Author: Gregory Brooks WaymirePublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business forecasting
Languages : en
Pages : 156
Book Description
An Empirical Analysis of Voluntary Management Earnings Forecasts
Author: Gregory Brooks WaymirePublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business forecasting
Languages : en
Pages : 156
Book Description
Voluntary Management Earnings Forecasts
Author: Hark-Ppin YhimPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business forecasting
Languages : en
Pages : 286
Book Description
The Consistency of Mandatory and Voluntary Management Earnings Forecasts and Implications for Analyst and Investor Information Processing
Author: Richard A. CazierPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 47
Book Description
In this study we examine whether managers' voluntary forecasts of future earnings are consistent with the implicit forecasts of future earnings that underlie a specific mandatory accrual, the valuation allowance. This accrual relies heavily on managerial estimation and is also based, in part, on managers' private, forward-looking information. Thus, it provides an ideal setting to investigate the interplay between voluntary and mandatory financial disclosures. By examining the consistency between the voluntary and mandatory forecasts, we are also able to provide insight into whether the predictable accrual-related bias in voluntary earnings forecasts carries over into the mandatory forecast embedded in the valuation allowance. We then investigate whether the biased voluntary earnings guidance helps analysts and investors more accurately interpret the information in valuation allowance changes about future earnings expectations. To increase the power of our tests we utilize a sample of loss firms, which frequently record valuation allowances to fully or partially offset deferred tax assets.We first document that more than 62 percent of our sample of loss firms report valuation allowance changes and management earnings guidance that convey the same basic information about future earnings (i.e., either both forecast profit or both forecast loss). Thus, these voluntary and mandatory forecasts are largely consistent with each other. We then provide evidence that managers provide overly pessimistic forecasts for observations whose valuation allowance changes signal bad news about future earnings, but overly optimistic forecasts for observations whose valuation allowance changes signal strong good news about future earnings. Finally, our results suggest that managers' biased earnings forecasts actually help analysts and investors more accurately interpret the information about future earnings in valuation allowance changes. Our findings provide new insights into actions managers can take to improve investor and analyst processing of financial statement-based tax information.
Motivations for and Reactions to Voluntary Management Disclosures
Author: Susan GillPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate profits
Languages : en
Pages : 292
Book Description
Management Earnings Expectations, Earnings Uncertainty and Voluntary Disclosure of Earnings Forecasts by Management
Author: Jung Ho ChoiPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Disclosure in accounting
Languages : en
Pages : 121
Book Description
Voluntary Vs. Mandatory Management Earnings Forecasts in IPOs
Author: Dimitrios GounopoulosVoluntary Disclosure of Management Earnings Forecasts in Ipos and the Impact on Underpricing and Post - Issue Return Performance
Author: Vijay M. JogPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
Underpricing and post - issue return performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) has long been a subject of extensive research and debate. While a variety of explanations for both have been put forward, asymmetric information between the owner/managers (insiders) and the investing public (outsiders) has factored as one of the main explanations. In this paper, we test for one mechanism designed to alleviate asymmetric information, namely, the voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecasts by issuers of IPOs. Our results indicate that the voluntary disclosure of forecasts has had a significant impact on both underpricing and post - issue return performance.
Country-Level Institutions and Management Earnings Forecasts
Author: Wenjing LiPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 52
Book Description
Using a comprehensive sample hand-collected from the original texts of management earnings forecasts from 27 countries, we provide descriptive evidence on the country-level institutional determinants and economic consequences of forecast characteristics. Using principal component factors constructed from a number of country-level institutional variables, we find that forecast disaggregation, frequency, precision, and attribution vary significantly with the business and accounting environment of a country. We further document that better quality management forecasts are generally associated with stronger stock market reactions and higher investment efficiency. Together, our findings suggest that country-level institutions play a vital role in voluntary disclosure characteristics.
Voluntary Management Earnings Forecasts, Discretionary Accruals and Stock Returns
Author: Jeffrey D. GramlichVoluntary Disclosure of Management Earnings Forecasts in IPO Prospectuses
Author: Bruce J. McConomyPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Asymmetric information and mechanisms for its resolution in the initial public offering (IPO) process are subjects of extensive research and debate. In this paper, we investigate the impact of one such mechanism, namely voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecasts by issuers of IPOs, as a means of reducing asymmetric information as well as ex ante uncertainty. Our focus is on the relative importance of this voluntary disclosure mechanism on both IPO underpricing and post-issue return performance. Our results indicate that management earnings forecasts provide important and incremental information compared to other means of reducing asymmetric information, and these disclosures appear to improve the environment of IPO issuance. For example, our underpricing results show that firms that choose to provide forecasts leave quot;less money on the tablequot; with a lower degree of underpricing. In terms of post-issue performance, firms whose forecasts turn out to be optimistic are penalized significantly relative to other forecasters and non-forecasters.