Author: Bruce A. Elleman
Publisher: M.E. Sharpe
ISBN: 9780765610508
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 252
Book Description
Using sources in Japanese, Chinese and American archives, this text reassesses Woodrow Wilson's agenda at the Paris Peace Conference. It argues Wilson did not "betray" China, but negotiated a compromise with the Japanese to ensure that China's sovereignty would be respected in Shandong Province.
Wilson and China
Author: Bruce A. Elleman
Publisher: M.E. Sharpe
ISBN: 9780765610508
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 252
Book Description
Using sources in Japanese, Chinese and American archives, this text reassesses Woodrow Wilson's agenda at the Paris Peace Conference. It argues Wilson did not "betray" China, but negotiated a compromise with the Japanese to ensure that China's sovereignty would be respected in Shandong Province.
Publisher: M.E. Sharpe
ISBN: 9780765610508
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 252
Book Description
Using sources in Japanese, Chinese and American archives, this text reassesses Woodrow Wilson's agenda at the Paris Peace Conference. It argues Wilson did not "betray" China, but negotiated a compromise with the Japanese to ensure that China's sovereignty would be respected in Shandong Province.
Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question
Author: Bruce Elleman
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317452003
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 249
Book Description
Drawing on sources in Japanese, Chinese, and American archives and libraries, this book reassesses another facet of Woodrow Wilson's agenda at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference at the end of World War I. Breaking with accepted scholarly opinions, the author argues that Wilson did not "betray" China, as many Chinese and Western scholars have charged; rather, Wilson successfully negotiated a compromise with the Japanese to ensure that China's sovereignty would be respected in Shandong Province. Rejecting the compromise, Chinese negotiators refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, creating conditions for the Soviet Union's entry into China and its later influence over the course of the Chinese revolution.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317452003
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 249
Book Description
Drawing on sources in Japanese, Chinese, and American archives and libraries, this book reassesses another facet of Woodrow Wilson's agenda at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference at the end of World War I. Breaking with accepted scholarly opinions, the author argues that Wilson did not "betray" China, as many Chinese and Western scholars have charged; rather, Wilson successfully negotiated a compromise with the Japanese to ensure that China's sovereignty would be respected in Shandong Province. Rejecting the compromise, Chinese negotiators refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, creating conditions for the Soviet Union's entry into China and its later influence over the course of the Chinese revolution.
The A B C's of the Twenty-one Demands
Author: Thomas Franklin Millard
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : China
Languages : en
Pages : 16
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : China
Languages : en
Pages : 16
Book Description
The American Review of Reviews
American Monthly Review of Reviews
The American Review of Reviews
Millard's Review of the Far East
Literary Digest: a Repository of Contemporaneous Thought and Research as Presented in the Periodical Literature of the World
Author: Edward Jewitt Wheeler
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 940
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 940
Book Description
The Literary Digest
Author: Edward Jewitt Wheeler
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Literature
Languages : en
Pages : 1498
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Literature
Languages : en
Pages : 1498
Book Description
From Mahan to Pearl Harbor
Author: Sadao Asada
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 161251295X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 402
Book Description
A major work by one of Japan’s leading naval historians, this book traces Alfred Thayer Mahan’s influence on Japan’s rise as a sea power after the publication of his classic study, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. Hailed by the British Admiralty, Theodore Roosevelt, and Kaiser Wilhelm II, the international bestseller also was endorsed by the Japanese Naval Ministry, who took it as a clarion call to enhance their own sea power. That power, of course, was eventually used against the United States. Sadao Asada opens his book with a discussion of Mahan’s sea power doctrine and demonstrates how Mahan’s ideas led the Imperial Japanese Navy to view itself as a hypothetical enemy of the Americans. Drawing on previously unused Japanese records from the three naval conferences of the 1920s—the Washington Conference of 1921-22, the Geneva Conference of 1927, and the London Conference of 1930—the author examines the strategic dilemma facing the Japanese navy during the 1920s and 1930s against the background of advancing weapon technology and increasing doubt about the relevance of battleships. He also analyzes the decisions that led to war with the United States—namely, the 1936 withdrawal from naval treaties, the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, and the armed advance into south Indochina in July 1941—in the context of bureaucratic struggles between the army and navy to gain supremacy. He concludes that the ""ghost"" of Mahan hung over the Japanese naval leaders as they prepared for war against the United State and made decisions based on miscalculations about American and Japanese strengths and American intentions.
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 161251295X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 402
Book Description
A major work by one of Japan’s leading naval historians, this book traces Alfred Thayer Mahan’s influence on Japan’s rise as a sea power after the publication of his classic study, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. Hailed by the British Admiralty, Theodore Roosevelt, and Kaiser Wilhelm II, the international bestseller also was endorsed by the Japanese Naval Ministry, who took it as a clarion call to enhance their own sea power. That power, of course, was eventually used against the United States. Sadao Asada opens his book with a discussion of Mahan’s sea power doctrine and demonstrates how Mahan’s ideas led the Imperial Japanese Navy to view itself as a hypothetical enemy of the Americans. Drawing on previously unused Japanese records from the three naval conferences of the 1920s—the Washington Conference of 1921-22, the Geneva Conference of 1927, and the London Conference of 1930—the author examines the strategic dilemma facing the Japanese navy during the 1920s and 1930s against the background of advancing weapon technology and increasing doubt about the relevance of battleships. He also analyzes the decisions that led to war with the United States—namely, the 1936 withdrawal from naval treaties, the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, and the armed advance into south Indochina in July 1941—in the context of bureaucratic struggles between the army and navy to gain supremacy. He concludes that the ""ghost"" of Mahan hung over the Japanese naval leaders as they prepared for war against the United State and made decisions based on miscalculations about American and Japanese strengths and American intentions.