Author: Kit-Chun LamPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Wages
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Book Description
Wage Structure with Moral Hazard in Job Search
Author: Kit-Chun LamWage Structure with Moral Hazard in Job Search
Author: Kit-Chun LamOn-the-Job Search and Moral Hazard
Author: Espen R. MoenPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42
Book Description
We analyze the interaction between intertemporal incentive contracts and search frictions associated with on-the-job search. In our model, agency problems call for wage contracts with deferred compensation. At the same time workers do on-the-job search. Deferred compensation improves workers' incentives to exert effort but distorts their on-the-job search decisions. We show that deferred compensation is less attractive when the value to the worker-firm pair of on-the-job search is high . Moreover, the interplay between search frictions and wage contracts creates feedback effects. If firms in equilibrium use contracts with deferred compensation, fewer firms with vacancies enter the on-the-job search market, and this in turn reduces the distortions created by deferred compensation. These feedback effects between the incentive contracts used and the activity level in the search markets may lead to multiple equilibria: a low-turnover equilibrium where firms use deferred compensation, and a high-turnover equilibrium where they do not. Furthermore, the model predicts that firms are more likely to use deferred compensation when search frictions are high and when the gains from on-the-job search are small.
Handbook of Labor Economics
Author: Orley AshenfelterPublisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0444534504
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 863
Book Description
A guide to the continually evolving field of labour economics.
Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market
Author: George A. AkerlofPublisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521312844
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 196
Book Description
The contributors explore the reasons why involuntary unemployment happens when supply equals demand.
Institutional Structure and Labor Market Outcomes
Author: Mr.Robert J. FlanaganPublisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451848366
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Book Description
Changes in economic systems provide a rare opportunity to redesign basic institutional structures in labor markets. This paper attempts to provide guidance for such institutional choice by drawing on the findings of recent labor market research in market economies on the links between institutional structure and labor market performance. After considering the suitability of research from market economies for the labor market problems faced by economies in transition from central planning, the paper considers the effects of alternative institutions for wage determination (collective bargaining structures and minimum wage and indexation legislation), employment security, income security, and active labor market policy.
Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
Author: Amy FinkelsteinPublisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231538685
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 161
Book Description
Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
Compensation Mechanisms for Job Risks
Author: Michael J. MoorePublisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400860857
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 208
Book Description
In this major new work, Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi explore the question, "How are workers compensated for exposing themselves to the risk of physical injury while on the job?" The authors detail the diverse nature of labor market responses to job risks and the important role played by compensation-for-risk mechanisms. Following an overview of the literature, they present a number of unprecedented results. Comprehensive and systematic discussions of issues such as wage-risk tradeoffs, the effects of workers' compensation on wages and risk, the role of unions, and the role of product liability suits in job-related injuries make the volume an essential work for all those interested in risk policy and workplace safety. Among the major results presented for the first time are the first estimates of the value of life derived from recently released occupational fatality risk data from the National Traumatic Occupational Fatality Survey. From these same data the authors also demonstrate that higher workers' compensation benefit levels significantly reduce fatalities on the job--a finding that challenges virtually every other treatment of this topic. Originally published in 1990. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Increasing Economic Security for American Workers
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means. Subcommittee on Income Security and Family SupportPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Displaced workers
Languages : en
Pages : 96
Book Description
Moral Hazard and Benefits Consumption Capital in Program Overlap
Author: Richard J. ButlerPublisher: Now Publishers Inc
ISBN: 1601984286
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 65
Book Description
Moral Hazard and Benefits Consumption Capital in Program Overlap reviews and extends the analysis of moral hazard response in two empirical directions: 1) how insurance changes in one program affects employee participation in other programs at a point in time (inter-program moral hazard), and 2) how the consumption of program benefits now tends to affect employees behavior over time (benefits consumption capital). The authors focus principally on workers compensation and programs that overlap with potential workers compensation coverage to keep institutional issues to a manageable level. This will not only include employer-provided health/health care insurance, short and long term disability insurance, and Federal benefits under the social security disability program, but also Federal benefits paid under unemployment insurance.