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Vertical Foreclosure Using Exclusive Dealing

Vertical Foreclosure Using Exclusive Dealing PDF Author: Itai Ater
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36

Book Description


Vertical Foreclosure Using Exclusive Dealing

Vertical Foreclosure Using Exclusive Dealing PDF Author: Itai Ater
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36

Book Description


Vertical Foreclosure

Vertical Foreclosure PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business failures
Languages : en
Pages : 106

Book Description


Vertical Foreclosure Using Exclusivity Clauses

Vertical Foreclosure Using Exclusivity Clauses PDF Author: Itai Ater
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
Exclusive contracts are one of the most controversial topics in the economic analysis of antitrust. Yet, very few empirical papers analyze the determinants and the consequences of exclusive contracts. In this paper, I study exclusive contracts between hamburger restaurants and Israeli shopping malls, in which mall owners commit to prohibiting additional hamburger restaurants from entering their malls. I investigate the determinants of these exclusive contracts and examine how such contracts affect the number of hamburger restaurants and their sales. I show that exclusive contracts are less likely to be adopted in larger malls, in malls that face more competition from other malls, and in malls that opened before 1993, when McDonald's and Burger King entered the Israeli market. I then use the mall's opening year - before or after 1993 - as an instrumental variable to estimate a negative effect of exclusive contracts on the number of restaurants and on total mall hamburger sales. My findings are generally consistent with anti-competitive vertical foreclosure models.

Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships

Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships PDF Author: Volker Nocke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition, Imperfect
Languages : en
Pages : 63

Book Description
We develop a model of interlocking bilateral relationships between upstream firms (manufacturers) that produce differentiated goods and downstream firms (retailers) that compete imperfectly for consumers. Contract offers and acceptance decisions are private information to the contracting parties. We show that both exclusive dealing and vertical integration between a manufacturer and a retailer lead to vertical foreclosure, to the detriment of consumers and society. Finally, we show that firms have indeed an incentive to sign such contracts or to integrate vertically.

Exclusionary Practices

Exclusionary Practices PDF Author: Chiara Fumagalli
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108546803
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 651

Book Description
The most controversial area in competition policy is that of exclusionary practices, where actions are taken by dominant firms to deter competitors from challenging their market positions. Economists have been struggling to explain such conduct and to guide policy-makers in designing sensible enforcement rules. In this book, authors Chiara Fumagalli, Massimo Motta, and Claudio Calcagno explore predatory pricing, rebates, exclusive dealing, tying, and vertical foreclosure, through a blend of theory and practice. They develop a general framework which builds on and extends existing economic theories, drawing upon case law, discussions of cases and other practical considerations to identify workable criteria that can guide competition authorities to assess exclusionary practices. Along with analyses of policy implications and insights applied to case studies, the book provides practitioners with non-technical discussions of the issues at hand, while guiding economics students with dedicated technical sections with rigorous formal models.

Diagnosing Foreclosure Due to Exclusive Dealing

Diagnosing Foreclosure Due to Exclusive Dealing PDF Author: John Asker
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
Exclusive dealing arrangements, in which a distributor agrees to work exclusively with a single manufacturer, can be efficiency enhancing or can be an anticompetitive means to foreclose markets. This paper evaluates the effect of exclusive distribution arrangements on competition in the Chicago beer market in 1994. A diagnostic test is provided to judge whether exclusive arrangements lead to foreclosure. To implement this test a model of consumer demand and firm behavior is estimated that incorporates industry details and allows for distribution through exclusive and shared channels. The test indicates that foreclosure effects are not present in this market.

The Foreclosure Argument for Exclusive Dealing

The Foreclosure Argument for Exclusive Dealing PDF Author: Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 60

Book Description


Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control

Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control PDF Author: Roger D. Blair
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 1483261093
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 224

Book Description
Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control focuses on the processes, methodologies, and approaches involved in the law and economics of vertical integration and control. The publication first elaborates on transaction costs, fixed proportions and contractual alternatives, and variable proportions and contractual alternatives. Discussions focus on sales revenue royalties, ownership integration, output royalties, important product-specific services, successive monopoly, advantages and limitations of internal transfers, and transaction cost determinants. The text then examines vertical integration under uncertainty and vertical integration without contractual alternatives. The book ponders on legal treatment of ownership integration and per se illegal contractual controls. Topics include tying arrangements, public policy assessment, resale price maintenance, vertical integration and the Sherman Act, market foreclosure doctrine, and the 1982 Merger Guidelines. The text also takes a look at contractual controls that are not illegal per se, alternative legal rules, and antitrust policy. The publication is a dependable reference for researchers interested in the law and economics of vertical integration and control.

Handbook of Industrial Organization

Handbook of Industrial Organization PDF Author: Mark Armstrong
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 008055184X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 943

Book Description
This is Volume 3 of the Handbook of Industrial Organization series (HIO). Volumes 1 & 2 published simultaneously in 1989 and many of the chapters were widely cited and appeared on graduate reading lists. Since the first volumes published, the field of industrial organization has continued to evolve and this volume fills the gaps. While the first two volumes of HIO contain much more discussion of the theoretical literature than of the empirical literature, it was representative of the field at that time. Since then, the empirical literature has flourished, while the theoretical literature has continued to grow, and this new volume reflects that change of emphasis.Thie volume is an excellent reference and teaching supplement for industrial organization or industrial economics, the microeconomics field that focuses on business behavior and its implications for both market structures and processes, and for related public policies.*Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics series*Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields*A source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organizations or industrial economists

Vertical Effects in Competition Law and Regulatory Decisions in Pay-Television

Vertical Effects in Competition Law and Regulatory Decisions in Pay-Television PDF Author: Agustin Diaz Pines
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 74

Book Description
This paper examines vertical effects in competition law and regulatory decisions in pay-television markets in France, the United Kingdom and the United States, with a focus on vertical input and customer foreclosure, exclusive dealing, countervailing buyer power and some aspects of the implementation of remedies. Its inception in the discussion surrounding convergence is justified by the importance of vertical effects in consolidation and vertical integration trends between the telecommunication and pay-television industries. Although convergence between these two industries may be considered both from the vertical (vertical integration) and horizontal (service bundling) perspective, this paper only addresses its vertical aspects. Among all types of vertical effects, only those judged more relevant by the authorities, and subject to a greater degree of scrutiny are being addressed, as explained in Section 1. First, we examine the different treatments of buyer power and its use as an argument to justify relaxing requirements for the authorisation of mergers in France and the United Kingdom (countervailing buyer power). Second, we conduct an exhaustive assessment of vertical foreclosure (both input and customer foreclosure) in relation to its regulatory treatment in these countries. In a separate section, exclusive dealing and related competition law practice are assessed in order to discern in which situations it can be pro- or anti-competitive, including future market structures. Finally, a section discusses the pros and cons of having wholesale reference offers for pay-television content against the use of arbitration mechanisms to prevent vertical foreclosure.The overall conclusion of the paper is that, while the United States has been moving away from stringent ex-ante regulation in pay-television markets, justified by an improvement in competition dynamics, France and United Kingdom have only partially succeeded in addressing these concerns - in many ways more serious that in the United States - due to a lack of a legal framework to issue ex-ante regulation. The empirical evidence for this paper is based on an exhaustive assessment of all related competition law and regulatory decisions in pay-television markets in France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Annex includes a summary of vertical effects in antitrust and merger decisions in these countries from 1996 to 2014.