Author: Glenn Blackmon
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461527066
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 138
Book Description
The class is theory of price regulation assumed that the regulator knows the fIrm's costs, the key piece of information that enables regulators to pressure fmns to choose appropriate behaviors. The "regulatory problem" was reduced to a mere pricing problem: the regulator's goal was to align price with marginal cost, subject to the constraint that revenues must cover costs. Elegant and important insights ensued. The most important was that regulation was inevitably a struggle to achieve second-best outcomes. (Ramsey pricing was a splendid example. ) Reality proved harsh to regulatory theory. The fmn's costs are by no means known to the regulator. At best, the regulator may know how much is currently spent to provide services, but hardly what costs would be if the fmn vigorously pursued effIciency. Even if the current cost curve were known to the regulator, technologies change so swiftly that today's costs are a very poor indicator of tomorrow's, and those are the costs that will determine the fIrm's future decisions. With the burgeoning attention to information considerations and game theory in economics, the regulator's problem of eliciting host information about cost has received considerable attention. In most cases, however, it has been in context that are both static and stylized; such analyses rarely capture many of the essential elements of real world regulatory issues. This volume represents a fresh approach. It reflects Glenn Blackmon's twin strengths, a keen analytic mind and important experience in the regulatory arena.
Incentive Regulation and the Regulation of Incentives
Author: Glenn Blackmon
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461527066
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 138
Book Description
The class is theory of price regulation assumed that the regulator knows the fIrm's costs, the key piece of information that enables regulators to pressure fmns to choose appropriate behaviors. The "regulatory problem" was reduced to a mere pricing problem: the regulator's goal was to align price with marginal cost, subject to the constraint that revenues must cover costs. Elegant and important insights ensued. The most important was that regulation was inevitably a struggle to achieve second-best outcomes. (Ramsey pricing was a splendid example. ) Reality proved harsh to regulatory theory. The fmn's costs are by no means known to the regulator. At best, the regulator may know how much is currently spent to provide services, but hardly what costs would be if the fmn vigorously pursued effIciency. Even if the current cost curve were known to the regulator, technologies change so swiftly that today's costs are a very poor indicator of tomorrow's, and those are the costs that will determine the fIrm's future decisions. With the burgeoning attention to information considerations and game theory in economics, the regulator's problem of eliciting host information about cost has received considerable attention. In most cases, however, it has been in context that are both static and stylized; such analyses rarely capture many of the essential elements of real world regulatory issues. This volume represents a fresh approach. It reflects Glenn Blackmon's twin strengths, a keen analytic mind and important experience in the regulatory arena.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461527066
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 138
Book Description
The class is theory of price regulation assumed that the regulator knows the fIrm's costs, the key piece of information that enables regulators to pressure fmns to choose appropriate behaviors. The "regulatory problem" was reduced to a mere pricing problem: the regulator's goal was to align price with marginal cost, subject to the constraint that revenues must cover costs. Elegant and important insights ensued. The most important was that regulation was inevitably a struggle to achieve second-best outcomes. (Ramsey pricing was a splendid example. ) Reality proved harsh to regulatory theory. The fmn's costs are by no means known to the regulator. At best, the regulator may know how much is currently spent to provide services, but hardly what costs would be if the fmn vigorously pursued effIciency. Even if the current cost curve were known to the regulator, technologies change so swiftly that today's costs are a very poor indicator of tomorrow's, and those are the costs that will determine the fIrm's future decisions. With the burgeoning attention to information considerations and game theory in economics, the regulator's problem of eliciting host information about cost has received considerable attention. In most cases, however, it has been in context that are both static and stylized; such analyses rarely capture many of the essential elements of real world regulatory issues. This volume represents a fresh approach. It reflects Glenn Blackmon's twin strengths, a keen analytic mind and important experience in the regulatory arena.
Capital Attraction
Author: Matthew Burk
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781599325927
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
"Consistently raise capital to execute any small business real estate strategy."--Back cover.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781599325927
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
"Consistently raise capital to execute any small business real estate strategy."--Back cover.
Construction Work in Progress Policy Act
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Subcommittee on Energy Regulation
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electric power-plants
Languages : en
Pages : 1596
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electric power-plants
Languages : en
Pages : 1596
Book Description
City Power
Author: Richard Schragger
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190246685
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 337
Book Description
Reigning theories of urban power suggest that in a world dominated by footloose transnational capital, cities have little capacity to effect social change. In City Power, Richard C. Schragger challenges the existing assumptions, arguing that cities can govern, but only if we let them. In the past decade, city leaders across the country have raised the minimum wage, expanded social services, and engaged in social welfare redistribution. These cities have not suffered capital flight. In fact, many are experiencing an economic renaissance. Schragger argues that city policies are not limited by the demands of mobile capital, but instead by constitutional restraints serving the interests of state and federal officials. Maintaining weak cities is a political choice. In this new era of global capital, the power of cities is more relevant to citizen well-being than ever before. A dynamic vision of city politics for our new urban age, City Power reveals how cities can govern despite these constitutional limits - and why we should want them to.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190246685
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 337
Book Description
Reigning theories of urban power suggest that in a world dominated by footloose transnational capital, cities have little capacity to effect social change. In City Power, Richard C. Schragger challenges the existing assumptions, arguing that cities can govern, but only if we let them. In the past decade, city leaders across the country have raised the minimum wage, expanded social services, and engaged in social welfare redistribution. These cities have not suffered capital flight. In fact, many are experiencing an economic renaissance. Schragger argues that city policies are not limited by the demands of mobile capital, but instead by constitutional restraints serving the interests of state and federal officials. Maintaining weak cities is a political choice. In this new era of global capital, the power of cities is more relevant to citizen well-being than ever before. A dynamic vision of city politics for our new urban age, City Power reveals how cities can govern despite these constitutional limits - and why we should want them to.
