Bank Capital Regulation with Random Audits PDF Download

Author: Sudipto Bhattacharya
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bank capital
Languages : en
Pages : 42

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Author: Alistair Milne
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 52

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Book Description
We analyse the incentive impact of bank capital regulation in a model with endogenous capital, assuming regulators randomly audit banks and require undercapitalised banks either to bear the fixed cost of new issue or to liquidate. Forward looking banks with sufficient franchise value maintain a buffer of capital in excess of the regulatory minimum. In our dynamic setting we show, amongst other results: that incentives for risk taking depend upon this buffer of free capital, not the total level; and that the regulatory capital requirement has no long run effect on bank risk-taking.

Author:
Publisher: Lulu.com
ISBN: 9291316695
Category : Bank capital
Languages : en
Pages : 294

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Book Description

Author: Alistair Milne
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 52

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Book Description
We analyse the incentive impact of bank capital regulation in a model with endogenous capital, assuming regulators randomly audit banks and require undercapitalised banks either to bear the fixed cost of new issue or to liquidate. Forward looking banks with sufficient franchise value maintain a buffer of capital in excess of the regulatory minimum. In our dynamic setting we show, amongst other results: that incentives for risk taking depend upon this buffer of free capital, not the total level; and that the regulatory capital requirement has no long run effect on bank risk-taking.

Author: Alistair Milne
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 43

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Book Description
This paper models bank capital management assuming illiquid assets, stochastic cash flow, and fixed costs of equity issue. Banks with sufficient franchise value (expected cash flow) maintain a buffer of capital in excess of regulatory requirements. The desired buffer is a non-monotonic function of franchise value. Incentives for risk taking depend upon this buffer not the absolute level of capital. Capital requirements have little long run effect on bank risk-taking. Negative cash flow and higher capital requirements reduce bank lending and risk-taking, with greatest impact on severely undercapitalized banks. Risk-preference and looting emerge under random audit.

Author: Jean-Charles Rochet
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400828317
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 320

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Book Description
Almost every country in the world has sophisticated systems to prevent banking crises. Yet such crises--and the massive financial and social damage they can cause--remain common throughout the world. Does deposit insurance encourage depositors and bankers to take excessive risks? Are banking regulations poorly designed? Or are banking regulators incompetent? Jean-Charles Rochet, one of the world's leading authorities on banking regulation, argues that the answer in each case is "no." In Why Are There So Many Banking Crises?, he makes the case that, although many banking crises are precipitated by financial deregulation and globalization, political interference often causes--and almost always exacerbates--banking crises. If, for example, political authorities are allowed to pressure banking regulators into bailing out banks that should be allowed to fail, then regulation will lack credibility and market discipline won't work. Only by insuring the independence of banking regulators, Rochet says, can market forces work and banking crises be prevented and minimized. In this important collection of essays, Rochet examines the causes of banking crises around the world in recent decades, focusing on the lender of last resort; prudential regulation and the management of risk; and solvency regulations. His proposals for reforms that could limit the frequency and severity of banking crises should interest a wide range of academic economists and those working for central and private banks and financial services authorities.

Author: Alistair Milne
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 44

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Book Description
Bank risk-taking and capitalisation is studied in a continuous time model with a closed form solution, assuming uncertain cash flow, random regulatory audit, and a constraint on equity issue. Capital reserves are built up towards a desired level as an insurance against the threat of liquidation. Risk-taking is a discontinuous function of the level of capital. A solution is derived for the liquidation rate in steady state and the determinants of charter value are investigated. Minimum capital standards are found to have little long-term impact on bank behaviour. Audit frequency is the principal tool for restraining moral hazard.

Author: Lawrence D. Cluff
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 0788186701
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 187

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Author: Mathias Dewatripont
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780262513869
Category : Banking law
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
The Prudential Regulation of Banks applies modern economic theory to prudential regulation of financial intermediaries. Dewatripont and Tirole tackle the key problem of providing the right incentives to management in banks by looking at how external intervention by claimholders (holders of equity or debt) affects managerial incentives and how that intervention might ideally be implemented. Their primary focus is the regulation of commercial banks and S&Ls, but many of the implications of their theory are also valid for other intermediaries such as insurance companies, pension funds, and securities funds. Observing that the main concern of the regulation of intermediaries is solvency (the relation between equity, debt, and asset riskiness), the authors provide institutional background and develop a case for regulation as performing the monitoring functions (screening, auditing, convenant writing, and intervention) that dispersed depositors are unable or unwilling to perform. They also illustrate the dangers of regulatory failure in a summary of the S&L crisis of the 1980s. Following a survey of banking theory, Dewatripont and Tirole develop their model of the capital structure of banks and show how optimal regulation can be achieved using capital adequacy requirements and external intervention when banks are violated. They explain how regulation can be designed to minimize risks of accounting manipulations and to insulate bank managers from macroeconomic shocks, which are beyond their control. Finally, they provide a detailed evaluation of the existing regulation and of potential alternatives, such as rating agencies, private deposit insurance, and large private depositors. They show that these reforms are, at best, a complement, rather than a substitute, to the existing regulation which combines capital ratios with external intervention in case of insolvency. The Prudential Regulation of Banks is part of the Walras Pareto Lectures, from the Universiy of Lausanne.

Author: Nataliya Pakhomova
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 151

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Book Description
This dissertation consists of 3 self-contained theoretical essays.Essay 1 brings into focus the problem of "manufacturing" tail risk in the banking sector. This work shows that, in order to prevent banks from engaging in tail risk, bank capital regulation should account for the internal agency problem between bank shareholders and bank top managers. It is proposed to design bank capital requirements in the form of incentive-based recapitalization mechanism which would induce bank shareholders to shape executive compensation in such a way as to prevent top managers from engaging in tail-risk.Essay 2 deals with the problem of moral hazard in bank asset management. It proposes the concept of incentive-based bank supervision aimed at preventing moral hazard at a minimum cost to the regulator. It is shown that the intensity of supervision efforts should be gradually adjusted to the bank's financial health: banks in the mild form of distress should be subject to random audits, whereas deeply distressed banks should be placed under temporary regulatory control. To prevent double moral hazard, external auditors involved in supervision should be offered the optimal incentive contract.Essay 3 examines the impact of credit rationing (debt capacity) on corporate investment in the setting with costly debt financing. It is shown that, when credit constraints are binding, the firms with intermediate levels of debt capacity will establish larger investment projects than the firms with relatively low or high debt capacity. This non-monotonicity of investment on debt capacity arises due to the effect of the lump-sum debt issuance costs in the dynamic context of investment.