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Author: Cristian Ramirez Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 187
Book Description
Scholars in strategy, organizational behavior, and economics have shown increasing interest in the link between non-monetary, extrinsic incentives and employee productivity. However, nearly all of this research examines rewards that have some kind of social recognition mechanism. In the first chapter of my dissertation, I examine the awarding of private, non-monetary badges for hitting performance targets. On Amazon Mechanical Turk, workers receiving this type of badge upon hitting a performance threshold are approximately 9.4 percent more productive than workers in the control group. Interestingly, this increase in productivity was almost the exact same as giving workers hitting the threshold a 20 percent bonus in pay. The second chapter of my dissertation presents the analysis of an actual incentive scheme that has a unique characteristic: it combines both symbolic and pecuniary incentives under the same platform. By examining the results of this real-life application, I can estimate the extent to which workers respond to an actual application of gamification and how its impact varies over time. Understanding the determinants of value captured by different stakeholders is a key issue for both practitioners and scholars in strategic management. The final chapter of my dissertation presents a study on variations in worker compensation in the copper mining industry. Our results show that there is a positive effect of copper price on workers' compensation, but this effect is moderated by the characteristics of labor regulation in each country.
Author: Cristian Ramirez Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 187
Book Description
Scholars in strategy, organizational behavior, and economics have shown increasing interest in the link between non-monetary, extrinsic incentives and employee productivity. However, nearly all of this research examines rewards that have some kind of social recognition mechanism. In the first chapter of my dissertation, I examine the awarding of private, non-monetary badges for hitting performance targets. On Amazon Mechanical Turk, workers receiving this type of badge upon hitting a performance threshold are approximately 9.4 percent more productive than workers in the control group. Interestingly, this increase in productivity was almost the exact same as giving workers hitting the threshold a 20 percent bonus in pay. The second chapter of my dissertation presents the analysis of an actual incentive scheme that has a unique characteristic: it combines both symbolic and pecuniary incentives under the same platform. By examining the results of this real-life application, I can estimate the extent to which workers respond to an actual application of gamification and how its impact varies over time. Understanding the determinants of value captured by different stakeholders is a key issue for both practitioners and scholars in strategic management. The final chapter of my dissertation presents a study on variations in worker compensation in the copper mining industry. Our results show that there is a positive effect of copper price on workers' compensation, but this effect is moderated by the characteristics of labor regulation in each country.
Author: Carolyn M. Wolff Publisher: ISBN: Category : Incentive awards Languages : en Pages : 157
Book Description
"The three essays in this dissertation focus on the impacts of work incentives geared towards two very different segments of the labor market. The first essay, "Does Incentive Pay Alter Physician Effort? An Analysis of the Time and Treatment that Physicians Provide to Patients," examines the link between incentive pay and effort among a group of highly-skilled workers: physicians. The other two essays, "Exiting TANF in South Carolina after the Deficit Reduction Act" and "What Happened to Cash Assistance for Needy Families," focus on a group of generally low-skilled, low-wage workers: welfare recipients. "Exiting TANF in South Carolina after the Deficit Reduction Act " examines the impact of a recent welfare reform aimed at promoting employment and self-sufficiency on durations of welfare recipiency. "What Happened to Cash Assistance for Needy Families?" identifies trends in welfare recipiency and self-sufficiency over the past twenty years. While a number of studies have attempted to measure the impact of financial incentives on physician behavior, none has examined the impact of performance-based incentive pay on broad measures of physician effort. In "Does Incentive Pay Alter Physician Effort? An Analysis of the Time and Treatment that Physicians Provide to Patients." I use newly available data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey from 2006 through 2008 to estimate the effect of three specific types of performance-based incentive pay -- productivity incentives, patient-centered incentives, and practice profiling incentives -- on both the time physicians spend with patients and the intensity with which physicians treat patients. Using a discrete factor approximation approach to control for the endogeneity of incentive pay, I am able to estimate the impact of these types of incentive pay on physician effort. I find that performance-based incentive pay is associated with physicians spending significantly less time with each patient. I also find some evidence that performance-based incentive pay impacts physicians' intensity of treatment. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) narrowed and standardized the work and work readiness activities that satisfy the work requirement of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. In "Exiting TANF in South Carolina after the Deficit Reduction Act, " I use administrative data from South Carolina's TANF program and employ event history techniques with a difference-in-difference estimation framework to analyze the effect of this policy change. I find that the DRA's definition of work and work readiness activities reduced the likelihood of black recipients to exit the TANF program in South Carolina while increasing the likelihood of exit for non-black recipients. For blacks, this decrease in the hazard comes from a decrease in the likelihood of exit through employment. For non-blacks, the result stems from an increase in the hazards for administrative exits and for other income exits. I also find that the reform led to longer durations of TANF benefit receipt in South Carolina for black recipients and shorter durations of cash assistance for non-black recipients. A primary goal of welfare reform since the early 1990's has been to increase the self-sufficiency of welfare recipients. The essay "What Happened to Cash Assistance for Needy Families?, " coauthored with David. C. Ribar, examines trends in the characteristics and outcomes for recipient families to determine if welfare recipients are becoming more self-sufficient. Using annual public use data on AFDC and TANF households from the Department of Health and Human Services, we find both positive and negative trends over the past twenty years. We find that the size of the caseload has decreased, the fraction of the caseload with earned income has increased, and the average earnings of welfare recipients has increased. On the other hand, we find that the fraction of child-only cases has increased, the caseload has disproportionately dropped the least-skilled households, average benefits fell faster than earnings grew, and the majority of households that exit TANF have no earnings."--Abstract from author supplied metadata.
