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Vertical Foreclosure and the Regulation of Vertical Mergers

Vertical Foreclosure and the Regulation of Vertical Mergers PDF Author: Jun Lu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 168

Book Description


Vertical Foreclosure and the Regulation of Vertical Mergers

Vertical Foreclosure and the Regulation of Vertical Mergers PDF Author: Jun Lu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 168

Book Description


Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control

Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control PDF Author: Roger D. Blair
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 1483261093
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 224

Book Description
Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control focuses on the processes, methodologies, and approaches involved in the law and economics of vertical integration and control. The publication first elaborates on transaction costs, fixed proportions and contractual alternatives, and variable proportions and contractual alternatives. Discussions focus on sales revenue royalties, ownership integration, output royalties, important product-specific services, successive monopoly, advantages and limitations of internal transfers, and transaction cost determinants. The text then examines vertical integration under uncertainty and vertical integration without contractual alternatives. The book ponders on legal treatment of ownership integration and per se illegal contractual controls. Topics include tying arrangements, public policy assessment, resale price maintenance, vertical integration and the Sherman Act, market foreclosure doctrine, and the 1982 Merger Guidelines. The text also takes a look at contractual controls that are not illegal per se, alternative legal rules, and antitrust policy. The publication is a dependable reference for researchers interested in the law and economics of vertical integration and control.

The Economic Assessment of Mergers Under European Competition Law

The Economic Assessment of Mergers Under European Competition Law PDF Author: Daniel Gore
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107007720
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 559

Book Description
Provides a clear, concise and practical overview of the key economic techniques and evidence employed in European merger control.

Vertical Mergers, Foreclosure and Raising Rivals' Costs - Experimental Evidence

Vertical Mergers, Foreclosure and Raising Rivals' Costs - Experimental Evidence PDF Author: Hans-Theo Normann
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783863040048
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 29

Book Description


Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure

Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure PDF Author: Oliver D. Hart
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vertical integration
Languages : en
Pages : 79

Book Description
Few people would disagree with the proposition that horizontal mergers have the potential to restrict output and raise consumer prices. In contrast, there is much less agreement about the anti-competitive effects of vertical mergers. The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical model showing how vertical integration changes the nature of competition in upstream and downstream markets and identifying conditions under which market foreclosure will be a consequence or even a purpose of such integration. In contrast to much of the literature, we do not restrict upstream and downstream firms to particular contractual arrangements, but instead allow firms to choose from a full set of contractual arrangements both when integrated and when not. We also allow non-integrated firms to respond optimally to the integration decisions of other firms, either by remaining nonintegrated, exiting the industry or integrating too (i.e. bandwagoning). In a final section we use our analysis to shed some light on a number of prominent vertical merger cases, involving computer reservation systems for airlines, the cement industry and the St. Louis Terminal Railroad.

Handbook of Antitrust Economics

Handbook of Antitrust Economics PDF Author: Paolo Buccirossi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 716

Book Description
Experts examine the application of economic theory to antitrust issues in both the United States and Europe, discussing mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance, and the impact of market features. Over the past twenty years, economic theory has begun to play a central role in antitrust matters. In earlier days, the application of antitrust rules was viewed almost entirely in formal terms; now it is widely accepted that the proper interpretation of these rules requires an understanding of how markets work and how firms can alter their efficient functioning. The Handbook of Antitrust Economics offers scholars, students, administrators, courts, companies, and lawyers the economist's view of the subject, describing the application of newly developed theoretical models and improved empirical methods to antitrust and competition law in both the United States and the European Union. (The book uses the U.S. term “antitrust law” and the European “competition law” interchangeably, emphasizing the commonalities between the two jurisdictions.) After a general discussion of the use of empirical methods in antitrust cases, the Handbook covers mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance (or unilateral conducts), and market features that affect the way firms compete. Chapters examine such topics as analyzing the competitive effects of both horizontal and vertical mergers, detecting and preventing cartels, theoretical and empirical analysis of vertical restraints, state aids, the relationship of competition law to the defense of intellectual property, and the application of antitrust law to “bidding markets,” network industries, and two-sided markets. Contributors Mark Armstrong, Jonathan B. Baker, Timothy F. Bresnahan, Paulo Buccirossi, Nicholas Economides, Hans W. Friederiszick, Luke M. Froeb, Richard J. Gilbert, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Paul Klemperer, Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Francine Lafontaine, Damien J. Neven, Patrick Rey, Michael H. Riordan, Jean-Charles Rochet, Lars-Hendrick Röller, Margaret Slade, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Jean Tirole, Thibaud Vergé, Vincent Verouden, John Vickers, Gregory J. Werden

The Costs and Benefits of Ownership

The Costs and Benefits of Ownership PDF Author: Sanford J. Grossman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business enterprises
Languages : en
Pages : 76

Book Description


Vertical Foreclosure

Vertical Foreclosure PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business failures
Languages : en
Pages : 106

Book Description


Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure

Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure PDF Author: Alexander Schrader
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 32

Book Description


Quantifying the Increase in 'Effective Concentration' from Vertical Mergers that Raise Input Foreclosure Concerns

Quantifying the Increase in 'Effective Concentration' from Vertical Mergers that Raise Input Foreclosure Concerns PDF Author: Steven C. Salop
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
This comment responds to the request by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division for public comment on the draft 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. In this comment, we show that there is an inherent loss of an indirect competitor and competition when a vertical merger raises input foreclosure concerns. We also show that it then is possible to calculate an effective increase in the HHI measure of concentration for the downstream market. We refer to this “proxy” measure as the “dHHI.” We derive the dHHI measure by comparing the pricing incentives and associated upward pricing pressure (“UPP”) involved in two alternative types of acquisitions: (i) vertical mergers that raise unilateral input foreclosure concerns (and the associated vertical GUPPI measures), and (ii) horizontal acquisitions of partial ownership interests among competitors that raise unilateral effects concerns (and the associated modified GUPPI and modified HHI measures).