Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Analysis (Philosophy)
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Writings on Ludwig Wittgenstein's "On Certainty" and W.V.O. Quine's "Word and Object"
Author: Wittgenstein's On Certainty
Author: Rush RheesPublisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 0470777060
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 208
Book Description
Rush Rhees, a close friend of Wittgenstein and a major interpreter of his work, shows how Wittgenstein's On Certainty concerns logic, language, and reality – topics that occupied Wittgenstein since early in his career. Authoritative interpretation of Wittgenstein's last great work, On Certainty, by one of his closest friends. Debunks misconceptions about Wittgenstein's On Certainty and shows that it is an essay on logic. Exposes the continuity in Wittgenstein's thought, and the radical character of his conclusions. Contains a substantial and illuminating afterword discussing current scholarship surrounding On Certainty, and its relationship to Rhees's work on this subject.
Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
Author: D. Moyal-SharrockPublisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230505341
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 341
Book Description
This is the first collection of papers devoted to Ludwig Wittgenstein's cryptic but brilliant, On Certainty . This work, Wittgenstein's last, extends the thinking of his earlier, better known writings, and in so doing, makes the most important contribution to epistemology since Kant's Critique of Pure Reason - a claim the essays in this volume help to demonstrate. The essays have been grouped under four headings, reflecting current approaches to the work: the Framework, Transcendental, Epistemic, and Therapeutic readings.
Certainty
Author: Carolyn WildePublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Certainty
Languages : en
Pages : 100
Book Description
On Certainty
Author: Ludwig WittgensteinPublisher: Harper Collins
ISBN: 0061316865
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 196
Book Description
Written over the last 18 months of his life and inspired by his interest in G. E. Moore's defense of common sense, this much discussed volume collects Wittgenstein's reflections on knowledge and certainty, on what it is to know a proposition for sure.
Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty
Author: D. Moyal-SharrockPublisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230504469
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 263
Book Description
This book sheds unprecedented light on Wittgenstein's third masterpiece, On Certainty , clarifying his thoughts on basic beliefs and rebuttal of scepticism. As an introduction and commentary on Wittgenstein's final major philosophical work, Moyal-Sharrock's book will prove an indispensable guide to the student, scholar and general reader.
Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy
Author: Souren TeghrarianPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 250
Book Description
Wittgenstein's On Certainty: Insight and Method
Author: Robert Greenleaf BricePublisher:
ISBN: 9783030907822
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This book considers the important twentieth century Austrian philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and his conception of certainty. In his work entitled On Certainty, Wittgenstein provides not only a brilliant solution to a previously intractable philosophical problem, but also the elements of an entirely new way of approaching this and similar longstanding, apparently unresolvable, problems. In On Certainty, he re-conceives the problem of radical skepticism-the claim that we can never really be certain of anything except the contents of our own minds-as a kind of philosophical "disease" of thought. His approach to the problem, which is emphasized in the book, is similar to the treatment of disease, has two main goals: (1) bring about an awareness in the philosopher that this kind of extreme skepticism is not a methodological approach to be taken seriously, and, with this awareness, (2) an attempt to replace this radical skepticism with a practical, Common Sense framework. Implicit in Wittgenstein's approach are a number of strategies found in a contemporary approach to psychotherapy known as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT). These strategies, along with philosophical methods and scientific practices rooted in the Scottish School of Common Sense, seek to diagnose and treat irrational thoughts and beliefs that often emerge (and re-emerge) in the discipline of philosophy. The aim of this book, then, is to provide students of philosophy with the tools necessary to adjust and reshape these irrational, self-defeating thoughts and beliefs into something new, something healthy.
Wittgenstein and the Practice of Philosophy
Author: Michael HymersPublisher: Broadview Press
ISBN: 1460402154
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 278
Book Description
Wittgenstein and the Practice of Philosophy introduces Wittgenstein’s philosophy to senior undergraduates and graduate students. Its pedagogical premise is that the best way to understand Wittgenstein’s thought is to take seriously his methodological remarks. Its interpretive premise is that those methodological remarks are the natural result of Wittgenstein’s rejection of his early view of the ground of value, including semantic value or meaning, as something that must lie “outside the world.” This metaphysical view of meaning is replaced in his transitional writings with a kind of conventionalism, according to which meaning is made possible by the existence of grammatical conventions that are implicit in our linguistic practices. The implicit nature of these conventions makes us vulnerable to a special kind of confusion that results from lacking a clear view of the norms that underlie our linguistic practices. This special confusion is characteristic of philosophical problems, and the task of philosophy is the therapeutic one of alleviating confusion by helping us to see our grammatical norms clearly. This development of this therapeutic view of philosophy is traced from Wittgenstein’s early Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus through his transitional writings and lectures to his great masterwork, Philosophical Investigations, and his final reflections on knowledge and scepticism in On Certainty. Wittgenstein’s discussions of naming, family resemblances, rule-following and private language in Philosophical Investigations are all examined as instances of this sort of method, as is his discussion of knowledge in On Certainty. The book concludes by considering some objections to the viability of Wittgenstein’s method and speculating on how it might be extended to a discussion of moral value to which Wittgenstein never explicitly returns.
Righting Epistemology
Author: Bredo JohnsenPublisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190662786
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 321
Book Description
David Hume launched a historic revolution in epistemology when he showed that our theories about the world have no probability relative to what we think of as our evidence for them, hence that the distinction between justified and unjustified theories does not lie in their different probabilities relative to that evidence. However, allies in his revolution appeared only in the 20th century, in the persons of Sir Karl Popper, Nelson Goodman and W. V. Quine. Hume's second great contribution to the field, which remains unrecognized to this day, was to propose what is now known as reflective equilibrium theory as the framework within which justified and unjustified theories are rightly distinguished. The core of this book comprises an account of these developments from Hume to Quine, an extension of reflective equilibrium theory that renders it a general theory of epistemic justification concerning our beliefs about the world, and an argument that all four of these thinkers would have endorsed that extension. In chapters on Sextus, Descartes, Wittgenstein's On Certainty, and other aspects of Hume's epistemology I defend new readings of those philosophers' writings on skepticism and note significant relationships among their views on matters bearing on the Humean revolution. Finally, in chapters on Hilary Putnam's "Brains in a Vat" and Fred Dretske's contextualism - the only promising version of that view - I show that both fail to rule out the possible truth of radical skeptical hypotheses. This is not surprising, since those hypotheses are in fact possible. They are not, however, of any epistemological significance, since the justification of our beliefs about the world is a function of the extent to which bodies of beliefs to which they belong are in reflective equilibrium, and no extant conception of knowledge is of any epistemological interest.