Author: Georg NöldekePublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 16
Book Description
Unverifiable Information, Incomplete Contracts, and Renegotiation
Author: Georg NöldekePublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 16
Book Description
Contract Renegotiation Under Asymetric Information; on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
Author: Contract renegotiation under asymmetric information
Author: Sönje ReichePublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Academic theses
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Contract Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Formation
Author: Sonje Kerrin ReicheEssays on Contract Remedies, Incomplete Contracts, and Renegotiation
Author: Tai-Yeong ChungPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation in Long-term Trade Relationships
Author: Christoph LülfesmannPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : de
Pages : 161
Book Description
Renegotiating Incomplete Contracts
Author: Eduardo SaavedraPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Infrastructure (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 122
Book Description
The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics
Author: Philippe AghionPublisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190259019
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 224
Book Description
The 1986 article by Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart titled "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession.
Can Blockchain Solve the Hold-up Problem in Contracts?
Author: Richard HoldenPublisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 100902017X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 94
Book Description
A vexing problem in contract law is modification. Two parties sign a contract but before they fully perform, they modify the contract. Should courts enforce the modified agreement? A private remedy is for the parties to write a contract that is robust to hold-up or that makes the facts relevant to modification verifiable. Provisions accomplishing these ends are renegotiation-design and revelation mechanisms. But implementing them requires commitment power. Conventional contract technologies to ensure commitment – liquidated damages – are disfavored by courts and themselves subject to renegotiation. Smart contracts written on blockchain ledgers offer a solution. We explain the basic economics and legal relevance of these technologies, and we argue that they can implement liquidated damages without courts. We address the hurdles courts may impose to use of smart contracts on blockchain and show that sophisticated parties' ex ante commitment to them may lead courts to allow their use as pre-commitment devices.
Contract Theory
Author: Patrick BoltonPublisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262025768
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 746
Book Description
A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.