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Author: Michael Raith Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper examines how the degree of competition among firms in an industry affects the optimal incentives that firms provide to their managers. A central assumption is that there is free entry and exit in the industry, which implies that changes in the nature of competition lead to changes in the equilibrium market structure. The main result is that as the intensity of product market competition increases, principals unambiguously provide stronger incentives to their agents to reduce costs, and hence agents work harder. At the same time, more intense competition also leads to a higher volatility of both firm-level profits and managers' compensation. Consequently, managers' incentives are positively correlated with firm-level risk, consistent with empirical evidence.
Author: Michael Raith Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper examines how the degree of competition among firms in an industry affects the optimal incentives that firms provide to their managers. A central assumption is that there is free entry and exit in the industry, which implies that changes in the nature of competition lead to changes in the equilibrium market structure. The main result is that as the intensity of product market competition increases, principals unambiguously provide stronger incentives to their agents to reduce costs, and hence agents work harder. At the same time, more intense competition also leads to a higher volatility of both firm-level profits and managers' compensation. Consequently, managers' incentives are positively correlated with firm-level risk, consistent with empirical evidence.
Author: Stefan Beiner Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 53
Book Description
This paper contributes to the very small empirical literature on the effects of competition on managerial incentive schemes. Based on a theoretical model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal agent relationship, we analyze the relationship between product market competition, incentive schemes and firm valuation. The model predicts a nonlinear relationship between the intensity of product market competition and the strength of managerial incentives. We test the implications of our model empirically based on a unique and hand-collected dataset comprising over 600 observations on 200 Swiss firms over the 2002 to 2005 period. Our results suggest that, consistent with the implications of our model, the relation between product market competition and managerial intensive schemes is convex indicating that above a certain level of intensity in product market competition, the marginal effect of competition on the strength of the incentive schemes increases in the level of competition. Moreover, competition is associated with lower firm values. These results are robust to accounting for a potential endogeneity of managerial incentives and firm value in a simultaneous equations framework.
Author: Alessandra Chirco Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We investigate how market competition affects the incentive to adopt a non-profit-maximizing behaviour. The analysis is developed in a strategic delegation framework in which owners delegate output decisions to managers interested in firm's relative performance. We study how the optimal delegation scheme is affected by market concentration and the elasticity of market demand. We prove that the distortion from a profit-maximizing rule decreases as market becomes less concentrated, while it increases as demand becomes more elastic. Finally, we discuss the impact of market competitiveness on the welfare-enhancing ability of delegation contracts.
Author: Michael Raith
Author: Michael Raith
Author: Klaus M. Schmidt
Author: Gianni De Fraja
Author: Sonku Kim
Author: Giancarlo Spagnolo
Author: Zhentang Zhang
Author: Stefan Beiner
Author: Oleksandra Klink
Author: Domenico Scalera
Author: Alessandra Chirco