Coordination and Incentive Contracts in Stochastic Project Management PDF Download

Author: Murat Bayiz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Project management
Languages : en
Pages : 294

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Author: Murat Bayiz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
We study the problem of the manager of a project consisting of two sub-projects or tasks which are outsourced to different subcontractors. The project manager earns more revenue from the project if it is completed faster, but he cannot observe how hard subcontractors work, only the stochastic duration of their tasks. We derive the optimal linear incentive contracts to offer to the subcontractors when the tasks are conducted in series or in parallel. We compare them to the fixed-price contracts often encountered in practice, and discuss when incentive contracts lead to bigger performance improvement. We characterize how the incentive contracts vary with the subcontractors' risk aversion and cost of effort, the marginal effect of subcontractor effort, and the variability of task durations. We find that this dependence is sometimes counter-intuitive in nature. For instance, for parallel tasks, if the first agent's task is on the critical path and his variability increases, the project manager should induce the first agent to work less hard and the second agent to work harder.

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 580

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Author: Ted Klastorin
Publisher: SAGE Publications
ISBN: 1544333978
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 713

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Book Description
Project Management: A Risk-Management Approach prepares students to successfully navigate the many challenges, factors, and situations that project managers face.

Author: Martin Albrecht
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642028330
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 227

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Book Description
Integrated supply chain planning is well understood by theory and widely applied in practice – however, only with respect to intra-organisational supply chains. In inter-organisational supply chains, an additional, yet unresolved problem arises: due to confidentiality reasons, decentralized parties keep their local data private, which prevents an integrated planning. Local planning procedures such as upstream planning, which are usually applied then, result in suboptimal solutions for the supply chain as a whole. In this work, new mechanisms for inter-organizational, collaborative supply chain planning are presented. These mechanisms are able to identify the systemwide optimum for several classes of supply chain planning problems. They can be applied by two or more self-interested parties and do not require a trusted third party. Extensive computational tests for randomly generated and real-word data suggest a favorable performance of these mechanisms.

Author: Milind Dawande
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 48

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Motivated by the ever-growing complexity of projects and the consistent trend of outsourcing of individual tasks or components, we study the contract-design problem faced by a firm (or organization) for executing a project consisting of multiple tasks, each of which is performed by an individual contractor whose efforts (work-rates) are not observable. While the contractors incur costs continuously during the course of their tasks, the firm realizes its reward or revenue only when the entire project is (i.e., all tasks are) completed. The firm's contract-design decisions and the contractors' effort-level decisions are all governed by the goals of maximizing the respective party's expected discounted profit. We adopt the framework in Kwon et al. (2010a) and Chen et al. (2015), and derive optimal contracts for both parallel projects (tasks can be performed in parallel) and sequential projects (tasks have to be performed sequentially). The simplicity of the contracts we obtain suggests that there is potential for designing profit-maximizing contracts without paying a price in terms of contract complexity.

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Industrial management
Languages : en
Pages : 572

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Issues for Feb. 1965-Aug. 1967 include Bulletin of the Institute of Management Sciences.

Author: Pranava Raja Goundan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 176

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(cont.) In the second part of the thesis, we focus on the design and analysis of simple, possibly non-coordinating contracts in a single-supplier, multi-retailer supply chain where retailers make both pricing and inventory decisions. Specifically, we introduce a buy-back menu contract to improve supply chain efficiency, and compare two systems, one in which the retailers compete against each other, and another in which the retailers coordinate their decisions to maximize total expected retailer profit. In a linear additive demand setting, we show that for either retailer configuration, the proposed buy-back menu guarantees the supplier, and hence the supply chain, at least 50% of the optimal global supply chain profit. In particular, in a coordinated retailers system, the contract guarantees the supply chain at least 75% of the optimal global supply chain profit. We also analyze the impact of retail price caps on supply chain performance in this setting.

Author: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. National Meeting
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Industrial management
Languages : en
Pages : 480

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Author: Tsan-Ming Choi
Publisher: CRC Press
ISBN: 0203764692
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 122

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Book Description
Fashion Retail Supply Chain Management: A Systems Optimization Approach is a comprehensive reference source that provides the state-of-the-art findings on many important emerging research issues related to retail supply chain management and optimization problems. The book takes an explicit systems approach, and discusses retailled fashion supply ch