Author: Jai-June KimPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 262
Book Description
Three Essays on Oligopolistic Competition in an Open Economy
Author: Jai-June KimThree Essays on Strategic Trading in Oligopolistic Economies
Author: Alexei BoulatovThree Essays in Industrial Economics and Public Policy
Author: Cheawanet BunchaiPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
This dissertation comprises of three essays in industrial economics. My first essay analyzes social efficiency of entry into a downstream oligopoly of a vertical market structure, where an upstream supplier sells an essential input to all firms producing downstream. In the downstream markets, a multiproduct firm is both a monopoly in its own product and a leader in a different product market with free entry of followers. We show that in the presence of scale economies, entry is socially insufficient. The insufficiency of entry is due to the fact that entry generates a business-creating effect significantly large enough to dominate a business-stealing effect, regardless of whether the upstream supplier's input pricing strategy is discriminatory or uniform. This suggests that entry regulation as a public policy is socially undesirable in the downstream oligopoly of a vertical market structure. My second essay examines differences in welfare implications between discriminatory and uniform input price regimes in vertically related markets where a multiproduct firm operates downstream in two separate markets: one is a monopoly and the other is an oligopoly with entry of new firms. In the analysis, we analyze how the downstream entry into the oligopolistic market affects social efficiency. In an open economy, whether the input price regime is discriminatory or uniform, entry is always socially excessive in the presence of scale economies. This contrasts with the existing studies in the literature that entry is always socially insufficient in an open economy with the presence of scale economies. Focusing on the scenario where vertically integrated producer (VIP) adopts a non-foreclosure strategy, my third essay shows that downstream entry is socially insufficient despite scale economies and the marginal cost difference between the VIP and its retail competitors. The non-foreclosure equilibrium arises when the VIP's wholesale profit from the sales of an essential input is sufficiently large and the VIP shares the profit with its downstream competitors. For the case of an open economy where the VIP is a foreign firm, downstream entry continues to be socially insufficient. Entry regulation is therefore socially undesirable, but a production subsidy encouraging downstream entry is shown to be a welfare-improving policy.
Three Essays on Successive Vertical Oligopolies
Author: Joon LimPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Oligopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 254
Book Description
Three Essays on the Open Economy
Author: David Yaukar WongPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Capital movements
Languages : en
Pages : 266
Book Description
Three Essays on Firm Strategy and Public Policy
Author: Byung-Cheol KimPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumer protection
Languages : en
Pages : 250
Book Description
Three Essays on Oligopoly and Financial Structure
Author: Hyun Jong KimPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Three Essays in Competition Economics
Author: Dongyu GuoThe Theory of Money and Financial Institutions
Author: Martin ShubikPublisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262693110
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 472
Book Description
This first volume in a three-volume exposition of Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics" explores a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. This is the first volume in a three-volume exposition of Martin Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics"--a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form. The approach involves a search for minimal financial institutions that appear as a logical, technological, and institutional necessity, as part of the "rules of the game." Money and financial institutions are assumed to be the basic elements of the network that transmits the sociopolitical imperatives to the economy. Volume 1 deals with a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. Volume 2 explores the new economic features that arise when we consider multi-period finite and infinite horizon economies. Volume 3 will consider the specific role of financial institutions and government, and formulate the economic financial control problem linking micro- and macroeconomics.
Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games
Author: Pierre von MouchePublisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319292544
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 298
Book Description
This state-of-the-art collection of papers on the theory of Cournotian competition focuses on two main subjects: oligopolistic Cournot competition and contests. The contributors present various applications of the Cournotian Equilibrium Theory, addressing topics such as equilibrium existence and uniqueness, equilibrium structure, dynamic processes, coalitional behavior and welfare. Special emphasis is placed on the aggregative nature of the games that are relevant to such theory. This contributed volume was written to celebrate the 80th birthday of Prof. Koji Okuguchi, a pioneer in oligopoly theory.