Author: Byung-Cheol KimPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumer protection
Languages : en
Pages : 250
Book Description
Three Essays on Firm Strategy and Public Policy
Author: Byung-Cheol KimPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumer protection
Languages : en
Pages : 250
Book Description
Managing Risks And Uncertainty In Business-Government Relationship
Author: Himanshu BhattPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Within this broad domain of nonmarket strategy, I study a set of research questions concerning firms' risk and uncertainty management strategies as a response to government's policy actions. A robust literature in strategy, international business, and management has long established that governments' and businesses' interests do not always align and a measure of risks and uncertainty persists regarding governments' intent, priorities, and future behavior from the firms' perspective. Adopting a phenomena-driven approach, I advance and elaborate upon our understanding with respect to each of these theoretical perspectives - signaling theory, political risks, and policy uncertainty - by examining instances of governments' policy actions as shifts in institutional environment and how that may relate to firms' evaluation of underlying risks and uncertainty. Specifically, I study three such initiatives - law enforcement actions against organized crime, encouraging private participation in infrastructure projects, and harmonization of patent laws with global standards - in the form of three essays. In doing so, I focus on the firm as the unit of analysis, relying principally on quantitative analyses on a sample of observational data but also use other approaches - case study, interviews, etc. - to support my findings.
Three Essays on Firm Innovation
Author: Louise LundbjergPublisher:
ISBN: 9788775681228
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Three Essays in Industrial Economics and Public Policy
Author: Cheawanet BunchaiPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
This dissertation comprises of three essays in industrial economics. My first essay analyzes social efficiency of entry into a downstream oligopoly of a vertical market structure, where an upstream supplier sells an essential input to all firms producing downstream. In the downstream markets, a multiproduct firm is both a monopoly in its own product and a leader in a different product market with free entry of followers. We show that in the presence of scale economies, entry is socially insufficient. The insufficiency of entry is due to the fact that entry generates a business-creating effect significantly large enough to dominate a business-stealing effect, regardless of whether the upstream supplier's input pricing strategy is discriminatory or uniform. This suggests that entry regulation as a public policy is socially undesirable in the downstream oligopoly of a vertical market structure. My second essay examines differences in welfare implications between discriminatory and uniform input price regimes in vertically related markets where a multiproduct firm operates downstream in two separate markets: one is a monopoly and the other is an oligopoly with entry of new firms. In the analysis, we analyze how the downstream entry into the oligopolistic market affects social efficiency. In an open economy, whether the input price regime is discriminatory or uniform, entry is always socially excessive in the presence of scale economies. This contrasts with the existing studies in the literature that entry is always socially insufficient in an open economy with the presence of scale economies. Focusing on the scenario where vertically integrated producer (VIP) adopts a non-foreclosure strategy, my third essay shows that downstream entry is socially insufficient despite scale economies and the marginal cost difference between the VIP and its retail competitors. The non-foreclosure equilibrium arises when the VIP's wholesale profit from the sales of an essential input is sufficiently large and the VIP shares the profit with its downstream competitors. For the case of an open economy where the VIP is a foreign firm, downstream entry continues to be socially insufficient. Entry regulation is therefore socially undesirable, but a production subsidy encouraging downstream entry is shown to be a welfare-improving policy.
Three Essays on the Strategic Behavior of Firms
Author: Woosik ChuThree Essays on Regulation of Firms and Investment Funds
Author: Sheran DengPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate governance
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
ESSAY 1: Using a Department of Justice policy change intended to increase individual responsibility of managers for corporate offenses (e.g., pollution) as a natural experiment, I find that firms with a high ex-ante probability of regulatory violations ("exposed firms") reduce investment, sales, and employment. Such reductions in reduce shareholder value. Exposed firms suffer an abnormal return of -1% around the event date on average. The negative value effects are concentrated in exposed firms with low agency costs. Exposed firms have lower cash salaries for managers after the policy intervention. Various tests support the causal effect of the policy intervention on firm behavior. These findings suggest that most regulatory offenses do not represent an agency cost on shareholders when fines are paid by shareholders. Instead, fines on shareholders allow a manager to pursue potentially harmful projects whose value to shareholders outweighs fines borne by them. ESSAY2: We present a model on regulating externalities of a firm run by a manager and owned by shareholders. In equilibrium, optimal regulation in the presence of an agency conflict can take two forms. In one regulatory strategy, a fine is imposed on the manager, and no firing takes place. Alternatively, a fine is imposed on the firm (i.e., shareholders), and the fine is lower if the manager is fired. As the agency conflict becomes more severe fining the manager becomes more attractive. Finally, we find that regulation costs are lower when the manager and shareholders are separate entities. ESSAY3: This paper studies the impact of disclosure on short selling. Using a confidential dataset on shorts on stocks traded in the Dutch stock market including both short positions large enough to trigger public disclosure and positions not large enough, we find that the quality of shorts increases discontinuously at the reporting threshold. we find strong evidence that short sellers increase security selection intensity when their short positions approach the reporting threshold. We rule out several alternative explanations These results suggest that transparency disincentivizes shorting on noisy information.
Three Essays on Corporate Growth Strategy and Firm Performance
Author: Yu LiuPublisher:
ISBN: 9781109515312
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 127
Book Description
Three Essays on the Theory of the Firm
Author: Namhoon KwonThree Essays on the Growth of Firms
Author: Paul A. KattumanGrowth of Firms Under Uncertainty
Author: Ashoka ModyPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 314
Book Description