Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Bayesian Rationality PDF full book. Access full book title Bayesian Rationality by Mike Oaksford. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Mike Oaksford Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0198524498 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 342
Book Description
For almost 2,500 years, the Western concept of what is to be human has been dominated by the idea that the mind is the seat of reason - humans are, almost by definition, the rational animal. In this text a more radical suggestion for explaining these puzzling aspects of human reasoning is put forward.
Author: Mike Oaksford Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0198524498 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 342
Book Description
For almost 2,500 years, the Western concept of what is to be human has been dominated by the idea that the mind is the seat of reason - humans are, almost by definition, the rational animal. In this text a more radical suggestion for explaining these puzzling aspects of human reasoning is put forward.
Author: Jan Sprenger Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0191652229 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 384
Book Description
How should we reason in science? Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartmann offer a refreshing take on classical topics in philosophy of science, using a single key concept to explain and to elucidate manifold aspects of scientific reasoning. They present good arguments and good inferences as being characterized by their effect on our rational degrees of belief. Refuting the view that there is no place for subjective attitudes in 'objective science', Sprenger and Hartmann explain the value of convincing evidence in terms of a cycle of variations on the theme of representing rational degrees of belief by means of subjective probabilities (and changing them by Bayesian conditionalization). In doing so, they integrate Bayesian inference—the leading theory of rationality in social science—with the practice of 21st century science. Bayesian Philosophy of Science thereby shows how modeling such attitudes improves our understanding of causes, explanations, confirming evidence, and scientific models in general. It combines a scientifically minded and mathematically sophisticated approach with conceptual analysis and attention to methodological problems of modern science, especially in statistical inference, and is therefore a valuable resource for philosophers and scientific practitioners.
Author: Simon M. Huttegger Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 1108509150 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 239
Book Description
According to Bayesian epistemology, rational learning from experience is consistent learning, that is learning should incorporate new information consistently into one's old system of beliefs. Simon M. Huttegger argues that this core idea can be transferred to situations where the learner's informational inputs are much more limited than Bayesianism assumes, thereby significantly expanding the reach of a Bayesian type of epistemology. What results from this is a unified account of probabilistic learning in the tradition of Richard Jeffrey's 'radical probabilism'. Along the way, Huttegger addresses a number of debates in epistemology and the philosophy of science, including the status of prior probabilities, whether Bayes' rule is the only legitimate form of learning from experience, and whether rational agents can have sustained disagreements. His book will be of interest to students and scholars of epistemology, of game and decision theory, and of cognitive, economic, and computer sciences.
Author: Markus Knauff Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 0262045079 Category : Psychology Languages : en Pages : 879
Book Description
The first reference on rationality that integrates accounts from psychology and philosophy, covering descriptive and normative theories from both disciplines. Both analytic philosophy and cognitive psychology have made dramatic advances in understanding rationality, but there has been little interaction between the disciplines. This volume offers the first integrated overview of the state of the art in the psychology and philosophy of rationality. Written by leading experts from both disciplines, The Handbook of Rationality covers the main normative and descriptive theories of rationality—how people ought to think, how they actually think, and why we often deviate from what we can call rational. It also offers insights from other fields such as artificial intelligence, economics, the social sciences, and cognitive neuroscience. The Handbook proposes a novel classification system for researchers in human rationality, and it creates new connections between rationality research in philosophy, psychology, and other disciplines. Following the basic distinction between theoretical and practical rationality, the book first considers the theoretical side, including normative and descriptive theories of logical, probabilistic, causal, and defeasible reasoning. It then turns to the practical side, discussing topics such as decision making, bounded rationality, game theory, deontic and legal reasoning, and the relation between rationality and morality. Finally, it covers topics that arise in both theoretical and practical rationality, including visual and spatial thinking, scientific rationality, how children learn to reason rationally, and the connection between intelligence and rationality.
