Author: Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Transport Committee
Publisher: The Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780215053190
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 64
Book Description
Embarking on an ambitious, perhaps unachievable, reform of rail franchising, in haste, on the UK's most complex piece of railway was irresponsible. Many of the problems with the franchise competition, detailed in the Laidlaw report, reflect very badly on civil servants at the DfT. However, ministers approved a complex - perhaps unworkable - franchising policy at the same time as overseeing major cuts to the Department's resources. This was a recipe for failure which the DfT must learn from urgently. While the Department has already published a response to the Laidlaw report which Mr Laidlaw described as 'very encouraging', and has initiated a review of franchise MPs warn that a number of matters remain to be adequately resolved. The Committee calls on the Secretary of State and the Department for Transport to: explain why ministers and senior officials were misled about how subordinated loan facilities were calculated, if necessary after disciplinary proceedings against staff have concluded; complete a full email capture and get to the bottom of whether or not any officials manipulated the outcome of the competition to ensure First Group were awarded the contracts; provide a comprehensive breakdown of costs arising from the cancellation of the West Coast Mainline franchise competition. The Committee also wants to establish what lessons current and future ministers must learn from this episode
Cancellation of the InterCity West Coast Franchise Competition
Author: Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Transport Committee
Publisher: The Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780215053190
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 64
Book Description
Embarking on an ambitious, perhaps unachievable, reform of rail franchising, in haste, on the UK's most complex piece of railway was irresponsible. Many of the problems with the franchise competition, detailed in the Laidlaw report, reflect very badly on civil servants at the DfT. However, ministers approved a complex - perhaps unworkable - franchising policy at the same time as overseeing major cuts to the Department's resources. This was a recipe for failure which the DfT must learn from urgently. While the Department has already published a response to the Laidlaw report which Mr Laidlaw described as 'very encouraging', and has initiated a review of franchise MPs warn that a number of matters remain to be adequately resolved. The Committee calls on the Secretary of State and the Department for Transport to: explain why ministers and senior officials were misled about how subordinated loan facilities were calculated, if necessary after disciplinary proceedings against staff have concluded; complete a full email capture and get to the bottom of whether or not any officials manipulated the outcome of the competition to ensure First Group were awarded the contracts; provide a comprehensive breakdown of costs arising from the cancellation of the West Coast Mainline franchise competition. The Committee also wants to establish what lessons current and future ministers must learn from this episode
Publisher: The Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780215053190
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 64
Book Description
Embarking on an ambitious, perhaps unachievable, reform of rail franchising, in haste, on the UK's most complex piece of railway was irresponsible. Many of the problems with the franchise competition, detailed in the Laidlaw report, reflect very badly on civil servants at the DfT. However, ministers approved a complex - perhaps unworkable - franchising policy at the same time as overseeing major cuts to the Department's resources. This was a recipe for failure which the DfT must learn from urgently. While the Department has already published a response to the Laidlaw report which Mr Laidlaw described as 'very encouraging', and has initiated a review of franchise MPs warn that a number of matters remain to be adequately resolved. The Committee calls on the Secretary of State and the Department for Transport to: explain why ministers and senior officials were misled about how subordinated loan facilities were calculated, if necessary after disciplinary proceedings against staff have concluded; complete a full email capture and get to the bottom of whether or not any officials manipulated the outcome of the competition to ensure First Group were awarded the contracts; provide a comprehensive breakdown of costs arising from the cancellation of the West Coast Mainline franchise competition. The Committee also wants to establish what lessons current and future ministers must learn from this episode
Lessons from Cancelling the InterCity West Coast Franchise Competition
Author: Great Britain: National Audit Office
Publisher: The Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780102980523
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 52
Book Description
The Department for Transport competition to let the Intercity West Coast franchise lacked management oversight and the governance of the project was confused, according to the National Audit Office. The full cost to the taxpayer is unknown but likely to be significant, with at least £1.9 million in staff and adviser costs, £2.7 million in legal costs and £4.3 million on external advisers for the reviews that it has commissioned. The refranchising process was a major endeavour, with considerable complexity and uncertainty. The objectives of the Department for Transport were insufficiently clear during the franchise competition. The Department delayed the issuing of the invitation to tender by eight months because it had not finalized how it would implement recent policy changes. There was also confusion among Department staff about some aspects of the process. The subordinated loan facility was a particular area of confusion. A subordinated loan is capital provided by the parent company which guarantees franchise payments will be made to the Department should the franchisee get less passenger revenue than expected. However, there were significant errors in the tool the Department used to calculate how big a loan it would require bidders to have. The competition lacked strong project management and there was no clear route for the project team to get approval for major issues. No one person oversaw the whole process or could see patterns of emerging problems.
