A Model of Dynamic Compensation and Capital Structure PDF Download

Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download A Model of Dynamic Compensation and Capital Structure PDF full book. Access full book title A Model of Dynamic Compensation and Capital Structure by Zhiguo He. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.

A Model of Dynamic Compensation and Capital Structure

A Model of Dynamic Compensation and Capital Structure PDF Author: Zhiguo He
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40

Book Description
This paper studies the optimal compensation problem between shareholders and the agent in a general cash-flow setup, and offers a framework to quantitatively assess the impact of agency problems. Under the structural model of capital structure studied in Leland (1994), we find that the debt-overhang effect on the endogenous managerial incentives lowers the optimal leverage. Consistent with the data, our model delivers a negative relation between pay-performance sensitivity and firm size, and the interaction between debt-overhang and agency issue leads smaller firms to take less leverage relative to their larger peers. During financial distress, a firm's cash-flow becomes more sensitive to underlying performance shocks due to debt-overhang. The implications on credit spreads and debt covenants are also considered.

A Model of Dynamic Compensation and Capital Structure

A Model of Dynamic Compensation and Capital Structure PDF Author: Zhiguo He
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40

Book Description
This paper studies the optimal compensation problem between shareholders and the agent in a general cash-flow setup, and offers a framework to quantitatively assess the impact of agency problems. Under the structural model of capital structure studied in Leland (1994), we find that the debt-overhang effect on the endogenous managerial incentives lowers the optimal leverage. Consistent with the data, our model delivers a negative relation between pay-performance sensitivity and firm size, and the interaction between debt-overhang and agency issue leads smaller firms to take less leverage relative to their larger peers. During financial distress, a firm's cash-flow becomes more sensitive to underlying performance shocks due to debt-overhang. The implications on credit spreads and debt covenants are also considered.

Dynamic Compensation Contracts and Capital Structure Under Loss Aversion

Dynamic Compensation Contracts and Capital Structure Under Loss Aversion PDF Author: Keiichi Hori
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 52

Book Description
In this paper, we adapt a continuous-time agency model to incorporate the loss-aversion preferences of agents. To this end, by distinguishing between the gains in capital and income driven by variations in the agent's continuation payoff, we provide a theoretical model which overcomes the problem that the loss of utility arising from loss aversion disappears entirely with a continuous-time limit. We then show that the optimal contract includes part that is strictly positive but insensitive to the agent's continuation payoff, and part that encompasses a range of option-type payoffs. Implementing the optimal contract using a combination of equity, long-term debt, and a line of credit, we also predict that dividend payments are insensitive to changes in the firm's performance as long as its performance is moderately good. In addition, we derive some relations between dividends, the credit line balance (equity value), the limit of the credit line, and long-term debt. These results provide a unified explanation for the evolution of CEO compensation and corporate dividend-smoothing policy. The results also yield several predictions about dynamic capital structure in line with the empirical literature. In terms of robustness, the endogenous determination of the utility reference point does not greatly affect our main results.

The Impact of Asymmetric Information Between Managers and Investors on Managerial Incentives and Optimal Compensation Contracts

The Impact of Asymmetric Information Between Managers and Investors on Managerial Incentives and Optimal Compensation Contracts PDF Author: Marcel A. Priebsch
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 176

Book Description


A Dynamic Theory of Optimal Capital Structure and Executive Compensation

A Dynamic Theory of Optimal Capital Structure and Executive Compensation PDF Author: Andrew Atkeson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 42

Book Description
"We put forward a theory of the optimal capital structure of the firm based on Jensen's (1986) hypothesis that a firm's choice of capital structure is determined by a trade-off between agency costs and monitoring costs. We model this tradeoff dynamically. We assume that early on in the production process, outside investors face an informational friction with respect to withdrawing funds from the firm which dissipates over time. We assume that they also face an agency friction which increases over time with respect to funds left inside the firm. The problem of determining the optimal capital structure of the firm as well as the optimal compensation of the manager is then a problem of choosing payments to outside investors and the manager at each stage of production to balance these two frictions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Capital Structure and Firm Performance

Capital Structure and Firm Performance PDF Author: Arvin Ghosh
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 135153016X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 143

Book Description
Capital structure theory is one of the most dynamic areas of finance and forms the basis for modern thinking on the capital structure of firms. Much controversy has resulted from comparisons of the theory of capital structure originally developed by Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller to real-world situations. Two competing theories have emerged over the years, the optimal capital structure theory and the pecking order theory.Arvin Ghosh begins with an overview of the controversies regarding capital structure theories, and then statistically tests both the optimal capital structure and pecking order theories. Using the binomial approach he analyzes the determinants of capital structure while discussing the role of market power in determining capital structure decisions. Ghosh probes the questions of new stock offerings and stockholders' returns, and analyzes capital structure and executive compensation. He then looks into debt financing ownership structure, and the controversal relationship between capital structure and firm profitability. Finally, he discusses the latest developments in the field of capital structure.A concise overview of a major issue in business economics and finance, this volume provides a fuller understanding of capital structure influence on the financial performance of firms, and will certainly stimulate further debate. While hundreds of scholarly articles have been written on the subject this is the first book to test competing theories against measurements of firms' performance and their underlying capital structure.

