Author: Nomy Arpaly
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0195179765
Category : Agent
Languages : en
Pages : 218
Book Description
Conventional thinking about the mind, dating back to Aristotle envisions the emotions as being directed and determined by rational thought. The author argues that the conventional picture of rationality is fundamentally false and has little to do with how real human beings actually behave.
Unprincipled Virtue
Author: Nomy Arpaly
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0195179765
Category : Agent
Languages : en
Pages : 218
Book Description
Conventional thinking about the mind, dating back to Aristotle envisions the emotions as being directed and determined by rational thought. The author argues that the conventional picture of rationality is fundamentally false and has little to do with how real human beings actually behave.
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0195179765
Category : Agent
Languages : en
Pages : 218
Book Description
Conventional thinking about the mind, dating back to Aristotle envisions the emotions as being directed and determined by rational thought. The author argues that the conventional picture of rationality is fundamentally false and has little to do with how real human beings actually behave.
Unprincipled Virtue
Author: Nomy Arpaly
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0195152042
Category : Agent (Philosophy)
Languages : en
Pages : 214
Book Description
Conventional thinking about the mind, dating back to Aristotle, envisions the emotions as being directed and determined by rational thought. The author argues that the conventional picture of rationality is fundamentally false and has little to do with how real human beings actually behave.
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0195152042
Category : Agent (Philosophy)
Languages : en
Pages : 214
Book Description
Conventional thinking about the mind, dating back to Aristotle, envisions the emotions as being directed and determined by rational thought. The author argues that the conventional picture of rationality is fundamentally false and has little to do with how real human beings actually behave.
In Praise of Desire
Author: Nomy Arpaly
Publisher:
ISBN: 0199348162
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 337
Book Description
Joining the ancient debate over the roles of reason and appetite in the moral mind, In Praise of Desire takes the side of appetite. The book makes the claim that acting for moral reasons, acting in a praiseworthy manner, and acting out of virtue amount to nothing more than acting out of intrinsic desires for the right or the good, correctly conceived. In Praise of Desire shows that a desire-centered moral psychology can be richer than philosophers commonly think, accommodating the full complexity of moral life.
Publisher:
ISBN: 0199348162
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 337
Book Description
Joining the ancient debate over the roles of reason and appetite in the moral mind, In Praise of Desire takes the side of appetite. The book makes the claim that acting for moral reasons, acting in a praiseworthy manner, and acting out of virtue amount to nothing more than acting out of intrinsic desires for the right or the good, correctly conceived. In Praise of Desire shows that a desire-centered moral psychology can be richer than philosophers commonly think, accommodating the full complexity of moral life.
Worldly Virtue
Author: Judith Andre
Publisher: Lexington Books
ISBN: 0739185837
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 185
Book Description
Worldly Virtue argues that general discussions of virtue need to be complemented by attention to specific virtues. Each chapter addresses a single virtue, most of them traditional (e.g., honesty, generosity, and humility), and sometimes newly framed (“earthly virtue,” for instance, and “open hope.”) The final essay breaks ground by identifying virtues specific to the fact that we age. The book draws upon various spiritual traditions, especially Christianity and Buddhism, for what they value and the practices that sustain those values; at times it identifies ways in which each can mislead. The book also draws from contemporary sciences, natural but especially behavioral. Anthropologists and sociologists, for instance, have identified a universal norm of reciprocity; virtuous generosity must respect this need to give back. In another example, new understandings of addiction suggest that temperance requires dealing with pain as much as resisting pleasure. Because no single template applies to every virtue, different questions are asked about each. Nevertheless each chapter addresses the often-neglected question of how the virtue in question is acquired, and how social context can support or impede its acquisition. The book is addressed to philosophers, but may also be of interest in religious studies, for its philosophical development of religious themes.
Publisher: Lexington Books
ISBN: 0739185837
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 185
Book Description
Worldly Virtue argues that general discussions of virtue need to be complemented by attention to specific virtues. Each chapter addresses a single virtue, most of them traditional (e.g., honesty, generosity, and humility), and sometimes newly framed (“earthly virtue,” for instance, and “open hope.”) The final essay breaks ground by identifying virtues specific to the fact that we age. The book draws upon various spiritual traditions, especially Christianity and Buddhism, for what they value and the practices that sustain those values; at times it identifies ways in which each can mislead. The book also draws from contemporary sciences, natural but especially behavioral. Anthropologists and sociologists, for instance, have identified a universal norm of reciprocity; virtuous generosity must respect this need to give back. In another example, new understandings of addiction suggest that temperance requires dealing with pain as much as resisting pleasure. Because no single template applies to every virtue, different questions are asked about each. Nevertheless each chapter addresses the often-neglected question of how the virtue in question is acquired, and how social context can support or impede its acquisition. The book is addressed to philosophers, but may also be of interest in religious studies, for its philosophical development of religious themes.
Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage
Author: Nomy Arpaly
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400824508
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 158
Book Description
Perhaps everything we think, feel, and do is determined, and humans--like stones or clouds--are slaves to the laws of nature. Would that be a terrible state? Philosophers who take the incompatibilist position think so, arguing that a deterministic world would be one without moral responsibility and perhaps without true love, meaningful art, and real rationality. But compatibilists and semicompatibilists argue that determinism need not worry us. As long as our actions stem, in an appropriate way, from us, or respond in some way to reasons, our actions are meaningful and can be judged on their moral (or other) merit. In this highly original work, Nomy Arpaly argues that a deterministic world does not preclude moral responsibility, rationality, and love--in short, meaningful lives--but that there would still be something lamentable about a deterministic world. A person may respond well to reasons, and her actions may faithfully reflect her true self or values, but she may still feel that she is not free. Arpaly argues that compatibilists and semicompatibilists are wrong to dismiss this feeling--for which there are no philosophical consolations--as philosophically irrelevant. On the way to this bittersweet conclusion, Arpaly sets forth surprising theories about acting for reasons, the widely accepted idea that "ought implies can," moral blame, and more.
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400824508
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 158
Book Description
Perhaps everything we think, feel, and do is determined, and humans--like stones or clouds--are slaves to the laws of nature. Would that be a terrible state? Philosophers who take the incompatibilist position think so, arguing that a deterministic world would be one without moral responsibility and perhaps without true love, meaningful art, and real rationality. But compatibilists and semicompatibilists argue that determinism need not worry us. As long as our actions stem, in an appropriate way, from us, or respond in some way to reasons, our actions are meaningful and can be judged on their moral (or other) merit. In this highly original work, Nomy Arpaly argues that a deterministic world does not preclude moral responsibility, rationality, and love--in short, meaningful lives--but that there would still be something lamentable about a deterministic world. A person may respond well to reasons, and her actions may faithfully reflect her true self or values, but she may still feel that she is not free. Arpaly argues that compatibilists and semicompatibilists are wrong to dismiss this feeling--for which there are no philosophical consolations--as philosophically irrelevant. On the way to this bittersweet conclusion, Arpaly sets forth surprising theories about acting for reasons, the widely accepted idea that "ought implies can," moral blame, and more.
Virtue’s Reasons
Author: Noell Birondo
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1315314231
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 318
Book Description
Virtues and reasons are two of the most fruitful and important concepts in contemporary moral philosophy. Many writers have commented upon the close connection between virtues and reasons, but no one has done full justice to the complexity of this connection. It is generally recognized that the virtues not only depend upon reasons, but also sometimes provide them. The essays in this volume shed light on precisely how virtues and reasons are related to each other and what can be learned by exploring this relationship. Virtue’s Reasons is divided into three sections, each of them devoted to a general issue regarding the relationship between virtues and reasons. The first section analyzes how the virtues may be related to, or linked with, normative reasons in ways that improve our understanding of what constitutes virtuous character and ethical agency. The second section explores the reasons moral agents have for cultivating the virtues and how the virtues impact moral responsiveness or development. The final section examines how reasons can be employed in understanding the nature of virtue, and how specific virtues, like modesty and practical wisdom, interact with reasons. This book will be of major interest to scholars working on virtue theory, the nature of moral character, and normative ethics.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1315314231
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 318
Book Description
Virtues and reasons are two of the most fruitful and important concepts in contemporary moral philosophy. Many writers have commented upon the close connection between virtues and reasons, but no one has done full justice to the complexity of this connection. It is generally recognized that the virtues not only depend upon reasons, but also sometimes provide them. The essays in this volume shed light on precisely how virtues and reasons are related to each other and what can be learned by exploring this relationship. Virtue’s Reasons is divided into three sections, each of them devoted to a general issue regarding the relationship between virtues and reasons. The first section analyzes how the virtues may be related to, or linked with, normative reasons in ways that improve our understanding of what constitutes virtuous character and ethical agency. The second section explores the reasons moral agents have for cultivating the virtues and how the virtues impact moral responsiveness or development. The final section examines how reasons can be employed in understanding the nature of virtue, and how specific virtues, like modesty and practical wisdom, interact with reasons. This book will be of major interest to scholars working on virtue theory, the nature of moral character, and normative ethics.