Publisher: The Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780102980523
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 52
Book Description
The Department for Transport competition to let the Intercity West Coast franchise lacked management oversight and the governance of the project was confused, according to the National Audit Office. The full cost to the taxpayer is unknown but likely to be significant, with at least £1.9 million in staff and adviser costs, £2.7 million in legal costs and £4.3 million on external advisers for the reviews that it has commissioned. The refranchising process was a major endeavour, with considerable complexity and uncertainty. The objectives of the Department for Transport were insufficiently clear during the franchise competition. The Department delayed the issuing of the invitation to tender by eight months because it had not finalized how it would implement recent policy changes. There was also confusion among Department staff about some aspects of the process. The subordinated loan facility was a particular area of confusion. A subordinated loan is capital provided by the parent company which guarantees franchise payments will be made to the Department should the franchisee get less passenger revenue than expected. However, there were significant errors in the tool the Department used to calculate how big a loan it would require bidders to have. The competition lacked strong project management and there was no clear route for the project team to get approval for major issues. No one person oversaw the whole process or could see patterns of emerging problems.
Conundrum
Author: Richard Bacon
Publisher: Biteback Publishing
ISBN: 1849546169
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 244
Book Description
Government failure is affecting everyone. The single mum worried sick by a tax credit demand from HMRC to 'repay' thousands of pounds she never received; the family whose holiday was ruined because the Passport Office couldn't issue passports in time; the school that couldn't open at the start of term because CRB checks were being carried out by an organisation in meltdown; the farmers led to bankruptcy and even suicide by a Kafkaesque system for administering farm payments; and rail operators facing an uncertain future because the Department for Transport inadvertently landed the whole rail franchising system in chaos. Why is government getting it so wrong? Richard Bacon and Christopher Hope delve into the astonishing world of cock-ups and catastrophes and ponder why those at the top continue to fall short.
Publisher: Biteback Publishing
ISBN: 1849546169
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 244
Book Description
Government failure is affecting everyone. The single mum worried sick by a tax credit demand from HMRC to 'repay' thousands of pounds she never received; the family whose holiday was ruined because the Passport Office couldn't issue passports in time; the school that couldn't open at the start of term because CRB checks were being carried out by an organisation in meltdown; the farmers led to bankruptcy and even suicide by a Kafkaesque system for administering farm payments; and rail operators facing an uncertain future because the Department for Transport inadvertently landed the whole rail franchising system in chaos. Why is government getting it so wrong? Richard Bacon and Christopher Hope delve into the astonishing world of cock-ups and catastrophes and ponder why those at the top continue to fall short.
HC 600 - Reform of the Rail Franchising Programme
Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Committee of Public Accounts
Publisher: The Stationery Office
ISBN: 0215091353
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 21
Book Description
The last time we discussed rail franchising was in 2012, in the wake of the collapsed competition for the InterCity West Coast franchise. We are encouraged that, since then, the Department for Transport has strengthened its capability to let franchises, but there are still gaps in its ability to then manage the contracts effectively. The Department's increased focus on the passenger experience is also welcome, but it is unclear when passengers themselves will actually see the benefits. Furthermore, the Department has not yet developed the partnerships with operators that are required to support innovation, improve efficiency and improve services for passengers. Successful rail franchising depends on strong interest from the market and effective competition but there are barriers to entry to the UK market and the possibility that current participants in the market may drop out. Any reduction to the current level of competition is a major risk to securing value for money for the taxpayer. Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the Department is to manage the complex interdependencies between passenger rail franchises, the infrastructure that train services run on and the introduction of new fleets of trains to the network. Uncertainty about infrastructure work has resulted in delays to franchise competitions and the Department will have to rely on potentially expensive changes to franchises during the life of contracts. The Department's role is to provide a strategic lead for the complex rail system but it has not yet shown that it has embraced this role. It needs to provide a coherent strategic vision and stronger leadership to ensure that the investment decisions it makes now do not result in increased costs in the long term.