Author: George G. Woodworth Publisher: Wiley-Interscience ISBN: Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 392
Book Description
An essential introductory text linking traditional biostatistics with bayesian methods In recent years, Bayesian methods have seen an explosion of interest, with applications in fields including biochemistry, ecology, medicine, oncology, pharmacology, and public health. As an interpretive system integrating data with observation, the Bayesian approach provides a nuanced yet mathematically rigorous means of conceptualizing biomedical statistics–from diagnostic tests to DNA evidence. Biostatistics: A Bayesian Introduction offers a pioneering approach by presenting the foundations of biostatistics through the Bayesian lens. Using easily understood, classic Dutch Book thought experiments to derive subjective probability from a simple principle of rationality, the book connects statistical science with scientific reasoning. The author shows how to compute, interpret, and report Bayesian statistical analyses in practice, and illustrates how to reinterpret traditional statistical reporting–such as confidence intervals, margins of error, and one-sided p-values–in Bayesian terms. Topics covered include: Probability and subjective probability Distributions and descriptive statistics Continuous probability distributions Comparing rates and means Linear models and statistical adjustment Logistic regression and adjusted odds ratios Survival analysis Hierarchical models and meta-analysis Decision theory and sample size determination The book includes extensive problem sets and references in each chapter, as well as complete instructions on computer analysis with the versatile SAS and WinBUGS software packages as well as the Excel spreadsheet program. For professionals and students, Biostatistics: A Bayesian Introduction offers an unique, real-world entry point into a remarkable alternative method of interpreting statistical data.
Author: Ken Binmore Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 1400833094 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 214
Book Description
It is widely held that Bayesian decision theory is the final word on how a rational person should make decisions. However, Leonard Savage--the inventor of Bayesian decision theory--argued that it would be ridiculous to use his theory outside the kind of small world in which it is always possible to "look before you leap." If taken seriously, this view makes Bayesian decision theory inappropriate for the large worlds of scientific discovery and macroeconomic enterprise. When is it correct to use Bayesian decision theory--and when does it need to be modified? Using a minimum of mathematics, Rational Decisions clearly explains the foundations of Bayesian decision theory and shows why Savage restricted the theory's application to small worlds. The book is a wide-ranging exploration of standard theories of choice and belief under risk and uncertainty. Ken Binmore discusses the various philosophical attitudes related to the nature of probability and offers resolutions to paradoxes believed to hinder further progress. In arguing that the Bayesian approach to knowledge is inadequate in a large world, Binmore proposes an extension to Bayesian decision theory--allowing the idea of a mixed strategy in game theory to be expanded to a larger set of what Binmore refers to as "muddled" strategies. Written by one of the world's leading game theorists, Rational Decisions is the touchstone for anyone needing a concise, accessible, and expert view on Bayesian decision making.
Author: Jan Sprenger Publisher: ISBN: 0199672113 Category : Bayesian statistical decision theory Languages : en Pages : 414
Book Description
How should we reason in science? Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartmann offer a refreshing take on classical topics in philosophy of science, using a single key concept to explain and to elucidate manifold aspects of scientific reasoning. They present good arguments and good inferences as beingcharacterized by their effect on our rational degrees of belief. Refuting the view that there is no place for subjective attitudes in "objective science", Sprenger and Hartmann explain the value of convincing evidence in terms of a cycle of variations on the theme of representing rational degrees ofbelief by means of subjective probabilities (and changing them by Bayesian conditionalization). In doing so, they integrate Bayesian inference - the leading theory of rationality in social science - with the practice of 21st century science.Bayesian Philosophy of Science thereby shows how modeling such attitudes improves our understanding of causes, explanations, confirming evidence, and scientific models in general. It combines a scientifically minded and mathematically sophisticated approach with conceptual analysis and attention tomethodological problems of modern science, especially in statistical inference, and is therefore a valuable resource for philosophers and scientific practitioners.
Author: Mike Oaksford Publisher: ISBN: 9780191584923 Category : Bayesian statistical decision theory Languages : en Pages : 330
Book Description
For almost 2,500 years, the Western concept of what is to be human has been dominated by the idea that the mind is the seat of reason - humans are, almost by definition, the rational animal. In this text a more radical suggestion for explaining these puzzling aspects of human reasoning is put forward.
