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Author: Christian Ewerhart Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly asymmetric, then full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog reveals her type in an attempt to moderate the favorite while, similarly, the strongest type of the favorite tries to discourage the underdog - so that the contest unravels. This strong-form disclosure principle is robust with respect to correlation, partitional evidence, randomized disclosures, sequential moves, and continuous type spaces. Moreover, the assumption of uniform asymmetry is not needed when incomplete information is one-sided. However, the principle breaks down when contestants are potentially too similar in strength, possess commitment power, or when information is unverifiable. In fact, cheap talk will always be ignored, even if mediated by a trustworthy third party.
Author: Christian Ewerhart Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly asymmetric, then full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog reveals her type in an attempt to moderate the favorite while, similarly, the strongest type of the favorite tries to discourage the underdog - so that the contest unravels. This strong-form disclosure principle is robust with respect to correlation, partitional evidence, randomized disclosures, sequential moves, and continuous type spaces. Moreover, the assumption of uniform asymmetry is not needed when incomplete information is one-sided. However, the principle breaks down when contestants are potentially too similar in strength, possess commitment power, or when information is unverifiable. In fact, cheap talk will always be ignored, even if mediated by a trustworthy third party.
Author: Qiang Fu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 32
Book Description
We examine how disclosure policy can be optimally designed to incentivize contestants when their participation is exogenously stochastic. In a generalized Tullock contest setting with two players who are asymmetric in both their values and entry probabilities, we fully characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions under which no disclosure dominates full disclosure. We find that the comparison depends solely on a balance effect exercised by entry probabilities on the expected total effort. The optimal disclosure policy must better balance the competition. These conditions continue to hold when the precision r of Tullock contests is endogenously chosen by the designer.
Author: Stephen P. Baginski Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 60
Book Description
Using a unique, hand-gathered sample of 893 forward-looking voluntary disclosures by 70 proxy contest firms during 1992-2001, we examine whether managers temporarily alter the frequency and tone of their disclosures during proxy contests. Broadly consistent with the corporate control contest hypothesis, we find that, after controlling for performance and other determinants of disclosure, managers increase the frequency of forward-looking voluntary disclosures during the proxy contest relative to the pre-proxy period. After the proxy contest is resolved, managers decrease forward-looking voluntary disclosures. We also find that, after controlling for earnings-based performance and concurrent period stock returns, the voluntary forward-looking disclosure news is more positive, on average, during proxy contests relative to the pre-contest period. In addition, we find limited evidence that disclosure news is more positive during proxy contests relative to the post-contest period, suggesting that the more positive tone of the disclosures during proxy contests is temporary. Our results are robust to alternative estimation methods that model the endogeneity of the proxy contest event and to controlling for management tenure and turnover. In summary, proxy contest voluntary disclosure behavior is consistent with increased incentives to convince shareholders that managers are in control of the operating environment and to signal that poor past performance is transitory.
Author: Jeremy Bertomeu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 38
Book Description
This article examines the demand for disclosure rules by informed managers interested in increasing the market price of their firms. Within a model of political influence, a majority of managers chooses disclosure rules with which all firms must comply. In equilibrium, disclosure rules are asymmetric with greater levels of disclosure over adverse events. This asymmetry is positively associated with the informativeness of the measurement and increasing in the level of verifiability and ex-ante uncertainty of the information. The theory also offers implications about the relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure, when both channels are endogenous.
Author: Nemit Shroff Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
In 2005, the SEC enacted the Securities Offering Reform (Reform), which relaxes 'gun jumping' restrictions, thereby allowing firms to more freely disclose information before equity offerings. We examine the effect of the Reform on voluntary disclosure behavior before equity offerings and the associated economic consequences. We find that firms provide significantly more pre-offering disclosures after the Reform. Further, we find that these pre-offering disclosures are associated with a decrease in information asymmetry and a reduction in the cost of raising equity capital. Our findings not only inform the debate on the market effect of the Reform, but also speak to the literature on the relation between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry by examining the effect of quasi-exogenous changes in voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry, and thus a firm's cost of capital.
Author: Qiang Fu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : fr Pages : 0
Book Description
French Abstract: Politique de divulgation dans des concours à la Tullock quand l'entrée est stochastique et asymétrique. On examine comment une politique de divulgation ou non du nombre des participants à un concours peut être optimisée pour donner des incitations aux participants quand leur participation est le résultat d'aléas exogènes. Dans le contexte généralisé d'un concours à la Tullock avec deux joueurs qui sont asymétriques tant dans leurs valeurs que dans leurs probabilités d'entrée, on définit les conditions nécessaires et suffisantes pour lesquelles la non divulgation est préférable à la pleine divulgation. On découvre que la comparaison dépend seulement de l'effet de balance exercé par les probabilités d'entrée sur l'effort total anticipé. La politique optimale de divulgation doit balancer au mieux la concurrence. Ces conditions sont maintenues quand la précision r des concours à la Tullock est choisie de manière endogène par le designer du concours.
Author: Anastasia Antsygina Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We study optimal information disclosure in static contests where players do not know their own values of winning but can learn them, publicly or privately, from the designer. The designer chooses a disclosure policy that maximizes the total expected effort, and commits to it before observing the realized value profile. A distinct feature of our model is that conditional on receiving private information from the designer, contestants are allowed to communicate with each other by sending informative (truthful) or uninformative (empty) messages. As our results show, the contestants have incentives to share their private information with each other if and only if the values of winning are positively correlated. At the same time, learning is rarely perfect because mixing between the two types of messages leads to higher expected payoff in the communication game. Since with a positive probability communication results in an asymmetric contest associated with lower expected effort, the designer prefers concealment to any other disclosure policy available. This result is in a stark contrast with the no communication benchmark where private disclosure is best when the values of winning are sufficiently positively correlated.
Author: Paiva, Inna Sousa Publisher: IGI Global ISBN: 1799821307 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 369
Book Description
Over the last few years, we have witnessed the enormous success of corporate social responsibility and business all over the world. These developments, including those in which governments foster both growth through entrepreneurship and achievement of sustainable development by creating tools for worldwide impact to reconcile business interests with the demands of communities, have been unequivocal concerning job and wealth creation. Replacing short-term visions, however, has become instrumental to business success throughout the industry. Conceptual and Theoretical Approaches to Corporate Social Responsibility, Entrepreneurial Orientation, and Financial Performance is a pivotal reference source that explores corporate social responsibility through the lens of entrepreneurship and firm performance in an effort to change the approach towards long-term growth. While highlighting topics such as risk management, stewardship theory, and CEO duality, this publication explores contributions to societal welfare and methods of business creation. This book is ideally designed for managers, executives, human resources professionals, entrepreneurs, developers, academicians, researchers, industry professionals, and students.
Author: Christian Ewerhart
Author: Christian Ewerhart
Author: Qiang Fu
Author: Lucy F. Ackert
Author: Stephen P. Baginski
Author: Jeremy Bertomeu
Author: Aleksander Berentsen
Author: Nemit Shroff
Author: Qiang Fu
Author: Anastasia Antsygina
Author: Paiva, Inna Sousa