Publisher: The Stationery Office
ISBN: 0215091353
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 21
Book Description
The last time we discussed rail franchising was in 2012, in the wake of the collapsed competition for the InterCity West Coast franchise. We are encouraged that, since then, the Department for Transport has strengthened its capability to let franchises, but there are still gaps in its ability to then manage the contracts effectively. The Department's increased focus on the passenger experience is also welcome, but it is unclear when passengers themselves will actually see the benefits. Furthermore, the Department has not yet developed the partnerships with operators that are required to support innovation, improve efficiency and improve services for passengers. Successful rail franchising depends on strong interest from the market and effective competition but there are barriers to entry to the UK market and the possibility that current participants in the market may drop out. Any reduction to the current level of competition is a major risk to securing value for money for the taxpayer. Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the Department is to manage the complex interdependencies between passenger rail franchises, the infrastructure that train services run on and the introduction of new fleets of trains to the network. Uncertainty about infrastructure work has resulted in delays to franchise competitions and the Department will have to rely on potentially expensive changes to franchises during the life of contracts. The Department's role is to provide a strategic lead for the complex rail system but it has not yet shown that it has embraced this role. It needs to provide a coherent strategic vision and stronger leadership to ensure that the investment decisions it makes now do not result in increased costs in the long term.
Government Response to the Brown Review of the Rail Franchising Programme
Author: Great Britain: Department for Transport
Publisher: IDRC
ISBN: 9780101867825
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Dated July 2013. The Brown review published as Cm. 8526 (February 2013, ISBN 9780101852623)
Publisher: IDRC
ISBN: 9780101867825
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Dated July 2013. The Brown review published as Cm. 8526 (February 2013, ISBN 9780101852623)
High Speed 2
Author: Great Britain: National Audit Office
Publisher: Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780102981421
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Book Description
In this early examination of progress by the Department for Transport in planning for the High Speed 2 rail network, the National Audit Office expresses reservations about the Department's business case. The Department has poorly articulated the strategic need for a transformation in rail capacity and how High Speed 2 will help generate regional economic growth. The Department's methodology for appraising the project puts a high emphasis on journey-time savings, but the relationship between these savings and the strategic reasons for doing the project, such as rebalancing regional economies, is unclear. The benefit-cost ratio calculated for phase one has twice contained errors and the Department has been slow to carry out its own assurance of the underlying analysis. The most recent benefit-cost ratio (published in August 2012) is 1.4 to 1 but is likely to change as the ratio is sensitive to changes in data underpinning assumptions, such as GDP growth forecasts. It does not, however, reflect the Department's current assumption on the relationship between passenger numbers and GDP growth. The Department should also carry out research into how business travellers use their time on trains. HS2 Limited has also not yet analysed the effect on passenger demand, revenues and the benefit-cost ratio of charging passengers premium prices. The NAO estimates that there is a £3.3 billion funding gap over four years (2017-18 to 2020-21) which the government has yet to decide how to fill.
Publisher: Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780102981421
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Book Description
In this early examination of progress by the Department for Transport in planning for the High Speed 2 rail network, the National Audit Office expresses reservations about the Department's business case. The Department has poorly articulated the strategic need for a transformation in rail capacity and how High Speed 2 will help generate regional economic growth. The Department's methodology for appraising the project puts a high emphasis on journey-time savings, but the relationship between these savings and the strategic reasons for doing the project, such as rebalancing regional economies, is unclear. The benefit-cost ratio calculated for phase one has twice contained errors and the Department has been slow to carry out its own assurance of the underlying analysis. The most recent benefit-cost ratio (published in August 2012) is 1.4 to 1 but is likely to change as the ratio is sensitive to changes in data underpinning assumptions, such as GDP growth forecasts. It does not, however, reflect the Department's current assumption on the relationship between passenger numbers and GDP growth. The Department should also carry out research into how business travellers use their time on trains. HS2 Limited has also not yet analysed the effect on passenger demand, revenues and the benefit-cost ratio of charging passengers premium prices. The NAO estimates that there is a £3.3 billion funding gap over four years (2017-18 to 2020-21) which the government has yet to decide how to fill.
