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Author: Julie Wulf Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 42
Book Description
I show that performance incentives vary by decision-making authority of division managers. For division managers with broader authority, i.e., those designated as corporate officers, both the sensitivity of pay to quot;globalquot; performance measures and the relative importance of quot;globalquot; to quot;localquot; measures are larger, relative to non-officers. There is no difference in sensitivity of pay to quot;localquot; measures by officer status. These results support theories suggesting that authority over project selection combined with incentives designed to maximize firm performance, as well as induce effort for the division, are important in incentive design for division managers. Consistent with earlier findings, the evidence strongly supports one of the main predictions of the principal-agent model, that is, a negative tradeoff between risk and incentives.
Author: Julie Wulf Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 42
Book Description
I show that performance incentives vary by decision-making authority of division managers. For division managers with broader authority, i.e., those designated as corporate officers, both the sensitivity of pay to quot;globalquot; performance measures and the relative importance of quot;globalquot; to quot;localquot; measures are larger, relative to non-officers. There is no difference in sensitivity of pay to quot;localquot; measures by officer status. These results support theories suggesting that authority over project selection combined with incentives designed to maximize firm performance, as well as induce effort for the division, are important in incentive design for division managers. Consistent with earlier findings, the evidence strongly supports one of the main predictions of the principal-agent model, that is, a negative tradeoff between risk and incentives.
Author: Raj Aggarwal Publisher: ISBN: Category : Executives Languages : en Pages : 40
Book Description
Empirical research on executive compensation has focused almost exclusively on the incentives provided to chief executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution of incentives and responsibilities for other members of the top management team. An extension of the standard principal-agent model to allow for multiple signals of effort predicts that executives who have other, more precise signals of their effort than firm performance will have compensation that is less sensitive to the overall performance of the firm. We test this prediction in a comprehensive panel dataset of executives at large corporations by comparing executives with explicit divisional responsibilities to those with broad oversight authority over the firm and to CEOs. Controlling for executive fixed effects and the level of compensation, we find that CEOs have pay-performance incentives that are $5.85 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth higher than the pay-performance incentives of executives with divisional responsibility. Executives with oversight authority have pay-performance incentives that are $1.26 per thousand higher than those of executives with divisional responsibility. The aggregate pay-performance sensitivity of the top management team is quite substantial, at $30.24 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth for the median firm in our sample. Our work sheds light on the alignment of responsibility and incentives within firms and suggests that the principal-agent model provides an appropriate characterization of the internal organization of the firm.
Author: Isabell M. Welpe Publisher: Springer ISBN: 3319097857 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 493
Book Description
This book contributes to the current discussion in society, politics and higher education on innovation capacity and the financial and non-financial incentives for researchers. The expert contributions in the book deal with implementation of incentive systems at higher education institutions in order to foster innovation. On the other hand, the book also discusses the extent to which governance structures from economy can be transferred to universities and how scientific performance can be measured and evaluated. This book is essential for decision-makers in knowledge-intensive organizations and higher-educational institutions dealing with the topic of performance management.
Author: Andrew Hopkins Publisher: CRC Press ISBN: 1317062582 Category : Technology & Engineering Languages : en Pages : 155
Book Description
Financial incentives have long been used to try to influence professional values and practices. Recent events including the global financial crisis and the BP Texas City refinery disaster have been linked to such incentives, with commentators calling for a critical look at these systems given the catastrophic outcomes. Risky Rewards engages with this debate, particularly in the context of the present and potential role of incentives to manage major accident risk in hazardous industries. It examines the extent to which people respond to financial incentives, the potential for perverse consequences, and approaches that most appropriately focus attention on major hazard risk. The book is based in part on an empirical study of bonus arrangements in eleven companies operating in hazardous industries, including oil, gas, chemical and mining.
