Corporate Governance and the Home Bias PDF Download

Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Corporate Governance and the Home Bias PDF full book. Access full book title Corporate Governance and the Home Bias by Lee Pinkowitz. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.

Corporate Governance and the Home Bias

Corporate Governance and the Home Bias PDF Author: Lee Pinkowitz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 35

Book Description
In most countries, many of the largest corporations are controlled by large shareholders. We show that, under reasonable assumptions, this stylized fact implies that portfolio holdings of U.S. investors should exhibit a home bias in equilibrium. We construct an estimate of the world portfolio of shares available to investors who are not controlling shareholders. This available world portfolio differs sharply from the world market portfolio. In regressions explaining the portfolio weights of U.S. investors, the world portfolio of available shares has a positive significant coefficient but the world market portfolio has no additional explanatory power. This result holds when we control for country characteristics.

Corporate Governance and the Home Bias

Corporate Governance and the Home Bias PDF Author: Lee Pinkowitz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 35

Book Description
In most countries, many of the largest corporations are controlled by large shareholders. We show that, under reasonable assumptions, this stylized fact implies that portfolio holdings of U.S. investors should exhibit a home bias in equilibrium. We construct an estimate of the world portfolio of shares available to investors who are not controlling shareholders. This available world portfolio differs sharply from the world market portfolio. In regressions explaining the portfolio weights of U.S. investors, the world portfolio of available shares has a positive significant coefficient but the world market portfolio has no additional explanatory power. This result holds when we control for country characteristics.

Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and the Home Bias

Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and the Home Bias PDF Author: Magnus Dahlquist
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 48

Book Description
If investors are poorly protected, it is optimal for firms to be closely held because selling shares to minority shareholders is otherwise too expensive. Empirically, most firms in countries with poor investor protection are closely held so that investors cannot hold the market portfolio. We show that the prevalence of closely held firms in countries with poor investor protection explains part of the home bias of U.S. investors. We construct an estimate of the world portfolio of shares available to investors who are not controlling shareholders (the world float portfolio). The world float portfolio differs sharply from the world market portfolio. In regressions explaining the portfolio weights of U.S. investors, the world float portfolio has a positive significant coefficient but the world market portfolio has no additional explanatory power. This result holds when we control for country characteristics. An analysis of foreign investor holdings at the firm level for Sweden confirms the importance of the float portfolio as a determinant of these holdings.

Financial Globalisation, Governance and the Evolution of the Home Bias

Financial Globalisation, Governance and the Evolution of the Home Bias PDF Author: Bong-Chan Kho
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate governance
Languages : en
Pages : 52

Book Description
Despite the disappearance of formal barriers to international investment across countries, we find that the average home bias of US investors towards the 46 countries with the largest equity markets did not fall from 1994 to 2004 when countries are equally weighted but fell when countries are weighted by market capitalisation. This evidence is inconsistent with portfolio theory explanations of the home bias, but is consistent with what we call the optimal insider ownership theory of the home bias. Since foreign investors can only own shares not held by insiders, there will be a large home bias towards countries in which insiders own large stakes in corporations. Consequently, for the home bias to fall substantially, insider ownership has to fall in countries where it is high. Poor governance leads to concentrated insider ownership, so that governance improvements make it possible for corporate ownership to become more dispersed and for the home bias to fall. We find that the home bias of US investors decreased the most towards countries in which the ownership by corporate insiders is low and countries in which ownership by corporate insiders fell. Using firm-level data for Korea, we find that portfolio equity investment by foreign investors in Korean firms is inversely related to insider ownership and that the firms that attract the most foreign portfolio equity investment are large firms with dispersed ownership.

Financial Globalization, Governance, and the Evolution of the Home Bias

Financial Globalization, Governance, and the Evolution of the Home Bias PDF Author: Bong-Chan Kho
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 53

Book Description
Despite the disappearance of formal barriers to international investment across countries, we find that the average home bias of U.S. investors towards the 46 countries with the largest equity markets did not fall from 1994 to 2004 when countries are equally weighted but fell when countries are weighted by market capitalization. This evidence is inconsistent with portfolio theory explanations of the home bias, but is consistent with what we call the optimal insider ownership theory of the home bias. Since foreign investors can only own shares not held by insiders, there will be a large home bias towards countries in which insiders own large stakes in corporations. Consequently, for the home bias to fall substantially, insider ownership has to fall in countries where it is high. Poor governance leads to concentrated insider ownership, so that governance improvements make it possible for corporate ownership to become more dispersed and for the home bias to fall. We find that the home bias of U.S. investors decreased the most towards countries in which the ownership by corporate insiders is low and countries in which ownership by corporate insiders fell. Using firm-level data for Korea, we find that portfolio equity investment by foreign investors in Korean firms is inversely related to insider ownership and that the firms that attract the most foreign portfolio equity investment are large firms with dispersed ownership.

