Author: Tina Kao
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
In this paper we consider a model of duopoly with differentiated products to examine the welfare effects of a merger between two asymmetric firms. We find that, for quantity competition, the parameter range for welfare-enhancing merger widens if the products are closer substitutes. On the other hand, mergers are never welfare enhancing in this setting when firms compete in prices.
Welfare-Enhancing Mergers Under Product Differentiation
Author: Tina Kao
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
In this paper we consider a model of duopoly with differentiated products to examine the welfare effects of a merger between two asymmetric firms. We find that, for quantity competition, the parameter range for welfare-enhancing merger widens if the products are closer substitutes. On the other hand, mergers are never welfare enhancing in this setting when firms compete in prices.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
In this paper we consider a model of duopoly with differentiated products to examine the welfare effects of a merger between two asymmetric firms. We find that, for quantity competition, the parameter range for welfare-enhancing merger widens if the products are closer substitutes. On the other hand, mergers are never welfare enhancing in this setting when firms compete in prices.
The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries
Author: Gregory Werden
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 30
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 30
Book Description
A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers of Differentiated Products
Author: Gregory Werden
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 5
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 5
Book Description
Simulation as an Alternative to Structural Merger Policy in Differentiated Products Industries
Author: Gregory Werden
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 42
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 42
Book Description
The Demsetz Postulate and the Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries
Author: Luke M. Froeb
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 26
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 26
Book Description
Product Differentiation, Cost-Reducing Mergers, and Consumer Welfare
Author: George Norman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Cost synergies are an explicitly recognized justification for a two-firm merger, and empirical techniques are now widely used to assess the impact of cost-reducing mergers on prices and welfare in the post-merger market. We show that if the merger occurs in a vertically product differentiated market, then the merger will lead to a reduction in product offerings that limits the usefulness of pre-merger empirical estimates. Indeed, we further show that in such markets, two-firm mergers will typically lead to higher prices regardless of the merger's cost savings.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Cost synergies are an explicitly recognized justification for a two-firm merger, and empirical techniques are now widely used to assess the impact of cost-reducing mergers on prices and welfare in the post-merger market. We show that if the merger occurs in a vertically product differentiated market, then the merger will lead to a reduction in product offerings that limits the usefulness of pre-merger empirical estimates. Indeed, we further show that in such markets, two-firm mergers will typically lead to higher prices regardless of the merger's cost savings.
Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis
Author: Ken Heyer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Book Description
Merger Incentives of Cost Asymmetric Firms Under Production Differentiation
Author: Xia Li
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
This report examines merger incentives of cost asymmetric firms under product differentiation and their welfare implications. Considering a simple contract under which merger profit is distributed according to the proportions of differential marginal costs between duopolistic firms, we show in a stylized model that for almost all parameter ranges (in terms of market competition intensity and marginal cost differential), a low-cost firm may have no incentive to merge with a high-cost firm whereas the high-cost firm always finds merger to be profitable. Only when marginal cost differential is sufficiently low and the degree of product similarity is sufficiently high will both the low-cost firm and the high-cost firm share the common interest in merger. On the other hand, the merger equilibrium is not welfare-improving, regardless of whether the firms initially compete in quantities or prices. Viewed from the perspective of production efficiency, mergers with differentiated products thus create a fundamental conflict between the maximization of consumer and social welfare and the maximization of firm profits. We also examine the scenario that merger takes place when merger profit exceeds the sum of firm profits under duopoly, without considering how merger profit is distributed between the firms. We discuss the conditions under which mergers may or may not be welfare-improving.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
This report examines merger incentives of cost asymmetric firms under product differentiation and their welfare implications. Considering a simple contract under which merger profit is distributed according to the proportions of differential marginal costs between duopolistic firms, we show in a stylized model that for almost all parameter ranges (in terms of market competition intensity and marginal cost differential), a low-cost firm may have no incentive to merge with a high-cost firm whereas the high-cost firm always finds merger to be profitable. Only when marginal cost differential is sufficiently low and the degree of product similarity is sufficiently high will both the low-cost firm and the high-cost firm share the common interest in merger. On the other hand, the merger equilibrium is not welfare-improving, regardless of whether the firms initially compete in quantities or prices. Viewed from the perspective of production efficiency, mergers with differentiated products thus create a fundamental conflict between the maximization of consumer and social welfare and the maximization of firm profits. We also examine the scenario that merger takes place when merger profit exceeds the sum of firm profits under duopoly, without considering how merger profit is distributed between the firms. We discuss the conditions under which mergers may or may not be welfare-improving.
The Entry Inducing Effects of Horizontal Mergers
Author: Gregory Werden
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Barriers to entry (Industrial organization)
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Barriers to entry (Industrial organization)
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Mergers and Acquisitions
Author: Duarte Brito
Publisher: Kluwer Law International B.V.
ISBN: 9041124519
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 248
Book Description
Drawing on twenty years of merger analysis literature, this single source offers practical solutions to a wide range of problems faced by specialists working in the field of mergers and acquisitions. The authors take an industrial organization approach in which effects on profits, on consumer surplus and on overall welfare are of greatest relevance. The focus is primarily on horizontal mergers, although vertical and conglomerate mergers are addressed when producers of complementary goods are involved. Among the issues and elements examined, the authors provide answers to the following: How does a merger affect the insider firm's profitabifity? Why may outsiders stock market value increase or decrease following a merger? What are the expected welfare effects of a merger? What sort of arguments can be used for merger defense? How do economists model the firm's merging decision? How can the authorities simulate the price effects of a horizontal merger? Is post-merger entry likely to compensate the effects of a merger? The discussion proceeds from an analysis of the simplest exercise of market power to evermore complex merger environments. In their detailed coverage of policy evaluation of proposed acquisitions, the authors provide a merger simulation toolkit which can be applied to important recent judicial decisions in the field. This book will be of great value not only to academics in microeconomics and industrial organization, but also to lawyers and officials seeking expert practical guidance in the business or administrative responsibilities surrounding mergers and acquisitions.
Publisher: Kluwer Law International B.V.
ISBN: 9041124519
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 248
Book Description
Drawing on twenty years of merger analysis literature, this single source offers practical solutions to a wide range of problems faced by specialists working in the field of mergers and acquisitions. The authors take an industrial organization approach in which effects on profits, on consumer surplus and on overall welfare are of greatest relevance. The focus is primarily on horizontal mergers, although vertical and conglomerate mergers are addressed when producers of complementary goods are involved. Among the issues and elements examined, the authors provide answers to the following: How does a merger affect the insider firm's profitabifity? Why may outsiders stock market value increase or decrease following a merger? What are the expected welfare effects of a merger? What sort of arguments can be used for merger defense? How do economists model the firm's merging decision? How can the authorities simulate the price effects of a horizontal merger? Is post-merger entry likely to compensate the effects of a merger? The discussion proceeds from an analysis of the simplest exercise of market power to evermore complex merger environments. In their detailed coverage of policy evaluation of proposed acquisitions, the authors provide a merger simulation toolkit which can be applied to important recent judicial decisions in the field. This book will be of great value not only to academics in microeconomics and industrial organization, but also to lawyers and officials seeking expert practical guidance in the business or administrative responsibilities surrounding mergers and acquisitions.