Author: Lionel Martellini Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 29
Book Description
Executive compensation packages are often valued in an inconsistent manner: while employee stock options (ESOs) are typically valued ex-ante, i.e., before uncertainties are resolved, cash bonuses are valued ex-post, i.e., by discounting the realized cash grants. Such a lack of consistency can, potentially, distort empirical results. A related, yet mostly overlooked, problem is that when ex-post valuation is used pay-performance measures cannot be well defined. Consistent use of ex-ante valuation for all components of a compensation package would simultaneously resolve both of these problems and provide a natural framework for the analysis of agency problems.In this paper, we perform ex-ante valuation of cash bonus contracts as if the executive's performance were measured by the company stock price, demonstrate how the shape of the bonus contract influences the executive's attitude toward risk, and study the pay-performance sensitivity of such contracts. We commence by demonstrating that a typical executive bonus contract with a linear incentive zone has a payoff structure equivalent to a portfolio of standard and binary European call options so that the ex-ante contract value is given by the linear combination of Black and Scholes call and binary call prices, with the strike prices at the boundary points of the incentive zone. Assuming that a risk neutral executive can choose the level of stock price volatility by selecting a set of projects at origination, we show that bonus contract terms can dramatically affect the executive's risk taking behavior and pay-performance incentives. Our results are extended to bonus contracts with non-linear incentive zones, and performance share contracts with vesting risk. Several testable predictions are made, and venues of future research outlined.
Author: Richard N Ericson Publisher: John Wiley & Sons ISBN: 0470616121 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 336
Book Description
Make the most of the new standards Every year companies spend millions of dollars on executive incentives. All too often, however, these programs provide a very weak link between pay and performance, with executives potentially rewarded as much for bad decisions as they are for good ones. Packed with examples, The New Standards insightfully discusses: How to link pay with business results that create long-term value Why incentive structures can discourage management from reasonable risk-taking, in some cases, and can enocourage imprudent risks in others The full range of inputs that should guide proper incentive policy Why performance measures must reflect both the quality and quantity of earnings Risk, executive behavior, and the cost of capital How to use valuation criteria when choosing metrics The pros and cons of common approaches to stock-based incentive pay Written by noted compensation expert Richard Ericson, this innovative book is a must-read for directors and management concerned with executive compensation design or financial performance measurement and forecasting. Get the guidance and concrete solutions you need to thoroughly reexamine your executive compensation policies and practices with the principles and financial maxims found in The New Standards.
Author: Mercer, LLC Publisher: John Wiley & Sons ISBN: 047047811X Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 288
Book Description
The numerous incentive approaches and combinations and their implications can be dizzying even to the compensation professional. Pay for Results provides a road map for developing and implementing executive incentives that drive business needs and strategy. It is filled with specific analytic tools, including tables, exhibits, forms, checklists. In addition, it uncovers myths in performance measurement strategy and design. Timely and thorough, this book expertly shows businesses how to drive their specific needs and strategy. Human resources and compensation officers will discover how to apply performance metrics that align with shareholder investment.
Author: Michael I.C. Nwogugu Publisher: Springer Nature ISBN: 1137447044 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 849
Book Description
Most research about financial stability and sustainable growth focuses on the financial sector and macroeconomics and neglects the real sector, microeconomics and psychology issues. Real-sector and financial-sectors linkages are increasing and are a foundation of economic/social/environmental/urban sustainability, given financial crises, noise, internet, “transition economics”, disintermediation, demographics and inequality around the world. Within complex systems theory framework, this book analyses some multi-sided mechanisms and risk-perception that can have symbiotic relationships with financial stability, systemic risk and/or sustainable growth. Within the context of Regret Minimization, MN-Transferable Utility and WTAL, new theories-of-the-firm are developed that consider sustainable growth, price stability, globalization, financial stability and birth-to-death evolutions of firms. This book introduces new behaviour theories pertaining to real estate and intangibles, which can affect the evolutions of risk-taking and risk perception within organizations and investment entities. The chapters address elements of the dilemma of often divergent risk perceptions of, and risk-taking by corporate executives, regulators and investment managers.
Author: Julie Wulf
Author: Julie Wulf
Author: Raj Aggarwal
Author: Isabell M. Welpe
Author: Andrew Hopkins
Author: Elif Şişli-Ciamarra
Author: Lionel Martellini
Author: Matthew C. Bloom
Author: Richard N Ericson
Author: Mercer, LLC
Author: Michael I.C. Nwogugu