The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism
Author: Douglas W. Portmore
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0190905328
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 689
Book Description
"This handbook contains thirty-two previously unpublished contributions to consequentialist ethics by leading scholars, covering what's happening in the field today as well as pointing to new directions for future research. Consequentialism is a rival to such moral theories as deontology, contractualism, and virtue ethics. But it's more than just one rival among many, for every plausible moral theory must concede that the goodness of an act's consequences is something that matters even if it's not the only thing that matters. Thus, all plausible moral theories will accept both that the fact that an act would produce good consequences constitutes a moral reason to perform it and that the better that act's consequences the moral reason there is to perform it. Now, if this is correct, then much of the research concerning consequentialist ethics is important for ethics in general. For instance, one thing that consequentialist researchers have investigated is what sorts of consequences matter: the consequences that some act would have or the consequences that it could have-if, say, the agent were to follow up by performing some subsequent act. And it's reasonable to suppose that the answer to such questions will be relevant for normative ethics regardless of whether the goodness of consequences is the only thing matters (as consequentialists presume) or just one of many things that matter (as non-consequentialists presume)"--
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0190905328
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 689
Book Description
"This handbook contains thirty-two previously unpublished contributions to consequentialist ethics by leading scholars, covering what's happening in the field today as well as pointing to new directions for future research. Consequentialism is a rival to such moral theories as deontology, contractualism, and virtue ethics. But it's more than just one rival among many, for every plausible moral theory must concede that the goodness of an act's consequences is something that matters even if it's not the only thing that matters. Thus, all plausible moral theories will accept both that the fact that an act would produce good consequences constitutes a moral reason to perform it and that the better that act's consequences the moral reason there is to perform it. Now, if this is correct, then much of the research concerning consequentialist ethics is important for ethics in general. For instance, one thing that consequentialist researchers have investigated is what sorts of consequences matter: the consequences that some act would have or the consequences that it could have-if, say, the agent were to follow up by performing some subsequent act. And it's reasonable to suppose that the answer to such questions will be relevant for normative ethics regardless of whether the goodness of consequences is the only thing matters (as consequentialists presume) or just one of many things that matter (as non-consequentialists presume)"--
Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, and Its Influence on Morals and Happiness
Author: William Godwin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Political ethics
Languages : en
Pages : 526
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Political ethics
Languages : en
Pages : 526
Book Description
On Virtue Ethics
Author: Rosalind Hursthouse
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198238185
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 286
Book Description
Virtue ethics is perhaps the most important development within late 20th-century moral philosophy. Rosalind Hursthouse presents an exposition and defence of her neo-Aristotelian version of virtue ethics.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198238185
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 286
Book Description
Virtue ethics is perhaps the most important development within late 20th-century moral philosophy. Rosalind Hursthouse presents an exposition and defence of her neo-Aristotelian version of virtue ethics.
From Valuing to Value
Author: David Sobel
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192507532
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 471
Book Description
Subjective accounts of well-being and reasons for action have a remarkable pedigree. The idea that normativity flows from what an agent cares about-that something is valuable because it is valued-has appealed to a wide range of great thinkers. But at the same time this idea has seemed to many of the best minds in ethics to be outrageous or worse, not least because it seems to threaten the status of morality. Mutual incomprehension looms over the discussion. From Valuing to Value, written by an influential former critic of subjectivism, owns up to the problematic features to which critics have pointed while arguing that such criticisms can be blunted and the overall view rendered defensible. In this collection of his essays David Sobel does not shrink from acknowledging the real tension between subjective views of reasons and morality, yet argues that such a tension does not undermine subjectivism. In this volume the fundamental commitments of subjectivism are clarified and revealed to be rather plausible and well-motivated, while the most influential criticisms of subjectivism are straightforwardly addressed and found wanting.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192507532
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 471
Book Description
Subjective accounts of well-being and reasons for action have a remarkable pedigree. The idea that normativity flows from what an agent cares about-that something is valuable because it is valued-has appealed to a wide range of great thinkers. But at the same time this idea has seemed to many of the best minds in ethics to be outrageous or worse, not least because it seems to threaten the status of morality. Mutual incomprehension looms over the discussion. From Valuing to Value, written by an influential former critic of subjectivism, owns up to the problematic features to which critics have pointed while arguing that such criticisms can be blunted and the overall view rendered defensible. In this collection of his essays David Sobel does not shrink from acknowledging the real tension between subjective views of reasons and morality, yet argues that such a tension does not undermine subjectivism. In this volume the fundamental commitments of subjectivism are clarified and revealed to be rather plausible and well-motivated, while the most influential criticisms of subjectivism are straightforwardly addressed and found wanting.