An Analysis of the Proposed Surface Warfare Officer Career Incentive Pay (SWOCIP) Program Using an Annualized Cost of Living (ACOL) Model PDF Download

Author: David E. Nosal
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781423571674
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 66

View

Book Description
This thesis investigates the effect of the proposed Surface Warfare Officer Career Incentive Pay (SWOCIP) program on the voluntary separation behavior of Navy surface warfare officers using an Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model. Data provided by the Center for Naval Analyses and the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey CA, on surface warfare officers are used for this analysis. Multivariate predict models are estimated to predict the effects of the proposed SWOCIP program on the voluntary retention rate of surface warfare officers between six and ten years of service. These estimates are used to calculate the costs and benefits of the SWOCIP program. This thesis finds that the SWOCIP program would increase the voluntary retention rate by 2. 62 percent in the sixth year of service and 1.16 percent in the seventh year of service. The effect would decrease between eight and ten years of service. The calculated savings in accessions are greater then the estimated bonus cost. These calculations indicate, therefore, that the program is cost-effective.

Author: David E. Nosal
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 110

View

Book Description
Uses the annual cost of leaving (ACOL) framework to evaluate the potential effectiveness of the SWOCIP program on surface warfare officer (SWO) retention rates.

Author: Peter F. Kostiuk
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 49

View

Book Description
This report investigate the effect of pay on the retention of Marine Corps aviators. It uses a simplified version of the annualized cost of leaving (ACOL) model to estimate the impact of pay changes on the voluntary attrition of Marine aviators. The estimated pay effects are then used to evaluate the potential effect of three recent proposals to adjust the structure of Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP). The analysis found that pay does have a significant effect on aviator retention. The estimated elasticity of attrition with respect to the pay differential is -0.26.(The elasticity gives the percentage change in attrition for a 1-percent change in pay.) The three proposed changes to ACIP evaluated by CNA would eliminate ACIP for officers with over 25 years of service (YOS), 20 YOS, or 12 YOS. Table I shows the associated costs and benefits of each alternative. The benefits are reduced ACIP payments, and the cost is the expense of training replacement pilots for those who will leave the military because of the pay change. The estimates show that each proposal will actually increase total expenditures once the replacement training costs are included. The aviator's decision to stay in the Marine corps is analyzed as an occupational choice, in which an individual chooses among a set of career opportunities, selecting the career that maximizes discounted lifetime earnings. For this study of aviators, the value of continuing in a military career is compared to the potential earnings of civilian airline pilots. Data form the military pay tables and on the average salaries of civilian airline pilots are used to calculate the expected present value of earnings over different lengths of time.

Author: Brenda S. Farrell
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437988016
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 43

View

Book Description
Assesses DoD¿s use of cash incentives to recruit and retain highly qualified individuals for service in the armed forces. It: (1) identifies recent trends in DoD's use of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses; (2) assesses the extent to which the services have processes to determine which occupational specialties require bonuses and whether bonus amounts are optimally set; and (3) determines how much flexibility DoD has in managing selected special and incentive pays for officer and enlisted personnel. The report analyzed service data on bonuses and special and incentive pays, and reviewed relevant guidance and other documentation from DoD and the services. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand report.

Author: Michael D. Makee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 58

View

Book Description
Current Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) retention is well below the level needed to staff Department Head billets in the Fleet. The Navy is developing a career incentive pay to stem the flow of SWOs leaving the Navy and increase retention. The purpose of this thesis is to capture the training costs of junior Surface Warfare Officers that occur between commissioning and qualifying as a SWO. This thesis also explains the economic theory of specific training and its relevance to the wage streams offered to SWOs. This thesis estimates the training cost of qualifying a SWO to be $80,194.

Author: Michael T. Talaga
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 133

View

Book Description
This thesis analyzes the impact of the Navy's fully-funded graduate education program on Surface Warfare Officer performance. Three measures of officer performance are used: (1) probability of promotion to O-4; (2) percent of all LT FITREPs recommended for early promotion; and (3) the probability of receiving an early promotion recommendation on the last LT FITREP. Navy Officer Master Files (FY1981 through FY1990), created by Prof. William Bowman, USNA, are merged with NPRDC's Officer FITREP Files to statistically analyze performance differences between Surface Warfare Officers with and without fully-funded graduate education. Ordinary least squares and non-linear maximum likelihood techniques are used to estimate the three performance models. Since selection into the fully-funded program is not random, an attempt is made to model the selection process and to correct for the potential bias in the estimated coefficient of graduate education in the performance models. The findings reveal that fully-funded graduate education has a significant positive impact on the probability of promotion to O-4, but insignificant effects on receiving early promotion recommendations on LT FITREPs. Additionally, selectivity does not appear to bias estimates of fully-funded graduate education in the performance models.

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

View

Book Description
This thesis analyzes the impact of the Navy's fully-funded graduate education program on Surface Warfare Officer performance. Three measures of officer performance are used: (1) probability of promotion to O-4; (2) percent of all LT FITREPs recommended for early promotion; and (3) the probability of receiving an early promotion recommendation on the last LT FITREP. Navy Officer Master Files (FY1981 through FY1990), created by Prof. William Bowman, USNA, are merged with NPRDC's Officer FITREP Files to statistically analyze performance differences between Surface Warfare Officers with and without fully-funded graduate education. Ordinary least squares and non-linear maximum likelihood techniques are used to estimate the three performance models. Since selection into the fully-funded program is not random, an attempt is made to model the selection process and to correct for the potential bias in the estimated coefficient of graduate education in the performance models. The findings reveal that fully-funded graduate education has a significant positive impact on the probability of promotion to O-4, but insignificant effects on receiving early promotion recommendations on LT FITREPs. Additionally, selectivity does not appear to bias estimates of fully-funded graduate education in the performance models.

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 66

View

Book Description
This research estimated a multiperiod Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL-2) model that predicts officer career decisions as a function of economic, demographic, and Army personnel policy (e.g., military compensation) influences. The panel probit estimation yielded statistically significant pay but not unemployment effects. The research also found that fixed, unobserved preferences for military service significantly influence retention behavior. The estimation encompassed up to 13 consecutive annual decision points, with data taken from ARI's Officer Longitudinal Research Database, covering year groups 1979-1992. The retention parameter estimates were embedded in an Officer Personnel Inventory, Cost and Compensation (OPICC) Model. This PC-based prototype model was designed and developed to improve the Army's ability to effectively manage its officer force by providing policy makers with accurate information about the impact of policy changes, including promotion policy, compensation, and separation incentives. The OPICC model provides estimates of the impacts of policy and economic changes to the Officer Personnel Management Directorate inventory for a 6-year projection horizon. The prototype version does not contain a cost estimation capability. The model was validated by using it to predict actual historical behavior.