Are Managers Strategic in Reporting Non-Earnings News? Evidence on Timing and News Bundling PDF Download

Author: Benjamin Segal
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 51

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Book Description
Using a comprehensive sample of non-earnings 8-K filings from 2005-2013, we examine whether firms engage in strategic reporting of mandatory and voluntary news. In particular, we examine whether firms report negative news when investor attention is low, and whether firms bundle positive and negative news. Our findings support the notion that managers believe in the existence of investor inattention and engage in strategic disclosure by reporting negative news after trading hours. These results particularly apply to public firms, where equity market pressures provide stronger incentives to mitigate market reaction to news by exploiting investor inattention. Further analysis of the market reaction to strategic disclosure uncovers no evidence of investor inattention, consistent with market efficiency. We also observe that public firms are more likely to engage in strategic disclosure through news bundling and that the likelihood of strategic disclosure through bundling increases with the likelihood of strategic disclosure through timing.

Author: Peter Fagan
Publisher: CRC Press
ISBN: 1003845444
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 206

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Book Description
This book examines the cybersecurity phenomenon, looking at the folklore, the hype, and the behaviour of its practitioners. A central theme is that the management of cybersecurity needs to be owned by the people running the organisation, rather than by the cybersecurity team, who frequently don’t have management as a core skill. In order to effect that change, managers need to have the background and detail to challenge what they are being told, enabling them to engage in a way that will result in more appropriate outcomes for the business. This book provides that background and detail. It debunks a number of cyber-myths, and calls out basic errors in the accepted thinking on cyber. The content is strongly rooted in available research and presented in an accessible manner, with a number of business-related case studies. Each chapter in the book takes a theme such as end-user behaviours and compares the available evidence with what the industry would like to have its customers believe. The conclusion is that there is definitely a problem, and we certainly need cyber defences. Just not the ones the industry is currently selling.

Author: Jeffrey T. Doyle
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 44

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Book Description
Beginning with Patell and Wolfson (1982), several papers have documented that earnings announcements made after the market closes and/or on Fridays tend to contain worse earnings news than those made at other times. One hypothesis is that opportunistic managers release earnings at these times of decreased media attention to quot;hidequot; their bad news and reduce the associated market penalty. Using firm-level tests that focus on only those firms that switch their disclosure timing (rather than consistently report at the same time), we find no evidence that managers opportunistically report worse news after the market closes or on Fridays. We then explore other determinants of the timing decision, including the more benign hypothesis that managers with worse earnings news release earnings after the market closes to more broadly disseminate the information. Consistent with desiring more time for the market to assimilate the announcement, we find some evidence that more complex firms tend to announce earnings after the market closes. We also find that these announcements are associated with greater abnormal volume, possibly indicating a successful dissemination strategy. We also find that the corporate headquarters location, the size of the firm, the number of analysts covering the firm, and industry membership are all significant explanatory variables for the timing decision. Overall, our findings are consistent with efficient capital markets that are effective at monitoring new information, regardless of the time of the announcement.

Author: Roni Michaely
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 51

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Book Description
Using combinations of weekdays and times of day (before, during, and after trading hours) of earnings announcements, we examine whether managers attempt to strategically time these announcements. We document that the worst earnings news is announced on Friday evening and find robust evidence that only Friday evening announcements represent managers' rational opportunistic behavior. Friday evening announcements are followed by insider trading in the direction of earnings news and the largest post-earnings announcement drift. Managers also attempt to reduce interaction with investors and hide more than just earnings news by announcing on Friday evening. We find that Friday evening announcements occur later in the evening than announcements on other evenings, firms have a reduced propensity to hold conference calls, and major firm restructuring events are relatively more likely to occur after Friday evening announcements.