The Equity Home Bias Puzzle

The Equity Home Bias Puzzle PDF Author: Ian Cooper
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781601987631
Category : International finance
Languages : en
Pages : 133

Book Description
Home bias - the empirical phenomenon that investors assign anomalously high weights to their own domestic assets - has puzzled academics for decades: financial theory predicts that an internationally well diversified portfolio of stocks and short-term bonds can reduce risk significantly without affecting expected return. Although the globalization of international equity markets has increased international investments, equity portfolios remain severely home biased today, and no single explanation seems to solve the puzzle completely. In this paper, we first provide a thorough description of the equity home bias phenomenon by defining, discussing, and applying the competing measures and presenting some estimates of the costs of under-diversification. Second, we evaluate the explanations for the equity home bias proposed in the literature such as information asymmetries, behavioral aspects, barriers to foreign investment, and governance issues, and conclude that each explanation on its own falls short, suggesting that the equity home bias probably reflects a combination of factors. Lastly, we review the implications of international under-diversification for portfolio formation and the cost of capital of companies.

Corporate Governance and the Home Bias

Corporate Governance and the Home Bias PDF Author: Lee Pinkowitz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate governance
Languages : en
Pages : 52

Book Description
In most countries, many of the largest corporations are controlled by large shareholders. We show that, under reasonable assumptions, this stylized fact implies that portfolio holdings of U.S. investors should exhibit a home bias in equilibrium. We construct an estimate of the world portfolio of shares available to investors who are not controlling shareholders. This available world portfolio differs sharply from the world market portfolio. In regressions explaining the portfolio weights of U.S. investors, the world portfolio of available shares has a positive significant coefficient but the world market portfolio has no additional explanatory power. This result holds when we control for country characteristics.

Corporate Governance, International Cross Listing and Home Bias

Corporate Governance, International Cross Listing and Home Bias PDF Author: Michael R. King
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 45

Book Description
The equity of Canadian-listed firms trades at a discount to U.S.-listed firms. This discount may be due to weaker corporate governance in Canada relative to the United States. Canadian firms may mitigate this discount by cross listing on a U.S. stock exchange. Results show that Canadian firms cross listed on a U.S. exchange achieve a higher valuation than firms listed exclusively in Canada, after controlling for factors known to affect valuation. Canadian firms that are predominantly traded in the U.S. receive similar valuations to other U.S.-listed firms, while cross listed Canadian firms with little U.S. turnover continue to trade at a discount.

Portfolio Preferences of Foreign Institutional Investors

Portfolio Preferences of Foreign Institutional Investors PDF Author: Reena Aggarwal
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Foreign exchange
Languages : en
Pages : 47

Book Description


Corporate Governance in Japan

Corporate Governance in Japan PDF Author: Masahiko Aoki
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191536385
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 480

Book Description
Debates regarding corporate governance have become increasingly important in Japan as the post-war model of bank-based, stakeholder-oriented corporate governance faces the new pressures associated with globalization and growing investor demands for shareholder value. Bringing together a group of leading scholars from economics, law, sociology and management studies, this book looks at how the Japanese approach to corporate governance and the firm have changed in the post-bubble era. The contributions offer a unique empirical exploration of why and how Japanese firms are reshaping their corporate governance arrangements, leading to greater diversity among firms and new 'hybrid' forms of corporate governance. The book concludes by looking at what effect these incremental but transformative changes may have on Japan's distinctive variety of capitalism.

Corporate Governance Strengthening Latin American Corporate Governance The Role of Institutional Investors

Corporate Governance Strengthening Latin American Corporate Governance The Role of Institutional Investors PDF Author: OECD
Publisher: OECD Publishing
ISBN: 9264116052
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 78

Book Description
This report reflects long-term, in-depth discussion and debate by participants in the Latin American Roundtable on Corporate Governance.