Author: Yining Li Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 29
Book Description
Intrinsic motives and non-monetary incentives are important drivers of worker satisfaction, particularly in the modern knowledge economy. Recent empirical work has established, for example, that various forms of non-monetary incentives can make workers more satisfied, more likely to stay at the firm, and more productive (e.g., Cassar and Meier, 2018). However, little theoretical work is done to understand the role of general non-monetary incentives in organizations. Hence, this thesis intends to fill that gap by developing a sequence of four models based on Bakers multi-task framework (2002) to capture the effects of non-monetary incentives on employee behavior and wage design. I argue that non-monetary incentives can complement traditional monetary compensation to motivate effort. Such incentives can serve as a more efficient alternative to wages and solve many incentive problems caused by the limitations of a purely financial incentive contract, including adverse selection problems, moral hazard problems, and coordination failures.
Author: Emre Ekinci Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 196
Book Description
This dissertation is a collection of three essays on personnel economics. The first essay studies bonus payments in a hierarchical firm. A well-documented finding in the internal labor markets literature is that the size of bonus payments increases as one moves up the corporate ladder. Two existing theories that can be used to explain this finding cannot fully capture the empirical patterns of the size of bonus payments. I develop a unified framework that can better match the empirical findings. Using a dynamic tournament model augmented with an asymmetric learning structure in which the current employer has an informational advantage over its competitors regarding the worker's productivity, my model offers an economic rationale for the employer's decision on the size of bonus payments by identifying two counteracting mechanisms that determine bonuses. Specifically, the size of bonus payments increases with the level of effort the employer aims to induce, but decreases with the size of the worker's career-concern incentives. I test the model's predictions using data from the personnel records of a medium-sized firm in the financial services industry. The results provide direct evidence for the model's predictions. The second essay investigates how salaries and bonus payments are related to turnover. In contrast with the existing literature, this study treats bonus payments as a distinct type of compensation, rather than aggregating them with salaries. The first part of the empirical analysis focuses on data coming from the personnel records of a medium-sized U.S. firm. I find that earning a bonus in the current period, as well as the size of the bonus, is negatively related to the probability of turnover after controlling for the size of salary or the growth rate of salary. These results also indicate that the growth rate of salary is negatively related to turnover, while results concerning the effect of the size of salaries are mixed. The second part of the empirical analysis uses a sample drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The results show that salary, both in terms of size and growth rate, has a negative effect on the probabilities of quits and layoffs; whereas the negative effect of bonus payments is more evident in layoffs than quits. This third essay examines conditions under which employee referrals serve a screening function. Unlike the existing theoretical work, the possibility of a conflict of interest arising between the firm and current employees during the referral process is investigated. I consider two potential mechanisms that lead to a conflict of interest. First, I examine how the employee's social connections relate to his referral decision. I show that the employee finds it optimal to refer applicants with whom he has a strong social connection rather than applicants of high ability. Second, I examine how the employee's promotion prospects affect his referral decisions. Specifically, I posit that the current employee will have incentives to refer an applicant of lower ability if he faces any possibility of competition for promotions between himself and the newly hired worker. In either of these situations, employee referrals may not provide screening of more able workers. Finally, I show that the firm can make use of referral bonuses, which are contingent on the referral's performance, to align incentives of the employee with those of the firm.
Author: Cristian Ramirez
Author: Cristian Ramirez
Author: Yanhui Wu
Author: Carolyn M. Wolff
Author: Yining Li
Author: Amalia Rebecca Miller
Author: Emre Ekinci
Author: Charles S. Wassell
Author: Ibolya Schindele
Author: Jacob A. Stockfisch
Author: Regine Oexl