Author: Carl E. WalshPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking, Central
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
Central Bank Independence and the Costs of Disinflation in the EC
Author: Carl E. WalshPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking, Central
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
Central Bank Independence and Disinflationary Credibility
Author: Adam Simon PosenPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking, Central
Languages : en
Pages : 60
Book Description
Granting central banks independence from short-term political control is widely assumed to decrease inflation by increasing the credibility of commitments to price stability. This paper analyzes public- and private-sector behavior in a sample of seventeen OECD countries for evidence of variations in disinflationary credibility with monetary institutions. The paper does not find evidence that the costs of disinflation are lower in countries with independent central banks, even when differences in contracting behavior are taken into account. It also does not find evidence that central bank independence inhibits government collection of seignorage revenues or manipulation of economic policy for electoral gain. These results raise questions about some explanations of the negative correlation between central bank independence and inflation, as well as the empirical relevance of government time-inconsistancy problems as a source of inflation differences.
Central Bank Independence and Disinflationary Credibility
Author: Adam S. PosenPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Granting central banks independence from short-term political control is widely assumed to decrease inflation by increasing the credibility of commitments to price stability. This paper analyzes public- and private-sector behavior in a sample of seventeen OECD countries for evidence of variations in disinflationary credibility with monetary institutions. The paper does not find evidence that the costs of disinflation are lower in countries with independent central banks, even when differences in contracting behavior are taken into account. It also does not find evidence that central bank independence inhibits government collection of seignorage revenues or manipulation of economic policy for electoral gain. These results raise questions about some explanations of the negative correlation between central bank independence and inflation, as well as the empirical relevance of government time-inconsistency problems as a source of inflation differences.
The Political Economy of Central-bank Independence
Author: Sylvester C. W. EijffingerPublisher: International Finance Section Department of Econ Ton Univers
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 100
Book Description
The Dominant Discourse of Central Bank Independence
Author: David Roger MonkPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
The period from 1960 to 2000 saw a major evolution in monetary policy and institutions. This dissertation makes the claim that there is a better explanation of these events than the typical narrative, or dominant discourse. The typical narrative is that a relationship between inflation and unemployment (the Phillips Curve) was proposed around 1960. One interpretation of the relationship was that increasing aggregate demand would reduce unemployment with some acceptable inflation. Milton Friedman then stated in 1968 that, in the long run, this practice would entrench inflationary expectations and there would be no useful employment benefits. This was accepted by the economics profession, especially by the mid-1970s, around the time of the first oil shock. This period also saw the rise of stagflation and the countries that managed the inflationary outbreak best were those where independent central banks were able to withstand politicians' short term instincts. Economists attributed this to a commitment concept; if governments could override their central bank only at the cost of legislation or constitutional change, then monetary policy would focus more on long term expectations, rather than the political short term. Empirical work in the 1990s established this relationship and many countries made their central banks more independent during this decade. A better view acknowledges some features of this narrative. For example, Milton Friedman's theory of expectations was very influential. (Chapter 2). But there is reduced evidence for the rest of this narrative. For example, the Federal Reserve did tighten monetary policy after 1982 compared with the period before 1979, but this appears to have been through placing less emphasis on output instead of being more inflation averse. Further, policymakers in the late 1960s and 1970s underestimated the level of unemployment at which inflation started increasing. (Chapter 3). Politicians were generally involved in disinflations, but their role and visibility decreased as legal inflation and central bank independence (CBI) increased. This suggests that, in practice, legal independence bestows the disinflation role on the central bank (Chapter 4). The role of politicians, however, is not fully clear because the proportion of elections where a voter backlash against inflation occurred was small. Therefore, the political dynamic against inflation may have occurred through elites, rather than popular opinion (Chapter 5). Finally, there was not a strong correlation between CBI in developed countries because the literature made errors of omitted variable bias and not examining whether CBI was endogenous. Inflation in the 1970s and 1980s was more clearly related to economic factors such as currency performance, output, past inflation, oil prices, and a time trend (Chapter 6). The weakness of CBI theory is that, by excluding politics, it overstates the costs of overriding a central bank. If there is little popular support for disinflation, then the costs of overriding the central bank will be low, regardless of the legal arrangements in place. Central banks perceive this and deliver policy within the politically palatable decision set.
The Effect of Transparency, Independence and Accountability of Central Banks on Disinflation Costs
Author: Golnaz B. MotieCentral Bank Independence and Monetary Policy Effects
Author: Min Chang (Economist)Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking, Central
Languages : en
Pages : 298
Book Description
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995
Author: Ben S. BernankePublisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262522052
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 364
Book Description
Contents : Wage Inequality and Regional Unemployment Persistence: U.S. vs. Europe, Guiseppe BErtola and Andreas Ichino. Capital Utilization and Returns to Scale, Craig Burnside, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo. Banks and Derivatives, Gary Gorton and Richard Rosen. Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilizations: Theory and Evidence, Sergio Rebelo and Carlos Vegh. Inflation Indicators and Inflation Policy, Stephen Cecchetti. Recent Central Bank Reforms and the Role of Price Stability as the Sole Objective of Monetary Policy, Carl Walsh. Is Central Bank Independence (and Low Inflation) the Result of Effective Financial Opposition to Inflation?, Adam Posen. The Unending Quest for Monetary Salvation, Stanley Fischer.
Inflation, Growth, and Central Banks: Theory and Evidence
Author: Jose GregorioPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
February 1996 Inflation limits economic growth by reducing the efficiency of investment rather than its level. An effective way of achieving low inflation is to establish an independent central bank. De Gregorio reviews the theory and evidence on inflation and growth and provides additional empirical evidence for a large cross-section of countries. The evidence, he reports, suggests a robust negative relationship between inflation and growth. He argues that inflation limits growth mainly by reducing the efficiency of investment rather than its level. But this finding is difficult to explain using traditional theories that rely on the effects of inflation on employment, which are not supported by the data. Explanations focusing on the effects of inflation on the allocation of talents and the functioning of financial markets may help in understanding better the long-run relationship between inflation and growth. De Gregorio also reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on how central banks affect inflation and output growth. An independent central bank can be effective in reducing inflation if the public perceives that it is tough on inflation. But inflation persists because the cost of reducing it is high -- the most evident cost being the loss of output from disinflation. De Gregorio concludes that although serious progress has been made in recent years in assessing empirically how central banks affect macroeconomic performance, the results are still inconclusive. The empirical evidence shows a negative correlation between inflation and central bank independence, especially in OECD countries, but the effects on growth are less conclusive. It is fair to say that the bulk of the evidence suggests that central bank independence produces lower inflation at no real costs. This paper -- a product of the Macroeconomics and Growth Division, Policy Research Department -- is part of a larger effort in the department to examine the determinants of economic growth.
Central Bank Independence, Accountability, and Transparency
Author: B. LaurensPublisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230282121
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 290
Book Description
This book explores three key areas of central banking and governance - autonomy, accountability and transparency. It looks at links between the areas, as well as assessing the impact of central bank autonomy on macroeconomic performance. The issues are approached from theoretical and empirical perspectives.