Interstate Commerce Commission Reports
Author: United States. Interstate Commerce Commission
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Interstate commerce
Languages : en
Pages : 1072
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Interstate commerce
Languages : en
Pages : 1072
Book Description
The Effect of Dodd-Frank on Small Financial Institutions and Small Businesses
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
The Industrial Reorganization Act: The communications industry
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 1288
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 1288
Book Description
The Industrial Reorganization Act
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 1864
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 1864
Book Description
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Reports
Author: United States. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Energy conservation
Languages : en
Pages : 2502
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Energy conservation
Languages : en
Pages : 2502
Book Description
Multi-dimensional Risk and Investment Return in the Energy Sector
Author: Peter Rabensteiner
Publisher: Haupt Verlag AG
ISBN: 325807805X
Category : Electric utilities
Languages : en
Pages : 194
Book Description
Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht die kapitalbezogenen Aspekte von Investitionen im regulierten Energiesektor, wobei der Fokus auf dem elektrischen Übertragungsnetz liegt. Eine grundlegende Prämisse ist hierbei die "Endogenität des Risikos," wonach das Risikoprofil einer regulierten Investition von den Spezifikationen des regulatorischen Marktdesigns abhängt, durch welches stochastische Kosten und Einnahmen unter den beteiligten Stakeholdern - den Investoren, Konsumenten und Steuerzahlern - aufgeteilt werden. Das übergreifende Konzept ist ein multidimensionales regulatorisches Risiko-Framework, welches eine systematische Beurteilung des Einflusses von stochastischen Risiken auf den Marktwert und Cashflow von regulierten Unternehmen ermöglicht. Gemäss den Dimensionen des Risiko-Frameworks werden die einzelnen Risiken nach ihren systematischen und symmetrischen Eigenschaften sowie nach deren finanziellen Auswirkungen auf das regulierte Unternehmen charakterisiert. Auf Grundlage der konzeptionellen Aufarbeitung und einer umfassenden bibliografischen Übersicht über die vorhandene wissenschaftliche Literatur werden neue Forschungsansätze entwickelt, welche sich mit den identifizierten analytischen und empirischen Forschungslücken befassen: Erstens erlaubt eine kapitalmarktbasierte Kennzahl für das implizierte systematische Risiko, welches auf Basis fundamentaler Bewertungsmodelle und Marktpreise errechnet werden kann, eine robuste Schätzung der Kapitalkosten von börsennotierten Übertragungsfirmen. Eine auf diesem Ansatz beruhende Anpassung der erlaubten Rendite könnte ein wertvolles selbstkorrigierendes Instrumentarium für Regulatoren darstellen. Zweitens ergibt die Analyse einer hypothetischen grenzüberschreitenden Übertragungsleitung zwischen Polen und Österreich, welche aufgrund stündlicher Spotpreise an den jeweiligen Strombörsen durchgeführt wurde, eine Schätzung des systematischen Risikos nahe Nul.
Publisher: Haupt Verlag AG
ISBN: 325807805X
Category : Electric utilities
Languages : en
Pages : 194
Book Description
Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht die kapitalbezogenen Aspekte von Investitionen im regulierten Energiesektor, wobei der Fokus auf dem elektrischen Übertragungsnetz liegt. Eine grundlegende Prämisse ist hierbei die "Endogenität des Risikos," wonach das Risikoprofil einer regulierten Investition von den Spezifikationen des regulatorischen Marktdesigns abhängt, durch welches stochastische Kosten und Einnahmen unter den beteiligten Stakeholdern - den Investoren, Konsumenten und Steuerzahlern - aufgeteilt werden. Das übergreifende Konzept ist ein multidimensionales regulatorisches Risiko-Framework, welches eine systematische Beurteilung des Einflusses von stochastischen Risiken auf den Marktwert und Cashflow von regulierten Unternehmen ermöglicht. Gemäss den Dimensionen des Risiko-Frameworks werden die einzelnen Risiken nach ihren systematischen und symmetrischen Eigenschaften sowie nach deren finanziellen Auswirkungen auf das regulierte Unternehmen charakterisiert. Auf Grundlage der konzeptionellen Aufarbeitung und einer umfassenden bibliografischen Übersicht über die vorhandene wissenschaftliche Literatur werden neue Forschungsansätze entwickelt, welche sich mit den identifizierten analytischen und empirischen Forschungslücken befassen: Erstens erlaubt eine kapitalmarktbasierte Kennzahl für das implizierte systematische Risiko, welches auf Basis fundamentaler Bewertungsmodelle und Marktpreise errechnet werden kann, eine robuste Schätzung der Kapitalkosten von börsennotierten Übertragungsfirmen. Eine auf diesem Ansatz beruhende Anpassung der erlaubten Rendite könnte ein wertvolles selbstkorrigierendes Instrumentarium für Regulatoren darstellen. Zweitens ergibt die Analyse einer hypothetischen grenzüberschreitenden Übertragungsleitung zwischen Polen und Österreich, welche aufgrund stündlicher Spotpreise an den jeweiligen Strombörsen durchgeführt wurde, eine Schätzung des systematischen Risikos nahe Nul.