Author: Jeffrey T. Doyle
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 41

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Book Description
In this study, we examine the strategic intraday and intraweek timing of management forecast announcements based on whether they contain good or bad news. In contrast to past research using highly visible earnings announcements, unscheduled voluntary management forecasts provide a setting in which there may be greater benefits to strategic announcement timing. We find strong evidence that bad news tends to be strategically released after the market closes and on Fridays. In addition, we find evidence that strategically timed bad news forecast announcements that are released after the market closes are associated with less negative market returns, less trading volume, and less market volatility. Thus, our results suggest that the strategic timing of bad news forecasts during times of lower investor attention is successful at mitigating negative market reactions.

Author: Xiaoli Tian
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 64

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Book Description
Over the last decade, the SEC has taken a number of steps to move towards a real-time reporting regime in an effort to deter strategic accumulation of news disclosures by management. However, evidence from theoretical literature suggests managers are still able to engage in strategic bunching of within-firm disclosures under a real-time reporting regime if managers have control over the timing of news-triggering events. To test whether real-time reporting deters strategic disclosures I examine managers' disclosure behavior for both regular poison pill adoptions and in-play pill adoptions because managers can time the regular poison pill adoptions but have limited ability to do so for in-play pill adoptions. My results indicate real-time reporting does not (does) deter disclosure bunching for regular poison pills (in-play pills). To the extent that disclosure bunching occurs for in-play pills under the real-time reporting regime, my findings suggest managers are more likely to time the disclosure of other news to achieve disclosure bunching. Disclosure bunching dampens the negative pricing impact of poison pill adoption disclosures and continues to do so under the real-time reporting regime.

Author: Stefano DellaVigna
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 49

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Book Description
Do firms time the release of news in response to investor inattention? We consider news about earnings and analyze the reaction of investors to announcements on Friday and on other weekdays. The day of the week for the announcement has two main effects on stock returns. First, the short-term response to Friday earnings announcements is 20 percent smaller than the response on other days of the week. Second, the post-earnings drift is 70 percent larger for Friday announcements. These stylized facts suggest that weekends distract investor attention temporarily. Consistent with this interpretation, trading volume around announcement day increases 20 percent less for Friday than for non-Friday announcements. The empirical evidence supports models of post-earning announcement drift based on underreaction to information due to cognitive constraints. We also show that firms appear to respond to investor distraction by releasing worse announcements on Friday. Friday releases are associated with a 25 percent higher probability of a negative earnings surprise and a 50 basis points lower abnormal stock return. Finally, we document a similar pattern of strategic behavior for political decisions. The US President is 25 percent less likely to sign executive orders or legislation containing good news on Friday.

Author: Suzie Noh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 39

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Book Description
This study provides evidence on firms' incentives to strategically time their earnings announcements. I propose and implement a novel approach to isolating the impact of the relative ordering of different firms' earnings announcements on market outcomes. This approach relies on quasi-exogenous variation in the relative timing of earnings announcements driven by the specific day-of-week on which a calendar month begins. I refer to the resulting variation in firms' relative timing as 'calendar rotations,' which are uncorrelated with various earnings- and market-based proxies for the news content of firms' announcements. I show firms whose earnings announcements are moved forward due to calendar rotations receive greater media coverage of earnings news, experience less preemption of earnings news, and display larger earnings response coefficient (ERC). Together, these results suggest one reason why managers accelerate good-news announcements and delay bad-news announcements is that doing so influences the extent of media exposure and the speed of stock price discovery to their advantage.

Author: Lino Cinquini
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030903559
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 477

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Book Description
The increasingly crucial role of companies’ non-financial disclosure (NFD) and integrated reporting (IR) has led to a lively debate among academics, practitioners, and regulators on the approaches, framework, contents, principles, and standards that should oversee these forms of reporting. Through several expert contributions, conducted both with qualitative and quantitative methodologies, this book provides an up-to-date portrait of the debate by exploring corporate NFD either in its mandated contents or voluntary information. Contributing authors provide studies that encompass the different lines of NFD, namely non-financial risk reporting, sustainability reporting, and intellectual capital reporting, as well as the integration of financial and non-financial information through IR, the assurance of the NFD and IR through auditing activities, and the role of management and CFOs in NFD and IR.

Author: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
Publisher: Cosimo, Inc.
ISBN: 1616405414
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 692

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Book Description
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.