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Author: David Min Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 82
Book Description
“Market discipline” -- the notion that short-term creditors can efficiently rein in bank risk -- has been a central pillar of banking regulation since the late 1980s, both in the United States and abroad. While market discipline did not prevent the buildup of bank risk that caused the recent financial crisis, the conventional wisdom has been that this failure was due to an insufficiency of market discipline, rather than any problems with the concept itself. As a result, policy makers have increased regulatory reliance on market discipline, making this a central part of their reform efforts. This Article challenges the prevailing wisdom and makes two significant contributions to the literature. First, I demonstrate that market discipline failed more severely and completely than has previously been acknowledged, as it did not even identify rising bank risk until after the financial crisis had already begun. Second, I explain the causes of this failure. Market discipline conflates two distinct types of bank-issued securities -- investment securities and money instruments -- and therefore errs in two critical ways. Market discipline relies too heavily upon investors in money instruments, who are relatively insensitive to risk and thus particularly poor monitors of banks. And market discipline ignores the effects of bank shareholders, who are highly risk-sensitive but may have incentives adverse to those of public policy. Despite these enormous flaws, market discipline continues to be a major point of emphasis among bank regulators and policy makers, increasing the risk that regulators may again be blindsided by another financial crisis.
Author: David Min Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 82
Book Description
“Market discipline” -- the notion that short-term creditors can efficiently rein in bank risk -- has been a central pillar of banking regulation since the late 1980s, both in the United States and abroad. While market discipline did not prevent the buildup of bank risk that caused the recent financial crisis, the conventional wisdom has been that this failure was due to an insufficiency of market discipline, rather than any problems with the concept itself. As a result, policy makers have increased regulatory reliance on market discipline, making this a central part of their reform efforts. This Article challenges the prevailing wisdom and makes two significant contributions to the literature. First, I demonstrate that market discipline failed more severely and completely than has previously been acknowledged, as it did not even identify rising bank risk until after the financial crisis had already begun. Second, I explain the causes of this failure. Market discipline conflates two distinct types of bank-issued securities -- investment securities and money instruments -- and therefore errs in two critical ways. Market discipline relies too heavily upon investors in money instruments, who are relatively insensitive to risk and thus particularly poor monitors of banks. And market discipline ignores the effects of bank shareholders, who are highly risk-sensitive but may have incentives adverse to those of public policy. Despite these enormous flaws, market discipline continues to be a major point of emphasis among bank regulators and policy makers, increasing the risk that regulators may again be blindsided by another financial crisis.
Author: World Bank Publisher: World Bank Publications ISBN: 1464814961 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 281
Book Description
Over a decade has passed since the collapse of the U.S. investment bank, Lehman Brothers, marked the onset of the largest global economic crisis since the Great Depression. The crisis revealed major shortcomings in market discipline, regulation and supervision, and reopened important policy debates on financial regulation. Since the onset of the crisis, emphasis has been placed on better regulation of banking systems and on enhancing the tools available to supervisory agencies to oversee banks and intervene speedily in case of distress. Drawing on ten years of data and analysis, Global Financial Development Report 2019/2020 provides evidence on the regulatory remedies adopted to prevent future financial troubles, and sheds light on important policy concerns. To what extent are regulatory reforms designed with high-income countries in mind appropriate for developing countries? What has been the impact of reforms on market discipline and bank capital? How should countries balance the political and social demands for a safety net for users of the financial system with potentially severe moral hazard consequences? Are higher capital requirements damaging to the flow of credit? How should capital regulation be designed to improve stability and access? The report provides a synthesis of what we know, as well as areas where more evidence is still needed. Global Financial Development Report 2019/2020 is the fifth in a World Bank series. The accompanying website tracks financial systems in more than 200 economies before, during, and after the global financial crisis (http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr) and provides information on how banking systems are regulated and supervised around the world (http://www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/BRSS).
Author: C. E. V. Borio Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 9780262025751 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 472
Book Description
Leading academics and policymakers address the theory of market discipline and consider evidence across different industries and countries. The effectiveness of market discipline -- the strong built-in incentives that encourage banks and financial systems to operate soundly and efficiently -- commands much attention today, particularly in light of recent accounting scandals. As government discipline, in the form of regulation, seems to grows less effective as the banking industry and financial markets grow more complex, the role of market discipline becomes increasingly important. In this collection, which grew out of a conference cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, a diverse group of academics and policymakers address different aspects of the ability of market discipline to affect corporate behavior and performance. A major purpose of the book is to develop evidence on how market discipline operates across non-government regulated industries and in different countries, how successful it has been, and how it may transfer to a regulated industry. The chapters examine such topics as the theory of market discipline, evidence of market discipline in banking and other industries, evidence of market discipline for countries, the current state of corporate governance, and the interaction of market discipline and public policy.
Author: Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt Publisher: World Bank Publications ISBN: 2311540211 Category : Banks and banking Languages : en Pages : 52
Book Description
It is difficult to design and implement an effective safety net for banks, because overgenerous protection of banks may introduce a risk-enhancing moral hazard and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect. The safety net that policymakers design must provide the right mix of market and regulatory discipline, enough to protect depositors without unduly undermining market discipline on banks.
Author: Apanard Penny Prabha Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This study analyzes the causes of the market discipline failure in the recent financial crisis. We argue that the most important market failure of informativeness was that large financial institutions had the incentive to remain opaque strategically so that outside investors could not assess their solvency. We also discuss how different debt-based and equity-based financial instruments provide more or less timely information by illustrating the behavior of different financial instruments (e.g., stock price indexes, credit default swaps and subordinated debt) around events associated with insolvency of some financial institutions during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Our paper concludes by laying out four “informativeness principles” for regulators and policy makers to follow with the objective to strengthen the incentives of market participants to acquire, analyze, disclose and signal information.
Author: Mr.Anil Ari Publisher: International Monetary Fund ISBN: 1484335376 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 64
Book Description
We present a model in which shadow banking arises endogenously and undermines market discipline on traditional banks. Depositors' ability to re-optimize in response to crises imposes market discipline on traditional banks: these banks optimally commit to a safe portfolio strategy to prevent early withdrawals. With costly commitment, shadow banking emerges as an alternative banking strategy that combines high risk-taking with early liquidation in times of crisis. We bring the model to bear on the 2008 financial crisis in the United States, during which shadow banks experienced a sudden dry-up of funding and liquidated their assets. We derive an equilibrium in which the shadow banking sector expands to a size where its liquidation causes a fire-sale and exposes traditional banks to liquidity risk. Higher deposit rates in compensation for liquidity risk also weaken threats of early withdrawal and traditional banks pursue risky portfolios that may leave them in default. Policy interventions aimed at making traditional banks safer such as liquidity support, bank regulation and deposit insurance fuel further expansion of shadow banking but have a net positive impact on financial stability. Financial stability can also be achieved with a tax on shadow bank profits.
Author: David Min
Author: David Min
Author: World Bank
Author: Jagtiani Julapa
Author: C. E. V. Borio
Author: Catharine Lemieux
Author: Asl? Demirgüç-Kunt
Author: Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt
Author: Marco Arena
Author: Apanard Penny Prabha
Author: Mr.Anil Ari