To war on tubing and canvas a case study... PDF Download

Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428992782
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 52

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Author: Gary A. Best
Publisher: Fonthill Media
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 372

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‘The guys would come into the glider like a bunch of piss-ants, skittering around, real cocky like. But they settled down in the glider. Some got airsick and they began thinking about what was ahead. One time we were fired on just as we were landing and exiting the glider and one of the boys was hit. His friends dragged him to cover beneath a tree. He looked up at me and said, “Take my rifle, I’m dying.” I reached down and took his weapon, and he slumped back and died. That was pretty tough...’ Combat gliders were called by some as ‘Death Crates’, ‘Purple Heart Boxes’, ‘Flying Coffins’ and ‘Tow Targets’. They were not pretty and had no graceful lines. Viewed from the front, they had a pug nose and a sloping Neanderthal forehead. Their wings looked like the heavily-starched ears of a jackrabbit placed at right angles on a canvas-covered frame. Twice the length of the body, these wings were eighty-four feet in length, 70 per cent as long as the Wright Brothers’ first powered flight at Kitty Hawk. They could not become airborne, let alone fly, unless assisted by an engine-powered tow plane. And for those riding in the back, it was like flying ‘through the gates of hell’. The men who were trained and assigned to guide gliders into battle were said to be the only pilots who had no motors, armament, parachutes and no second chances. Like the aircraft they commanded, they were called inglorious names such as The Bastards Nobody Wanted, Glider Gladiators in Wooden Chariots; Hybrid Jackasses and Glory Boys. Beautifully written, profoundly illustrated and researched, Silent Invaders: Combat Gliders of the Second World War is a work that is dedicated to those brave men under impossible odds from the British and American servicemen on D-Day, the doomed Operation Market Garden in Holland and Hitler’s radical commando raid to rescue Mussolini. Illustrations: 80 black-and-white photographs

Author: Major Michael H. Manion
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786250683
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 144

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This study examines the role of combat gliders in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States during World War II (WWII). This thesis compares and contrasts each country with respect to pre-WWII glider experience, glider and airborne doctrine, glider pilot training, and glider production while outlining each country’s major glider operations. The author then compares the glider operations in the China-Burma-India Theater to the operations in Europe to describe the unique challenges based on the terrain and mission. Next, this thesis presents an analysis of the glider’s precipitous decline following WWII. The study concludes with recommendations for glider operations in the future based on the experiences of the past.

Author: Ricky B. Kelly
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Artificial satellites in telecommunication
Languages : en
Pages : 64

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"The purpose of this paper is to determine to what extent and how the Joint Force Commander (JFC) should control support from space forces. Current Air Force doctrine, as delineated in Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, identifies the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) as being responsible for both air and space for the theater. This statement follows the Air Force notion that air and space are an indivisible medium of warfare. On the other hand, Joint Pub 3-14 states the Operations Directorate, J-3, on the supported commander's (the JFC's) staff functions in this role. To examine this issue of in-theater control of space forces more closely, this study is divided into five chapters. Following the Introduction, Chapter 2 looks into how space forces were planned for and employed during Desert Storm. This chapter discusses who was in-charge and what planning processes were used. In Chapter 3, lessons and initiatives to improve planning and employment of support from space forces are discussed. Chapter 4 explores the possible need to have one individual in-theater clearly identified as being responsible for directing space forces. Centralized control, similar to air, may have beneficial effects that allow joint commanders to take better advantage of space forces' full potential. The study concludes by offering recommendations."--Abstract.

Author: John W. Doucette
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Counterinsurgency
Languages : en
Pages : 72

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Author: Susan E. Strednansky
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Conflict management
Languages : en
Pages : 66

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This study analyzes the role of the military commander in termination planning during operations other than war. First, the author assesses past and present political guidance, such as the Weinberger Doctrine and the presidential directive on Peace Operations, as well as conditions that affect exit strategy planning. The conclusion is that most of the guidance is vague and that internal and external influences make the process of transforming political goals into viable military objectives very difficult. Next, the writer evaluates actual end-state development and the subsequent exit strategies in Somalia and Haiti operations. The results of the Somalia case study indicate that the military commander was not provided specific end-state conditions and had to determine a termination strategy as he was prosecuting the conflict. Although this approach worked for a brief period of time, political events eventually overcame military planning and U.S. forces were withdrawn without accomplishing the political goals. Having learned from the Somalia operation, the Haiti planning was more thorough and looked specifically for concrete end-state conditions. Consequently, the military mission was more successful, though it is questionable what the political results of this intervention will be in the future. The final chapter states three conclusions: (1) if the political leaders do not provide a specific end state, the military commander will have to develop one and pass it up the chain of command for consideration and approval; (2) much better results can be expected from a military mission which is given an end state that was developed in coordination with both the political and the military establishments prior to commencement of hostilities; and (3) in all cases, the planning process will be difficult and fluid.

