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Author: Eric Maskin Publisher: Columbia University Press ISBN: 0231153287 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 164
Book Description
Kenneth Arrow's pathbreaking Òimpossibility theoremÓ was a watershed in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book, Amartya Sen and Eric Maskin explore the implications of ArrowÕs theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theoremÕs value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, while Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the idealÑgiven that achieving the ideal is impossible. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth Arrow himself, as well as essays by Sen and Maskin outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.
Author: Eric Maskin Publisher: Columbia University Press ISBN: 0231153287 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 164
Book Description
Kenneth Arrow's pathbreaking Òimpossibility theoremÓ was a watershed in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book, Amartya Sen and Eric Maskin explore the implications of ArrowÕs theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theoremÕs value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, while Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the idealÑgiven that achieving the ideal is impossible. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth Arrow himself, as well as essays by Sen and Maskin outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.
Author: Xiangdong He Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642048927 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 339
Book Description
Edited in collaboration with FoLLI, the Association of Logic, Language and Information, this book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, LORI 2009, held in Chongqing, China, in October 2009. The 24 revised full papers presented together with 8 posters were carefully reviewed and selected from a flood of submissions. The workshops topics include but are not limited to semantic models for knowledge, for belief, and for uncertainty, dynamic logics of knowledge, information flow, and action, logical analysis of the structure of games, belief revision, belief merging, logics for preferences and utilities, logics of intentions, plans, and goals, logics of probability and uncertainty, argument systems and their role in interaction, as well as norms, normative interaction, and normative multiagent systems.
Author: Alan D. Taylor Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 0521810523 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 191
Book Description
Honesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. Indeed, in the early 1970s, Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, building on the seminal work of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, proved that with three or more alternatives there is no reasonable voting system that is non-manipulable; voters will always have an opportunity to benefit by submitting a disingenuous ballot. The ensuing decades produced a number of theorems of striking mathematical naturality that dealt with the manipulability of voting systems. This 2005 book presents many of these results from the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially the contributions of economists and philosophers, from a mathematical point of view, with many new proofs. The presentation is almost completely self-contained, and requires no prerequisites except a willingness to follow rigorous mathematical arguments. Mathematics students, as well as mathematicians, political scientists, economists and philosophers will learn why it is impossible to devise a completely unmanipulable voting system.
Author: Kenneth J. Arrow Publisher: Yale University Press ISBN: 0300186983 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 347
Book Description
Originally published in 1951, "Social Choice and Individual Values" introduced "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem" and founded the field of social choice theory in economics and political science. This new edition, including a new foreword by Nobel laureate Eric Maskin, reintroduces Arrow's seminal book to a new generation of students and researchers."Far beyond a classic, this small book unleashed the ongoing explosion of interest in social choice and voting theory. A half-century later, the book remains full of profound insight: its central message, 'Arrow's Theorem, ' has changed the way we think."--Donald G. Saari, author of "Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected "
Author: Peter C. Fishburn Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 1400868335 Category : Social Science Languages : en Pages : 277
Book Description
One fundamental premise of democratic theory is that social policy, group choice, or collective action should be based on the preferences of the individuals in the society, group, or collective. Using the tools of formal mathematical analysis, Peter C. Fishburn explores and defines the conditions for social choice and methods for synthesizing individuals' preferences. This study is unique in its emphasis on social choice functions, the general position that individual indifference may not be transitive, and the use of certain mathematics such as linear algebra. The text is divided into three main parts: social choice between two alternatives, which examines a variety of majority-like functions; simple majority social choice, which focuses on social choice among many alternatives when two-element feasible subset choices are based on simple majority; and a general study of aspects and types of social choice functions for many alternatives. Originally published in 1973. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Author: Daniel J. Velleman Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 0521861241 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 401
Book Description
Many students have trouble the first time they take a mathematics course in which proofs play a significant role. This new edition of Velleman's successful text will prepare students to make the transition from solving problems to proving theorems by teaching them the techniques needed to read and write proofs. The book begins with the basic concepts of logic and set theory, to familiarize students with the language of mathematics and how it is interpreted. These concepts are used as the basis for a step-by-step breakdown of the most important techniques used in constructing proofs. The author shows how complex proofs are built up from these smaller steps, using detailed 'scratch work' sections to expose the machinery of proofs about the natural numbers, relations, functions, and infinite sets. To give students the opportunity to construct their own proofs, this new edition contains over 200 new exercises, selected solutions, and an introduction to Proof Designer software. No background beyond standard high school mathematics is assumed. This book will be useful to anyone interested in logic and proofs: computer scientists, philosophers, linguists, and of course mathematicians.
Author: Martin Aigner Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3662223430 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 194
Book Description
According to the great mathematician Paul Erdös, God maintains perfect mathematical proofs in The Book. This book presents the authors candidates for such "perfect proofs," those which contain brilliant ideas, clever connections, and wonderful observations, bringing new insight and surprising perspectives to problems from number theory, geometry, analysis, combinatorics, and graph theory. As a result, this book will be fun reading for anyone with an interest in mathematics.
Author: Giacomo Bonanno Publisher: Springer ISBN: 3642151647 Category : Computers Languages : en Pages : 219
Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Logic and the Foundations of the Theory of Game and Decision Theory, LOFT8 2008, held in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, July 2008. This volume is based on a selection of the presented papers and invited talks. They survived a thorough and lengthy reviewing process. The LOFT conferences are interdisciplinary events that bring together researchers from a variety of fields: computer science, economics, game theory, linguistics, logic, multi-agent systems, psychology, philosophy, social choice and statistics. Its focus is on the general issue of rationality and agency. The papers collected in this volume reflect the contemporary interests and interdisciplinary scope of the LOFT conferences.
Author: Allan M. Feldman Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 038729368X Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 401
Book Description
This book covers the main topics of welfare economics — general equilibrium models of exchange and production, Pareto optimality, un certainty, externalities and public goods — and some of the major topics of social choice theory — compensation criteria, fairness, voting. Arrow's Theorem, and the theory of implementation. The underlying question is this: "Is a particular economic or voting mechanism good or bad for society?" Welfare economics is mainly about whether the market mechanism is good or bad; social choice is largely about whether voting mechanisms, or other more abstract mechanisms, can improve upon the results of the market. This second edition updates the material of the first, written by Allan Feldman. It incorporates new sections to existing first-edition chapters, and it includes several new ones. Chapters 4, 6, 11, 15 and 16 are new, added in this edition. The first edition of the book grew out of an undergraduate welfare economics course at Brown University. The book is intended for the undergraduate student who has some prior familiarity with microeconomics. However, the book is also useful for graduate students and professionals, economists and non-economists, who want an overview of welfare and social choice results unburdened by detail and mathematical complexity. Welfare economics and social choice both probably suffer from ex cessively technical treatments in professional journals and monographs.
Author: Eric Maskin
Author: Eric Maskin
Author: Xiangdong He
Author: Alan D. Taylor
Author: Kenneth J. Arrow
Author: Peter C. Fishburn
Author: Peter C. Fishburn
Author: Daniel J. Velleman
Author: Martin Aigner
Author: Giacomo Bonanno
Author: Allan M. Feldman