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Author: Glenn Blackmon Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 1461527066 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 138
Book Description
The class is theory of price regulation assumed that the regulator knows the fIrm's costs, the key piece of information that enables regulators to pressure fmns to choose appropriate behaviors. The "regulatory problem" was reduced to a mere pricing problem: the regulator's goal was to align price with marginal cost, subject to the constraint that revenues must cover costs. Elegant and important insights ensued. The most important was that regulation was inevitably a struggle to achieve second-best outcomes. (Ramsey pricing was a splendid example. ) Reality proved harsh to regulatory theory. The fmn's costs are by no means known to the regulator. At best, the regulator may know how much is currently spent to provide services, but hardly what costs would be if the fmn vigorously pursued effIciency. Even if the current cost curve were known to the regulator, technologies change so swiftly that today's costs are a very poor indicator of tomorrow's, and those are the costs that will determine the fIrm's future decisions. With the burgeoning attention to information considerations and game theory in economics, the regulator's problem of eliciting host information about cost has received considerable attention. In most cases, however, it has been in context that are both static and stylized; such analyses rarely capture many of the essential elements of real world regulatory issues. This volume represents a fresh approach. It reflects Glenn Blackmon's twin strengths, a keen analytic mind and important experience in the regulatory arena.
Author: Glenn Blackmon Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 1461527066 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 138
Book Description
The class is theory of price regulation assumed that the regulator knows the fIrm's costs, the key piece of information that enables regulators to pressure fmns to choose appropriate behaviors. The "regulatory problem" was reduced to a mere pricing problem: the regulator's goal was to align price with marginal cost, subject to the constraint that revenues must cover costs. Elegant and important insights ensued. The most important was that regulation was inevitably a struggle to achieve second-best outcomes. (Ramsey pricing was a splendid example. ) Reality proved harsh to regulatory theory. The fmn's costs are by no means known to the regulator. At best, the regulator may know how much is currently spent to provide services, but hardly what costs would be if the fmn vigorously pursued effIciency. Even if the current cost curve were known to the regulator, technologies change so swiftly that today's costs are a very poor indicator of tomorrow's, and those are the costs that will determine the fIrm's future decisions. With the burgeoning attention to information considerations and game theory in economics, the regulator's problem of eliciting host information about cost has received considerable attention. In most cases, however, it has been in context that are both static and stylized; such analyses rarely capture many of the essential elements of real world regulatory issues. This volume represents a fresh approach. It reflects Glenn Blackmon's twin strengths, a keen analytic mind and important experience in the regulatory arena.
Author: Kurt A. Strasser Publisher: Praeger ISBN: Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 224
Book Description
This book proposes a new approach to the government regulation of utilities. Arguing that traditional command-and-control regulation does not encourage efficient performance, Strasser and Kohler advocate the use of an incentive-based regulatory system and offer a practical, realistic strategy for the successful implementation of such plans within the context of utility regulation. The analysis is supported by a comprehensive survey of the relevant legal materials, an overview of the literature on organization theory and institutional economics, and a survey of the latest thinking on how incentives can most effectively be paid. Strasser and Kohler begin by identifying problems associated with current regulatory techniques, demonstrating that disincentives are often built into the regulatory system. When that system has tried incentives, the authors show they have been applied in an ad hoc manner, further exacerbating the problem. In presenting the case for incentive-based regulation, the authors review the history of comprehensive incentive plans, look at what organization theory can teach us about using incentives as a regulatory strategy, and explore the effective use of incentive compensation by nonregulated companies. Strasser and Kohler then develop a strategy for implementing incentive plans in regulated utilities, showing that, in order to work, the plans must include the installation of clearly defined bonuses and penalties, specific standards of performance, the payment of bonuses to managers rather than shareholders, and reliable and complete measures of company performance. Policymakers, economists, public utility regulators, and attorneys involved in the complex arena of utility regulation will find Regulating Utilities with Management Incentives indispensable reading.
Author: Nancy L. Rose Publisher: University of Chicago Press ISBN: 022613816X Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 619
Book Description
The past thirty years have witnessed a transformation of government economic intervention in broad segments of industry throughout the world. Many industries historically subject to economic price and entry controls have been largely deregulated, including natural gas, trucking, airlines, and commercial banking. However, recent concerns about market power in restructured electricity markets, airline industry instability amid chronic financial stress, and the challenges created by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which allowed commercial banks to participate in investment banking, have led to calls for renewed market intervention. Economic Regulation and Its Reform collects research by a group of distinguished scholars who explore these and other issues surrounding government economic intervention. Determining the consequences of such intervention requires a careful assessment of the costs and benefits of imperfect regulation. Moreover, government interventions may take a variety of forms, from relatively nonintrusive performance-based regulations to more aggressive antitrust and competition policies and barriers to entry. This volume introduces the key issues surrounding economic regulation, provides an assessment of the economic effects of regulatory reforms over the past three decades, and examines how these insights bear on some of today’s most significant concerns in regulatory policy.