Author: Stephen M. Rothstein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Astronautics, Military
Languages : en
Pages : 116

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Major Rothstein traces the historical development of the aerospace concept, from its initial inception in 1944 as it was embodied in the far-reaching vision of Gen Henry H. 3Hap4 Arnold, until its public appearance in 1958. He uncovers reasons why airmen came to see their primary area of responsibility differently than the rest of the nation and why their aerospace concept failed to win bureaucratic support. By tracing the aerospace concept2s technological and intellectual development against a contextual backdrop of geopolitics, national security strategy, national space policy, interservice competition, and internal tensions within the Air Force, Major Rothstein offers historical lessons learned for today2s planners seeking to move the Air Force toward an aerospace force.

Author: Mark C. Nowland
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Aeronautics, Military
Languages : en
Pages : 100

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"The purpose of this study is to identify criteria that will provide objective analysis of a Halt Phase strategy. The study identifies the key criteria by examining air combat in three operations: the Battle of Bismarck Sea, the 1973 Golan Heights battles of the Yom Kippur War, and finally the Iraqi Republican Guard "escape" from Basra. The examination focuses on air operations looking for tactics, tactical innovations, and operational circumstances that inhibit or enhance air operations designed to halt the advance or retreat of significant ground formations. The study evaluates each case in three major phases: pre-hostility preparation, conduct of combat operations and finally the results and analysis of the operation. Pre-hostility operations specifically examine the doctrine, organization, equipment and technology, and the training of friendly forces. The conduct of operations phase explores the contextual elements, including a summary of the operation, and investigates intelligence, command and control and logistical factors. Finally, the results of each case are analyzed to discover factors that contribute positively, negatively, or not significantly to the outcome of the operation. Each case study's unique circumstances shaped the result; however, the criteria of organization and training appear dominant with command and control, doctrine and technology being recurrent in allowing air forces to halt an enemy surface force. The specific context of the battle, the intelligence preparation, and logistics of each conflict cannot be ignored, but were not determined as recurrent factors in all three case studies, although intelligence was significant in the Bismarck Sea. The study concludes with three major lessons. First, people make the Air Force successful; second, the halt strategy is appropriate for certain circumstances, but some sister service critiques of the strategy are valid; third, the Air Force should acknowledge the limitations of airpower, but it should also develop methods to minimize the limits in the application of airpower in order to make 'halt' the strategy even more effective in the future than it has been in the past."--Air University Library.

Author: Kimberly M. Corcoran
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Aeronautics, Military
Languages : en
Pages : 80

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Author: Peter A. Costello
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Aeronautics, Military
Languages : en
Pages : 92

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Doctrinal differences over the employment of airpower are as old as military aviation itself. One particular area of contention has been close air support (CAS). The two primary issues related to CAS are its command and control and responsiveness. Soldiers have argued that ground commanders should control their own aircraft, because ownership assures that airpower directly responds to their needs. Airmen have maintained that airpower should be centralized under a single air commander to allow for its flexible theaterwide employment. During World War 2, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm, ground commanders demanded greater influence over airpower employment. Concurrently, the Air Force disagreed with the Navy and Marine Corps over centralized versus decentralized control of air assets. These two issues of command and control and responsiveness are embodied in the process of apportioning and allocating CAS. In all conflicts since World War 2, the United States has had the luxury of an overabundance of air assets. Despite a facade of centralization, airpower was parceled out to fill nearly everyone's needs. This avoided the need for any difficult choices. This study follows the history of CAS since World War 2 to examine how it has been apportioned and allocated in the past. It then examines the current joint air operations process. It is the contention of this study that the current system, rooted in its historical past, does not fully employ CAS to its optimum potential. The historical view of CAS has been as a tactical measure, with limited localized effects. However, properly integrated and coequal with the ground scheme of maneuver, it can have operational level effects. This study examines two theories of the use of CAS at the operational level and then recommends changes to the view of CAS and the process for its apportionment and allocation.