Author: Luc Bovens Publisher: OUP Oxford ISBN: 0191533521 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 170
Book Description
Probabilistic models have much to offer to philosophy. We continually receive information from a variety of sources: from our senses, from witnesses, from scientific instruments. When considering whether we should believe this information, we assess whether the sources are independent, how reliable they are, and how plausible and coherent the information is. Bovens and Hartmann provide a systematic Bayesian account of these features of reasoning. Simple Bayesian Networks allow us to model alternative assumptions about the nature of the information sources. Measurement of the coherence of information is a controversial matter: arguably, the more coherent a set of information is, the more confident we may be that its content is true, other things being equal. The authors offer a new treatment of coherence which respects this claim and shows its relevance to scientific theory choice. Bovens and Hartmann apply this methodology to a wide range of much discussed issues regarding evidence, testimony, scientific theories, and voting. Bayesian Epistemology is an essential tool for anyone working on probabilistic methods in philosophy, and has broad implications for many other disciplines.
Author: Gorka Navarrete Publisher: Frontiers Media SA ISBN: 288919745X Category : Psychology Languages : en Pages : 209
Book Description
We confess that the first part of our title is somewhat of a misnomer. Bayesian reasoning is a normative approach to probabilistic belief revision and, as such, it is in need of no improvement. Rather, it is the typical individual whose reasoning and judgments often fall short of the Bayesian ideal who is the focus of improvement. What have we learnt from over a half-century of research and theory on this topic that could explain why people are often non-Bayesian? Can Bayesian reasoning be facilitated, and if so why? These are the questions that motivate this Frontiers in Psychology Research Topic. Bayes' theorem, named after English statistician, philosopher, and Presbyterian minister, Thomas Bayes, offers a method for updating one’s prior probability of an hypothesis H on the basis of new data D such that P(H|D) = P(D|H)P(H)/P(D). The first wave of psychological research, pioneered by Ward Edwards, revealed that people were overly conservative in updating their posterior probabilities (i.e., P(D|H)). A second wave, spearheaded by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, showed that people often ignored prior probabilities or base rates, where the priors had a frequentist interpretation, and hence were not Bayesians at all. In the 1990s, a third wave of research spurred by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby and by Gerd Gigerenzer and Ulrich Hoffrage showed that people can reason more like a Bayesian if only the information provided takes the form of (non-relativized) natural frequencies. Although Kahneman and Tversky had already noted the advantages of frequency representations, it was the third wave scholars who pushed the prescriptive agenda, arguing that there are feasible and effective methods for improving belief revision. Most scholars now agree that natural frequency representations do facilitate Bayesian reasoning. However, they do not agree on why this is so. The original third wave scholars favor an evolutionary account that posits human brain adaptation to natural frequency processing. But almost as soon as this view was proposed, other scholars challenged it, arguing that such evolutionary assumptions were not needed. The dominant opposing view has been that the benefit of natural frequencies is mainly due to the fact that such representations make the nested set relations perfectly transparent. Thus, people can more easily see what information they need to focus on and how to simply combine it. This Research Topic aims to take stock of where we are at present. Are we in a proto-fourth wave? If so, does it offer a synthesis of recent theoretical disagreements? The second part of the title orients the reader to the two main subtopics: what works and why? In terms of the first subtopic, we seek contributions that advance understanding of how to improve people’s abilities to revise their beliefs and to integrate probabilistic information effectively. The second subtopic centers on explaining why methods that improve non-Bayesian reasoning work as well as they do. In addressing that issue, we welcome both critical analyses of existing theories as well as fresh perspectives. For both subtopics, we welcome the full range of manuscript types.
Author: Mike Oaksford
Author: Mike Oaksford
Author: Jan Sprenger
Author: Simon M. Huttegger
Author: Markus Knauff
Author: George G. Woodworth
Author: Ken Binmore
Author: Jan Sprenger
Author: Mike Oaksford
Author: Luc Bovens
Author: Gorka Navarrete