Progress in the Thameslink programme
Author: Great Britain: National Audit Office
Publisher: Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780102983739
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Book Description
The Department for Transport has done well so far to contain the infrastructure costs for the Thameslink Programme within the original budget. Phase one of the Programme cost £1.704 billion, was completed on time and was £143 million under budget. However, delays of more than three years in agreeing the contract to buy new trains mean that delivering value for money from the Programme as a whole is at greater risk than the National Audit Office would have expected at this stage. There continues to be a robust transport case for the £3.552 billion (at 2006 prices) Programme. Thameslink services have consistently been among the most crowded London routes with passengers amongst the least satisfied with space on trains; and demand is forecast to increase. The Department estimates that the Programme will make net present benefits of £2.9 billion through reduced journey times, reduced overcrowding on trains and quicker interchanges between services. The Department needs to manage a complex interaction between completing the infrastructure project; buying new trains; and letting a new franchise. Delays to any of these projects can delay significantly or complicate delivery of other parts of the Programme. The award of the estimated £1.6 billion contract to buy new trains is currently delayed by over three years and this has implications for the rest of the programme. And until the contract is let it will not be clear whether delivery of the whole Programme by 2018 is still feasible.
Publisher: Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780102983739
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Book Description
The Department for Transport has done well so far to contain the infrastructure costs for the Thameslink Programme within the original budget. Phase one of the Programme cost £1.704 billion, was completed on time and was £143 million under budget. However, delays of more than three years in agreeing the contract to buy new trains mean that delivering value for money from the Programme as a whole is at greater risk than the National Audit Office would have expected at this stage. There continues to be a robust transport case for the £3.552 billion (at 2006 prices) Programme. Thameslink services have consistently been among the most crowded London routes with passengers amongst the least satisfied with space on trains; and demand is forecast to increase. The Department estimates that the Programme will make net present benefits of £2.9 billion through reduced journey times, reduced overcrowding on trains and quicker interchanges between services. The Department needs to manage a complex interaction between completing the infrastructure project; buying new trains; and letting a new franchise. Delays to any of these projects can delay significantly or complicate delivery of other parts of the Programme. The award of the estimated £1.6 billion contract to buy new trains is currently delayed by over three years and this has implications for the rest of the programme. And until the contract is let it will not be clear whether delivery of the whole Programme by 2018 is still feasible.
Department for Transport
Author: Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Committee of Public Accounts
Publisher: The Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780215054395
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
The Department for Transport's complete lack of common sense in the way it ran the West Coast franchise competition has landed the taxpayer with a bill of £50 million at the very least. If you factor in the cost of delays to investment on the line, and the potential knock-on effect on other franchise competitions, then the final cost to the taxpayer will be very much larger. The Department made fundamental errors in calculating the level of risk capital it would require bidders to put on the table and it did not demand appropriate levels of capital from both bidders. Faced with the possibility of legal challenge, it cancelled the competition. The Department failed to learn from mistakes made in previous projects. Recommendations made in the Committee's report 'The failure of Metronet' (HC 390, session 2009-10, ISBN 9780215544216) to prevent a lack of oversight and information were clearly not applied in this competition. Cuts in staffing and in consultancy budgets contributed to a lack of key skills. There was no single person responsible from beginning to end and, therefore, no one who had to live with the consequences of bad policy decisions. For three months, there was no single person in charge at all. Not only that, there was no senior civil servant in the team responsible for the work, despite the critical importance of this multi-billion pound franchise. Given that the Department got it so wrong over this competition, there is concern over how properly it will handle future projects, including HS2 and Thameslink
Publisher: The Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780215054395
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
The Department for Transport's complete lack of common sense in the way it ran the West Coast franchise competition has landed the taxpayer with a bill of £50 million at the very least. If you factor in the cost of delays to investment on the line, and the potential knock-on effect on other franchise competitions, then the final cost to the taxpayer will be very much larger. The Department made fundamental errors in calculating the level of risk capital it would require bidders to put on the table and it did not demand appropriate levels of capital from both bidders. Faced with the possibility of legal challenge, it cancelled the competition. The Department failed to learn from mistakes made in previous projects. Recommendations made in the Committee's report 'The failure of Metronet' (HC 390, session 2009-10, ISBN 9780215544216) to prevent a lack of oversight and information were clearly not applied in this competition. Cuts in staffing and in consultancy budgets contributed to a lack of key skills. There was no single person responsible from beginning to end and, therefore, no one who had to live with the consequences of bad policy decisions. For three months, there was no single person in charge at all. Not only that, there was no senior civil servant in the team responsible for the work, despite the critical importance of this multi-billion pound franchise. Given that the Department got it so wrong over this competition, there is concern over how properly it will handle future projects, including HS2 and Thameslink