A Dynamic Model of Optimal Capital Structure

A Dynamic Model of Optimal Capital Structure PDF Author: Sheridan Titman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Book Description
This paper presents a continuous time model of a firm that can dynamically adjust both its capital structure and its investment choices. In the model we endogenize the investment choice as well as firm value, which are both determined by an exogenous price process that describes the firm's product market. Within the context of this model we explore cross-sectional as well as time-series variation in debt ratios. We pay particular attention to interactions between financial distress costs and debtholder/equityholder agency problems and examine how the ability to dynamically adjust the debt ratio affects the deviation of actual debt ratios from their targets. Regressions estimated on simulated data generated by our model are roughly consistent with actual regressions estimated in the empirical literature.

A Dynamic Model of Corporate Capital Structure

A Dynamic Model of Corporate Capital Structure PDF Author: Stein Frydenberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 58

Book Description
In this paper I present a dynamic model for capital structure. The result of the dynamic panel data estimate is that fixed assets and the lagged-debt variables explain leverage. Conditioning the debt level on the lagged-debt level reveals that the significance of other parameters falls as compared to a static model, and can be interpreted as support for the pecking order hypothesis. I have shown that the capital structure is changing at a slow pace. The firms changes only about 15% of the debt each year. The debt ratio of low and high level debt firms changes more for each year and both low and high debt firms tend to change towards the mean. This finding indicates that the firms set a target level for their debt structure.

An Ebit-Based Model of Dynamic Capital Structure

An Ebit-Based Model of Dynamic Capital Structure PDF Author: Robert S. Goldstein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40

Book Description
Much of the literature on optimal capital structure has taken the unlevered firm value to be the underlying state variable, even though the unlevered firm ceases to exist after a capital structure change occurs. This approach has been a source of confusion, leading to conflicting views on the relationship between the levered and unlevered firm value at the moment of a capital structure change. Moreover, these frameworks imply that the role of government is to create a 'tax benefit' cash-flow into a firm, when in practice much of the cash that flows out of a firm is typically paid to government via taxes.To circumvent these difficulties, we take the claim to future EBIT as the underlying state variable, and assume that it is invariant to changes in capital structure. In such a framework, all claims to EBIT (equity, debt, government) are treated in a consistent fashion. In particular, the government claim is correctly modeled as an outflow of EBIT via taxes, rather than as an inflow of 'tax benefits'. This distinction dramatically affects the payout ratio, which in turn affects both the probability of bankruptcy and predicted yield spreads. In addition, the invariance feature of the state variable makes this framework ideal for investigating optimal dynamic capital structure strategy. When firms are permitted to increase their level of outstanding debt in the future, predicted leverage ratios are consistent with those observed.

Capital Structure and Corporate Financing Decisions

Capital Structure and Corporate Financing Decisions PDF Author: H. Kent Baker
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1118022947
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 504

Book Description
A comprehensive guide to making better capital structure and corporate financing decisions in today's dynamic business environment Given the dramatic changes that have recently occurred in the economy, the topic of capital structure and corporate financing decisions is critically important. The fact is that firms need to constantly revisit their portfolio of debt, equity, and hybrid securities to finance assets, operations, and future growth. Capital Structure and Corporate Financing Decisions provides an in-depth examination of critical capital structure topics, including discussions of basic capital structure components, key theories and practices, and practical application in an increasingly complex corporate world. Throughout, the book emphasizes how a sound capital structure simultaneously minimizes the firm's cost of capital and maximizes the value to shareholders. Offers a strategic focus that allows you to understand how financing decisions relates to a firm's overall corporate policy Consists of contributed chapters from both academics and experienced professionals, offering a variety of perspectives and a rich interplay of ideas Contains information from survey research describing actual financial practices of firms This valuable resource takes a practical approach to capital structure by discussing why various theories make sense and how firms use them to solve problems and create wealth. In the wake of the recent financial crisis, the insights found here are essential to excelling in today's volatile business environment.

A Dynamic Model of Optimal Capital Structure

A Dynamic Model of Optimal Capital Structure PDF Author: Sergey Tsyplakov
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 64

Book Description
This paper presents a continuous time model of a firm that can dynamically adjust both its capital structure and its investment choices. The model extends the dynamic capital structure literature by endogenizing the investment choice as well as firm value, which are both determined by an exogenous price process that describes the firm's product market. Within the context of this model we explore interactions between financial distress costs and debtholder/equityholder agency problems and examine how the ability to dynamically adjust the capital structure choice affects both target debt ratios and the extent to which actual debt ratios deviate from their targets. In particular, we examine how financial distress and the firm's objectives, i.e., whether it makes choices to maximize total firm value versus equity value, influence the extent to which firms make financing choices that move them towards their target debt ratios.