Author: Mohammad Ali KashefiPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Three Essays on Strategic Aspects in Oligopoly with Vertical Structure
Author: Mohammad Ali KashefiStrategic Aspects of Oligopolistic Vertical Integration
Author: C. WuPublisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 1483296164
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 244
Book Description
In this text some fundamental issues concerning the strategic impact of vertical structures of firms are discussed in a successive oligopoly model. Vertical integration strategy has been identified as one of the key strategies which determine the success or failure of enterprises. Many studies on vertical integration are based on business experiences and interviews with managers. However, the extensive application of game theory in business economics allows this study on vertical integration to be based on sound theoretic ground. Moreover, the significance of public enterprises in some Western European economies and the trends of economic transition in Eastern Europe justify the efforts to analyse vertical integration issues in the mixed market, which is created by the participation of a public firm into an industry otherwise characterised as a successive oligopoly.
Three Essays on Successive Vertical Oligopolies
Author: Joon LimPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Oligopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 254
Book Description
Three Essays on Oligopoly and Financial Structure
Author: Hyun Jong KimPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Essays on Strategic Behavior in Oligopoly Markets
Author: Kosin IsariyawongsePublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Oligopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 204
Book Description
This dissertation addresses issues of strategic behavior of firms in oligopoly markets. In the first study we analyze how generic advertising affects brand advertising and firm profits in differentiated oligopoly markets. We develop two models, one with vertical differentiation and another with horizontal differentiation. In the case of vertical differentiation, we amend Crespi's (2007) model to show that only the high quality firm will use brand advertising. We also show that when differentiation is horizontal, the equilibrium is likely to be more symmetric in terms of each firm's profits, spending on brand advertising, and response to generic advertising. We also demonstrate that generic advertising will increase expenditures on brand advertising when firms play a supermodular game. In the second study, we analyze the interaction between generic advertising, brand advertising, and firm profits when products are differentiated either vertically or horizontally and brand advertising is purely informative. That is, brand advertising lowers consumer search costs of identifying brand characteristics. The model demonstrates that firms can benefit from investing in brand advertising that lowers consumer search costs as well as from brand advertising that is purely persuasive. In addition, the results demonstrate that whether brand advertising is persuasive or informative, the outcome is more likely to be symmetric with horizontal differentiation than with vertical differentiation. This study shows that brand advertising is a strategic complement when persuasive and a strategic substitute when informative. In the third study, we allow the choice of strategic variable, output and price, to be endogenous to the firm. We consider the case where one firm chooses output and the other firm chooses price, which we call a Cournot-Bertrand model. We provide a real world example of this "Cournot-Bertrand" behavior and show that the outcome can be a Nash equilibrium. Allowing the timing of play (early or late) as well as the strategic variable (output or price) to be endogenous, we demonstrate an outcome where one firm competes in output and the other firm competes in price can be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Three Essays on Price Competition in Oligopoly
Author: Shyh-Fang UengPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 118
Book Description
This research investigates three issues related to the economic performance of oligopolistic markets where firms produce differentiated products and compete in prices. First of all, this dissertation uses a Markov Perfect Equilibrium approach with fixed periods of commitment of actions to answer the question of what prices a duopolists will charge in equilibrium if they produce horizontally differentiated products, move alternatingly, and compete in prices forever. It is found that firms charge prices which are higher than Nash equilibrium prices but lower than the fully collusive equilibrium prices. Also, contrasted with the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot constituent game, the firm having the significantly higher demand responsiveness to its own price always charges a lower price than the other firm does although it has higher marginal cost. The dissertation then proceeds to study whether a firm can overcome its cost disadvantage by upgrading its product over the rival's, and if so, whether there exists a profit-division which will induce the low cost firm and the high cost firm to collude and no one has an incentive to cheat. The results show that (1) the ability of upgrading the product over the rival's can allow a high cost firm to earn higher profit than a cost advantaged low cost firm; (2) there exists at least one profit-division which can sustain full collusion; and (3) in the collusive equilibrium firms enlarge their quality differences to alleviate the price tension between their products. Finally, this work investigates the welfare effect of mergers which occur in an oligopolistic industry where firms produce differentiated products. It is shown that for the merger to be socially beneficial, the number of the merging firms must be less than the total number of firms in the industry minus the ratio of the products' own elasticity to cross elasticity. The analysis indicates that the welfare effect of a merger of a specific size depends on the substitutability among products of the industry.
Three Essays on Strategic Aspects of International Trade
Author: Jee-Hyeong ParkThree Essays on Oligopoly
Author: Markus ReisingerStrategic and Behavioral Aspects of (anti-)competitive Conduct in Oligopolies
Author: Georg ClemensThree Essays on the Economics of Advertising in Oligopoly
Author: Jae-Woo LeePublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Oligopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 250
Book Description