schattle
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31

Book Description
Current American capability in counterinsurgency is analyzed by comparing past and present U.S. policy and military preparedness to operate within the revolutionary warfare environment. A comparison of U.S. policy and military capabilities is made concerning High Intensity Conflict (HIC), Medium Intensity Conflict (MIC), and Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) environments, and the results show a substantial weakness in the counterinsurgency arena. Although a reasonable policy has been established based on a legitimate threat analysis, American efforts to develop a strategy and organize, train, and equip U.S. military forces to operate within the counterinsurgency environment are inadequate.

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare PDF Author: Daniel Marston
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 1849086524
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 482

Book Description
A fascinating discussion of the development of counterinsurgency by experts in the field. Throughout history armies of occupation and civil power have been faced with the challenges of insurgency. British and American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan has highlighted this form of conflict in the modern world. Armies have had to adopt new doctrines and tactics to deal with the problems of insurgency and diverse counterinsurgency strategies have been developed. Here, fourteen authors examine the development of counterinsurgency from the early 20th century to the present. Including information on the Arab-Israeli conflict, Afghanistan and Iraq this book is a timely and accessible survey of a critical facet of modern warfare. This new paperback edition features a revised introduction, updated chapters on Iraq and Afghanistan and a completely new chapter on Columbia by expert Thomas Marks.