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Corporate Stock Ownership as an Alignment Mechanism

Corporate Stock Ownership as an Alignment Mechanism PDF Author: Cindy R. Alexander
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 56

Book Description


Corporate Stock Ownership as an Alignment Mechanism

Corporate Stock Ownership as an Alignment Mechanism PDF Author: Cindy R. Alexander
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 56

Book Description


Corporate Stock Ownership as an Alignment Mechanism

Corporate Stock Ownership as an Alignment Mechanism PDF Author: Cindy R. Alexander
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Stock ownership
Languages : en
Pages : 35

Book Description


Mechanisms for Dividing Labor and Sharing Revenue in Joint Ventures

Mechanisms for Dividing Labor and Sharing Revenue in Joint Ventures PDF Author: Keith Waehrer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Division of labor
Languages : en
Pages : 40

Book Description


Market Delineation Algorithms Based on the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm

Market Delineation Algorithms Based on the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm PDF Author: Gregory Werden
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 44

Book Description


Managerial Ownership and Incentive Alignment

Managerial Ownership and Incentive Alignment PDF Author: Phillip James Quinn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate governance
Languages : en
Pages : 49

Book Description
Mandatory stock ownership plans require executives to hold a minimum level of stock. I exploit these changes in managerial stock ownership to examine the relation between managerial ownership and manager-shareholder incentive alignment. In contrast to prior work that suggests equity incentives induce opportunistic managerial behavior, I find earnings management declines following the adoption of mandatory stock ownership plans relative to a propensity-matched control sample. I also posit and find a reduction in bid-ask spreads following plan adoptions, consistent with manager-shareholder incentive alignment improving market liquidity and decreasing information asymmetry. These findings are consistent with boards of directors contracting with managers to reduce the agency costs of equity.

A Nonparametric Analysis of International Long-distance Demand

A Nonparametric Analysis of International Long-distance Demand PDF Author: Sean Ennis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Demand (Economic theory)
Languages : en
Pages : 34

Book Description


Competing for the Effort of a Common Agent

Competing for the Effort of a Common Agent PDF Author: Jeffrey Wilder
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business insurance
Languages : en
Pages : 54

Book Description


Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation

Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation PDF Author: Craig Peters
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Airlines
Languages : en
Pages : 56

Book Description


Federal Antitrust Developments in the United States: Annual Reports to the Competition Committee of the Directorate For Financial and Enterprise Affairs of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2003

Federal Antitrust Developments in the United States: Annual Reports to the Competition Committee of the Directorate For Financial and Enterprise Affairs of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2003 PDF Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428953221
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 28

Book Description


Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance

Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance PDF Author: Hoang N. Pham
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1000540332
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 132

Book Description
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been studied extensively in corporate finance and corporate governance literature. Nevertheless, the mediation (path) analysis to examine the issue can be adopted as a new approach to explain why and how ownership structure is related to firm performance and vice versa. This approach calls for full recognition of the roles of agency costs and corporate risk-taking as essential mediating variables in the bi-directional and mediated relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Based on the agency theory, corporate risk management theory and accounting for the dynamic endogeneity in the ownership–performance relationship, this book develops two-mediator mediation models, including recursive and non-recursive mediation models, to investigate the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. It is demonstrated that agency costs and corporate risk-taking are the ‘missing links’ in the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. Hence, this book brings into attention the mediation and dynamic approach to this issue and enhances the knowledge of the mechanisms for improving firm’s financial performance. This book will be of interest to corporate finance, management and economics researchers and policy makers. Post-graduate research students in corporate governance and corporate finance will also find this book beneficial to the application of econometrics into multi-dimensional and complex issues of the firm, including ownership structure, agency problems, corporate risk management and financial performance.