Author: Robert L. Mansell Publisher: Calgary : Van Horne Institute for International Transportation and Regulatory Affairs, University of Calgary ISBN: Category : Technology & Engineering Languages : en Pages : 204
Book Description
This book arrives at a time when further changes in the regulatory arena are being considered in response to the ongoing evolution of the Canadian natural gas industry. Greater efficiency in all aspects of gas supply, transmission and distribution is critical, and this has generally sharpened the focus of regulation on efficiency issues. This study sets out regulatory fundamentals and traditional regimes, and examines some of the main alternatives concerning the regulation of major gas pipelines in Canada. It draws on regulatory changes and experiments with respect to other sectors, such as telecommunications and electricity, as well as the pipeline sector in other jurisdictions. The study should be of great interest to regulated companies in gas transmission and distribution, oil pipelines, oil and gas producers, regulators, governments, and academics. Because of its generic nature, it should also be of interest to individuals involved in the regulation of other utilities.The Van Horne Institute for International Transportation and Regulatory Affairs is a not-for-profit organisation, established in 1992, headquartered in Calgary, Alberta, and affiliated with The University of Calgary. The Institute has been established to address important transportation and related regulatory issues such as legislation, taxes, subsidies, technology and economics, and is funded through memberships and fees for services.
Author: Michael A. Einhorn Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 1461539765 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 247
Book Description
Michael A. Einhorn In continuing to deregulate telecommunications companies, regulators have begun to consider alternative approaches to traditional cost-based price regulation as a means of encouraging monopoly efficiency, promulgating technological innova tion, protecting consumers, and reducing administrative costs. Under cost-based regulatory procedures that had been used, prices were designed to recover the regulated company's costs plus an allowed rate of return on its rate base; this strategy was costly to administer, provided no consistent incentives to cost-ef ficiency and technological improvement, afforded many opportunities for strategic misrepresentation of reported costs, and may have encouraged both uneconomic expansion of the utility's rate base and cross-subsidization of its competitive services. A category of alternative regulatory approaches can be classified broadly as social contracts. Under the general strategy of social contract regulation, regulators first delimit a group of regulated core services that they continue to regulate and then stipulate a list of constraints that the utility must agree to meet in the future; in exchange, regulators agree to detariff or deregulate entirely other competitive or nonessential services that the utility may offer. As long as no stipulated constraints are violated, the utility may price freely any service; if it reduces costs, it may keep a share of its profits. According to the National Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA, 1987), social contract agreements of one form or another have been considered or implemented in a majority of American states.
Author: Jason Scott Johnston Publisher: Lexington Books ISBN: 0739169467 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 235
Book Description
Institutions and Incentives in Regulatory Science explores fundamental problems with regulatory science in the environmental and natural resource law field. Each chapter covers a variety of natural resource and regulatory areas, ranging from climate change to endangered species protection and traditional health-based environmental regulation. Regulatory laws and institutions themselves strongly influence the direction of scientific research by creating a system of rewards and penalties for science. As a consequence, regulatory laws or institutions that are designed naively end up incentivizing scientists to generate and then publish only those results that further the substantive regulatory goals preferred by the scientists. By relying so heavily on science to dictate policy, regulatory laws and institutions encourage scientists to use their assessment of the state of the science to further their own preferred scientific and regulatory policy agendas. Additionally, many environmental and natural resource regulatory agencies have been instructed by legislatures to rely heavily upon science in their rulemaking. In areas of rapidly evolving science, regulatory agencies are inevitably looking for scientific consensus prematurely, before the scientific process has worked through competing hypotheses and evidence. The contributors in this volume address how institutions for regulatory science should be designed in light of the inevitable misfit between the political or legal demand for regulatory action and the actual state of evolving scientific knowledge.
Author: Glenn Blackmon
Author: Glenn Blackmon
Author: Christopher R. Knittel
Author: Kurt A. Strasser
Author: Nancy L. Rose
Author: Robert L. Mansell
Author: Michael A. Einhorn
Author: Bobby Glenn Blackmon
Author: 
Author: Damayanti Ghosh
Author: Jason Scott Johnston