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Wittgenstein's Account of Truth

Wittgenstein's Account of Truth PDF Author: Sara Ellenbogen
Publisher: State University of New York Press
ISBN: 0791487369
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 165

Book Description
Wittgenstein's Account of Truth challenges the view that semantic antirealists attribute to Wittgenstein: that we cannot meaningfully call verification-transcendent statements "true." Ellenbogen argues that Wittgenstein would not have held that we should revise our practice of treating certain statements as true or false, but instead would have held that we should revise our view of what it means to call a statement true. According to the dictum "meaning is use," what makes it correct to call a statement "true" is not its correspondence with how things are, but our criterion for determining its truth. What it means for us to call a statement "true" is that we currently judge it true, knowing that we may some day revise the criteria whereby we do so.

Wittgenstein's Account of Truth

Wittgenstein's Account of Truth PDF Author: Sara Ellenbogen
Publisher: State University of New York Press
ISBN: 0791487369
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 165

Book Description
Wittgenstein's Account of Truth challenges the view that semantic antirealists attribute to Wittgenstein: that we cannot meaningfully call verification-transcendent statements "true." Ellenbogen argues that Wittgenstein would not have held that we should revise our practice of treating certain statements as true or false, but instead would have held that we should revise our view of what it means to call a statement true. According to the dictum "meaning is use," what makes it correct to call a statement "true" is not its correspondence with how things are, but our criterion for determining its truth. What it means for us to call a statement "true" is that we currently judge it true, knowing that we may some day revise the criteria whereby we do so.

Wittgenstein's Account of Truth

Wittgenstein's Account of Truth PDF Author: Sara Ellenbogen
Publisher: SUNY Press
ISBN: 9780791456262
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 172

Book Description
Wittgenstein's Account of Truth challenges the view that semantic antirealists attribute to Wittgenstein: that we cannot meaningfully call verification-transcendent statements "true." Ellenbogen argues that Wittgenstein would not have held that we should revise our practice of treating certain statements as true or false, but instead would have held that we should revise our view of what it means to call a statement true. According to the dictum "meaning is use, " what makes it correct to call a statement "true" is not its correspondence with how things are, but our criterion for determining its truth. What it means for us to call a statement "true" is that we currently judge it true, knowing that we may some day revise the criteria whereby we do so.

Elucidating the Tractatus

Elucidating the Tractatus PDF Author: Marie McGinn
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191529591
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 332

Book Description
Discussion of Wittgenstein's Tractatus is currently dominated by two opposing interpretations of the work: a metaphysical or realist reading and the 'resolute' reading of Diamond and Conant. Marie McGinn's principal aim in this book is to develop an alternative interpretative line, which rejects the idea, central to the metaphysical reading, that Wittgenstein sets out to ground the logic of our language in features of an independently constituted reality, but which allows that he aims to provide positive philosophical insights into how language functions. McGinn takes as a guiding principle the idea that we should see Wittgenstein's early work as an attempt to eschew philosophical theory and to allow language itself to reveal how it functions. By this account, the aim of the work is to elucidate what language itself makes clear, namely, what is essential to its capacity to express thoughts that are true or false. However, the early Wittgenstein undertakes this descriptive project in the grip of a set of preconceptions concerning the essence of language that determine both how he conceives the problem and the approach he takes to the task of clarification. Nevertheless, the Tractatus contains philosophical insights, achieved despite his early preconceptions, that form the foundation of his later philosophy. The anti-metaphysical interpretation that is presented includes a novel reading of the problematic opening sections of the Tractatus, in which the apparently metaphysical status of Wittgenstein's remarks is shown to be an illusion. The book includes a discussion of the philosophical background to the Tractatus, a comprehensive interpretation of Wittgenstein's early views of logic and language, and an interpretation of the remarks on solipsism. The final chapter is a discussion of the relation between the early and the later philosophy that articulates the fundamental shift in Wittgenstein's approach to the task of understanding how language functions and reveal the still more fundamental continuity in his conception of his philosophical task.

Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy

Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy PDF Author: Paul Horwich
Publisher: Oxford University Press (UK)
ISBN: 019966112X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 243

Book Description
Paul Horwich presents a bold new interpretation of Wittgenstein's later work. He argues that it is Wittgenstein's radically anti-theoretical metaphilosophy - and not his identification of the meaning of a word with its use - that underpins his discussions of specific issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, and religion.

Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language PDF Author: Saul A. Kripke
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 9780674954014
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 164

Book Description
Table of Contents " Preface " Introductory " The Wittgensteinian Paradox " The Solution and the 'Private Language' Argument " Postscript Wittgenstein and Other Minds " Index.

Wittgenstein's Tractatus

Wittgenstein's Tractatus PDF Author: Alfred Nordmann
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521850865
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 256

Book Description
This introduction, first published in 2005, considers the philosophical and literary aspects of Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' and shows how they are related.

Ludwig Wittgenstein: Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths

Ludwig Wittgenstein: Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths PDF Author: Jaakko Hintikka
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1402041098
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 358

Book Description
IF WITI'GENSTEIN COULD TALK, COULD WE UNDERSTAND HIM? Perusing the secondary literature on Wittgenstein, I have frequently experienced a perfect Brechtean Entfremdungseffekt. This is interesting, I have felt like saying when reading books and papers on Wittgenstein, but who is the writer talking about? Certainly not Ludwig Wittgenstein the actual person who wrote his books and notebooks and whom I happened to meet. Why is there this strange gap between the ideas of the actual philosopher and the musings of his interpreters? Wittgenstein is talking to us through the posthumous publication of his writings. Why don't philosophers understand what he is saying? A partial reason is outlined in the first essay of this volume. Wittgenstein was far too impatient to explain in his books and book drafts what his problems were, what it was that he was trying to get clear about. He was even too impatient to explain in full his earlier solutions, often merely referring to them casually as it were in a shorthand notation. For one important instance, in The Brown Book, Wittgenstein had explained in some detail what name-object relationships amount to in his view. There he offers both an explanation of what his problem is and an account of his own view illustrated by means of specific examples of language-games. But when he raises the same question again in Philosophical Investigations I, sec.

Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic

Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic PDF Author: Michael Potter
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199215839
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 325

Book Description
Michael Potter shows, for the first time, that Wittgenstein's early Notes on Logic are a work of philosophical and historical importance. Using a challenging blend of biography and philosophy, he draws new conclusions about the nature of the Notes, the genesis of the Tractatus, and Wittgenstein's working methods.

From Frege to Wittgenstein

From Frege to Wittgenstein PDF Author: Erich H. Reck
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198030533
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 488

Book Description
Analytic philosophy--arguably one of the most important philosophical movements in the twentieth century--has gained a new historical self-consciousness, particularly about its own origins. Between 1880 and 1930, the most important work of its founding figures (Frege, Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein) not only gained attention but flourished. In this collection, fifteen previously unpublished essays explore different facets of this period, with an emphasis on the vital intellectual relationship between Frege and the early Wittgenstein.

Thought's Footing

Thought's Footing PDF Author: Charles Travis
Publisher: Clarendon Press
ISBN: 0191537608
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 229

Book Description
Thought's Footing is an enquiry into the relationship between the ways things are and the way we think and talk about them. It is also a study of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: Charles Travis develops his account of certain key themes into a unified view of the work as a whole. His methodological starting-point is to see Wittgenstein's work as a response to Frege's. The central question is: how does thought get its footing? How can the thought that things are a certain way be connected to things being that way? Wittgenstein departs from Frege in holding that there are indefinitely many ways of filling out (giving content to) the notion of truth.. The truth of a thought or utterance is connected with the consequences of thinking or saying it. That is the point of Wittgenstein's introduction of the notion of a language game. The second key theme is this: a representation of things as being a certain way cannot take the right form for truth-bearing without a background of agreement in judgements: its form must belong to thinkers of a given kind. The third key theme is that the proprietary perceptions of a given sort of thinker as to what would be a case of judging when there is a particular way for things to be is not subject to criticism from outside it. Along the way Travis gives his own distinctive take on such topics as the problem of singular thought, the notion of a proposition, rule-following, sense and nonsense, the possibility of private language, and the representational content of experience. The result is an original and stimulating demonstration of the continuing value of Wittgenstein's work for central debates in philosophy today.