Author: James Campbell CooperPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 157
Book Description
Three Essays on Law and Economics
Author: James Campbell CooperPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 157
Book Description
Three Essays in Law and Economics
Author: Robert M. Hunt (econoom.)Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 166
Book Description
Three Essays in Law and Economics
Author: Asha SadanandThree Essays on Law and Economics
Author: Steven TokarPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Law and economics
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Three essays in economics and law
Author: Jonathan B. BakerThree Essays in Economics and Law
Author: Jonathan Brody BakerPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 172
Book Description
Three Essays in the Economics of Law and Language
Author: Hugo Marc MialonThree Essays in Law and Economics [microform] : Thesis
![Three Essays in Law and Economics [microform] : Thesis PDF](https://books.google.com/books/content/images/frontcover/GNAVmwEACAAJ?fife=w80-h100)
Author: Sadanand, AshaPublisher: Ann Arbor, Mich. : University Microfilms International
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 410
Book Description
Three Essays in Law and Economics
Author: Joshua B. FischmanPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 160
Book Description
(cont.) The parameters of the negotiation model and the judges' ideological inclinations are then estimated on a data set of sex discrimination cases using maximum likelihood estimation. The results find strong evidence that judges' votes are influenced by their panel colleagues, but that this influence mostly takes the form of outvoted judges joining the majority. However, judges in the minority appear to have a small but significant effect on case outcomes. The third chapter examines the impact of liability law on firms' investments in product safety when such investments take the form of fixed costs and liability does not apply equally to competing products. Using a model with one innovative good and one competitively supplied good, the paper finds that asymmetric liability deters safety innovation when the administration of the tort system is inefficient. When inefficiencies in the tort system are small, however, incentives to develop safer products may be stronger under asymmetric liability.
Author: Wei-Lin Liu