Author: John RavenhillPublisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 9780231515702
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 428
Book Description
Collective Clientelism
Collective Clientelism
Author: John RavenhillPublisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 9780231515702
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 428
Book Description
Collective Clientelism
Clientelism in Everyday Latin American Politics
Author: T. HilgersPublisher: Springer
ISBN: 1137275995
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 383
Book Description
This book improves understandings of how and why clientelism endures in Latin America and why state policy is often ineffective. Political scientists and sociologists, the contributors employ ethnography, targeted interviews, case studies, within-case and regional comparison, thick descriptions, and process tracing.
Clientelism, Capitalism, and Democracy
Author: Didi KuoPublisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108426085
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 181
Book Description
In the United States and Britain, capitalists organized in opposition to clientelism and demanded programmatic parties and institutional reforms.
Collective Clientelism and Democratic Success
Author: Cristobal MancillasClientelism and Economic Policy
Author: Aris TrantidisPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
How does clientelism affect policy-making? Can patrons in government discard groups of clients in order to pursue reforms in conditions of crisis? The article argues that clientelism goes beyond the exchange of votes and may permeate organizations with the capacity for collective action such as labour unions. This merger gives rise to a clientelist-collective system that changes both patron-client relations and the context of collective action with important implications for the design of economic policy. As evidence from Greece shows, patrons in government are better off avoiding reforms that deprive their client groups of collective and personal benefits (clientelist bias in policy-making). Labour unions infiltrated by party clients have weak autonomy from the patron party but, operating inside the party network, they can effectively safeguard their access to club goods. Interdependent preferences and organizational linkages between the patron party and its client organizations favour collaboration and co-optation over open confrontation in policy-making processes.
Patrons, Clients and Policies
Author: Herbert KitscheltPublisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521865050
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 344
Book Description
A study of patronage politics and the persistence of clientelism across a range of countries.
A Unified Theory of Collective Action and Social Change
Author: Luis MedinaPublisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN: 9780472024452
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Book Description
The notion that groups form and act in ways that respond to objective, external costs and benefits has long been the key to accounting for social change processes driven by collective action. Yet this same notion seems to fall apart when we try to explain how collectivities emerge out of the choices of individuals. This book overcomes that dilemma by offering an analysis of collective action that, while rooted in individual decision making, also brings out the way in which objective costs and benefits can impede or foster social coordination. The resulting approach enables us to address the causes and consequences of collective action with the help of the tools of modern economic theory. To illustrate this, the book applies the tools it develops to the study of specific collective action problems such as clientelism, focusing on its connections with economic development and political redistribution; and wage bargaining, showing its economic determinants and its relevance for the political economy of the welfare state. "Medina's study is a great step forward in the analytics of collective action. He shows the inadequacies of currently standard models and shows that straightforward revisions reconcile rational-choice and structural viewpoints. It will influence all future work." -Kenneth Arrow, Stanford University "Olson, Schelling, and now Medina. A Unified Theory deepens our understanding of collective action and contributes to the foundations of our field. A major work." -Robert H. Bates, Harvard University "Medina thinks that the main problem of social action is not whether or not to cooperate but how to do it. To this end he has produced an imaginative approach to analyzing strategic coordination problems that produces plausible predictions in a range of circumstances." -John Ferejohn, Stanford University Luis Fernando Medina is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia.
The Political Logic of Poverty Relief
Author: Alberto Diaz-CayerosPublisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107140285
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 259
Book Description
The Political Logic of Poverty Relief places electoral politics and institutional design at the core of poverty alleviation. The authors develop a theory with applications to Mexico about how elections shape social programs aimed at aiding the poor. They also assess whether voters reward politicians for targeted poverty alleviation programs.
Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism
Author: Philip KeeferPublisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Democracy
Languages : en
Pages : 45
Book Description
"Keefer and Vlaicu demonstrate that sharply different policy choices across democracies can be explained as a consequence of differences in the ability of political competitors to make credible pre-electoral commitments to voters. Politicians can overcome their credibility deficit in two ways. First, they can build reputations. This requires that they fulfill preconditions that in practice are costly--informing voters of their promises, tracking those promises, and ensuring that voters turn out on election day. Alternatively, they can rely on intermediaries--patrons--who are already able to make credible commitments to their clients. Endogenizing credibility in this way, the authors find that targeted transfers and corruption are higher and public good provision lower than in democracies in which political competitors can make credible pre-electoral promises. They also argue that in the absence of political credibility, political reliance on patrons enhances welfare in the short run, in contrast to the traditional view that clientelism in politics is a source of significant policy distortion. However, in the long run reliance on patrons may undermine the emergence of credible political parties. The model helps to explain several puzzles. For example, public investment and corruption are higher in young democracies than old; and democratizing reforms succeeded remarkably in Victorian England, in contrast to the more difficult experiences of many democratizing countries, such as the Dominican Republic. This paper--a product of the Growth and Investment Team, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to investigate the political economy of development"--World Bank web site.
Clientelism and Economic Policy
Author: Aris TrantidisPublisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317326601
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 256
Book Description
With its deep economic crisis and dramatic political developments Greece has puzzled Europe and the world. What explains its long-standing problems and its incapacity to reform its economy? Using an analytic narrative and a comparative approach, the book studies the pattern of economic reforms in Greece between 1985 and 2015. It finds that clientelism - the allocation of selective benefits by political actors (patrons) to their supporters (clients) - created a strong policy bias that prevented the country from implementing deep-cutting reforms. The book shows that the clientelist system differs from the general image of interest-group politics and that the typical view of clientelism, as individual exchange between patrons and clients, has not fully captured the wide range and implications of this phenomenon. From this, the author develops a theory on clientelism and policy-making, addressing key questions on the politics of economic reform, government autonomy and party politics. The book is an essential addition to the literatures on clientelism, public choice theory, and comparative political economy. It will be of key interest to scholars and students of European Union politics, economic policy and party politics.