Memorandum on the 2012 Civil Service Reform Plan
Author: Great Britain: National Audit Office
Publisher: The Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780102980639
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Book Description
The government published its Civil Service Reform Plan (the Plan) in June 2012 (www.civilservice.gov.uk/reform). It followed the publication of the 2011 Open Public Services White Paper (Cm.8145, ISBN 9780101814522) which called for a smaller, more strategic civil service that does less centrally, and commissions more from outside. The Plan has many themes in common with previous initiatives that attempted to reform the civil service, and adapt it to the changing needs of governments and public service users, but is arguably the broadest such reform programme since 1968. This Memorandum is intended primarily to inform the Committee's discussions with the leadership of the civil service about the Plan. Given that the Plan is less than a year old, it is not an evaluation of the reforms in the Plan, the progress made against them, or the implementation arrangements in place. It is designed to support the Committee to engage with the breadth of the Plan, so that they can use their influence to help ensure that its implementation improves efficiency, reinforces Parliamentary accountability and protects value for taxpayers and citizens. The Civil Service, in its present form as of 2012, employs 459,000 people across 106 departments and other bodies. The annual spend on Civil Service pay is £16 billion. The projected cost reduction for the Civil Service, between 2010 to 2015 is £80 billion and the projected reduction in the number of full-time equivalent civil servants over the same period is 110,000 representing about 23% of total staff.
Publisher: The Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780102980639
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Book Description
The government published its Civil Service Reform Plan (the Plan) in June 2012 (www.civilservice.gov.uk/reform). It followed the publication of the 2011 Open Public Services White Paper (Cm.8145, ISBN 9780101814522) which called for a smaller, more strategic civil service that does less centrally, and commissions more from outside. The Plan has many themes in common with previous initiatives that attempted to reform the civil service, and adapt it to the changing needs of governments and public service users, but is arguably the broadest such reform programme since 1968. This Memorandum is intended primarily to inform the Committee's discussions with the leadership of the civil service about the Plan. Given that the Plan is less than a year old, it is not an evaluation of the reforms in the Plan, the progress made against them, or the implementation arrangements in place. It is designed to support the Committee to engage with the breadth of the Plan, so that they can use their influence to help ensure that its implementation improves efficiency, reinforces Parliamentary accountability and protects value for taxpayers and citizens. The Civil Service, in its present form as of 2012, employs 459,000 people across 106 departments and other bodies. The annual spend on Civil Service pay is £16 billion. The projected cost reduction for the Civil Service, between 2010 to 2015 is £80 billion and the projected reduction in the number of full-time equivalent civil servants over the same period is 110,000 representing about 23% of total staff.
The European Commission's 4th Railway Package
Author: Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Transport Committee
Publisher: The Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780215056962
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 64
Book Description
The Transport Committee broadly welcomes the European Commission's 4th Railway Package but believes it focuses too much on liberalising the railway in domestic markets at the expense of important measures to improve cross-border freight and passenger services. The Committee recommends the UK Government should actively negotiate to ensure: joint working between Network Rail and train operators is not prohibited or unduly restricted; metro and light rail systems are not affected by the proposals to separate infrastructure and service operators; the UK's arrangements for letting train franchises are not challenged. In addition, MPs are concerned about: governance arrangements for Eurotunnel; the maximum annual threshold proposed for rail franchises, which could prevent UK companies bidding for work in other EU countries; and the possibility that the EU may become responsible for specifying the content of public transport plans: these should remain the responsibility of national or local governments.
Publisher: The Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780215056962
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 64
Book Description
The Transport Committee broadly welcomes the European Commission's 4th Railway Package but believes it focuses too much on liberalising the railway in domestic markets at the expense of important measures to improve cross-border freight and passenger services. The Committee recommends the UK Government should actively negotiate to ensure: joint working between Network Rail and train operators is not prohibited or unduly restricted; metro and light rail systems are not affected by the proposals to separate infrastructure and service operators; the UK's arrangements for letting train franchises are not challenged. In addition, MPs are concerned about: governance arrangements for Eurotunnel; the maximum annual threshold proposed for rail franchises, which could prevent UK companies bidding for work in other EU countries; and the possibility that the EU may become responsible for specifying the content of public transport plans: these should remain the responsibility of national or local governments.