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Three Essays on Firm Dynamics and Macroeconomics

Three Essays on Firm Dynamics and Macroeconomics PDF Author: María Francisca Pérez Veyl
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description


Three Essays on Firm Dynamics and Macroeconomics

Three Essays on Firm Dynamics and Macroeconomics PDF Author: María Francisca Pérez Veyl
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description


Essays on Macroeconomics and Firm Dynamics

Essays on Macroeconomics and Firm Dynamics PDF Author: Lei Zhang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 192

Book Description
This dissertation contains three essays at the interaction between macroeconomics and the financial market, with an emphasis on macroeconomic implications of heterogeneous firms under financial frictions. My dissertation explores the relationships among financial market friction, firms' entry and exit behaviors, and job reallocation over the business cycle. Chapter 1 examines the macroeconomic effects of financial leverage and firms' endogenous entry and exit on job reallocation over the business cycle. Financial leverage and the extensive margin are the keys to explain job reallocation at both the firm-level and the aggregate level. I build a general equilibrium industry dynamics model with endogenous entry and exit, a frictional labor market, and borrowing constraints. The model provides a novel theory that financially constrained firms adjust employment more often. I characterize an analytical solution to the wage bargaining problem between a leveraged firm and workers. Higher financial leverage allows constrained firms to bargain for lower wages, but also induces higher default risks. In the model, firms adopt (S,s) employment decision rules. Because the entry and exit firms are more likely to be borrowing constrained, a negative shock affects the inaction regions of the entry and exit firms more than that of the incumbents. In the simulated model, the extensive margin explains 36% of the job reallocation volatility, which is very close to the data and is quantitatively significant. Chapter 2 investigates firms' financial behaviors and size distributions over the business cycle. We propose a general equilibrium industry dynamics model of firms' capital structure and entry and exit behaviors. The financial market frictions capture both the age dependence and size dependence of firms' size distributions. When we add the aggregate shocks to the model, it can account for the business cycle patterns of firm dynamics: 1) entry is more procyclical than exit; 2) debt is procyclical, and equity issuance is countercyclical; and 3) the cyclicalities of debt and equity issuance are negatively correlated with firm size and age. Chapter 3 studies the equilibrium pricing of complex securities in segmented markets by risk-averse expert investors who are subject to asset-specific risk. Investor expertise varies, and the investment technology of investors with more expertise is subject to less asset-specific risk. Expert demand lowers equilibrium required returns, reducing participation, and leading to endogenously segmented markets. Amongst participants, portfolio decisions and realized returns determine the joint distribution of financial expertise and financial wealth. This distribution, along with participation, then determines market-level risk bearing capacity. We show that more complex assets deliver higher equilibrium returns to expert participants. Moreover, we explain why complex assets can have lower overall participation despite higher market-level alphas and Sharpe ratios. Finally, we show how complexity affects the size distribution of complex asset investors in a way that is consistent with the size distribution of hedge funds.

Essays on Firm Dynamics and Macroeconomics

Essays on Firm Dynamics and Macroeconomics PDF Author: Yuanhao Niu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Macroeconomics
Languages : en
Pages : 85

Book Description


Three Essays in the Role of Firms in Macroeconomics

Three Essays in the Role of Firms in Macroeconomics PDF Author: Benjamin Caswell
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Book Description


Essays in Macroeconomics and Firm Dynamics

Essays in Macroeconomics and Firm Dynamics PDF Author: Maryam Vaziri
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description


Essays on the Macroeconomics of Firm Dynamics and Financial Frictions

Essays on the Macroeconomics of Firm Dynamics and Financial Frictions PDF Author: Davide Maria Melcangi
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description


קבר הגולגלות החוורות

קבר הגולגלות החוורות PDF Author:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Book Description


Three Essays on Empirical Macroeconomics

Three Essays on Empirical Macroeconomics PDF Author: Christopher C. Douglas
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ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking, Central
Languages : en
Pages : 390

Book Description


Essays in Macroeconomics

Essays in Macroeconomics PDF Author: Thomas Walsh
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description


Essays on Macroeconomics and Firm Dynamics

Essays on Macroeconomics and Firm Dynamics PDF Author: Liyan Shi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 136

Book Description
This dissertation contributes towards the understanding of the macroeconomic effects of micro-level firm dynamics, in particular firm entry, exit, and innovation activities in driving aggregate economic dynamism and growth. It focuses on the frictions affecting firms in these activities when contracting with their managers and workers, as well as peers, and the corrective role policies can play. The dissertation consists of two chapters. The first chapter, "Restrictions on Executive Mobility and Reallocation: The Aggregate Effect of Non-Competition Contracts", assesses the aggregate effect of non-competition employment contracts, agreements that exclude employees from joining competing firms for a duration of time, in the managerial labor market. These contracts encourage firm investment but restrict manager mobility. To explore this tradeoff, I develop a dynamic contracting model in which firms use non-competition to enforce buyout payment when their managers are poached, ultimately extracting rent from outside firms. Such rent extraction encourages initial employing firms to undertake more investment, as they partially capture the external payoff, but distorts manager allocation. I show that the privately-optimal contract over-extracts rent by setting an excessively long non-competition duration. Therefore, restrictions on non-competition can improve efficiency. To quantitatively evaluate the theory, I assemble a new dataset on non-competition contracts for executives in U.S. public firms. Using the contract data, I find that executives under non-competition are associated with a lower separation rate and higher firm investment. I also provide new empirical evidence consistent with non-competition reducing wage-backloading in the model. The calibrated model suggests that the optimal restriction on non-competition duration is close to banning non-competition. The second chapter, "Knowledge Creation and Diffusion with Limited Appropriation" (joint with Hugo Hopenhayn), studies the interaction of innovation and imitation in driving economic growth. In relation to a series of recent papers in the macro literature have emphasized the interaction between the two forces, we introduce two key elements in considering the incentives to innovate versus imitate. First, we consider frictions in matching innovators and imitators in the process of knowledge diffusion. Second, while most of the recent literature assume that imitators capture the entire surplus from knowledge diffusion, we consider a general bargaining problem between the innovators and imitators in dividing surplus. In a simple one period model, we derive a Hosios condition for the optimal surplus division when firms are ex-ante homogeneous. But we also find that as the degree of firm heterogeneity increases, innovators' share of surplus must decrease to maximize growth, approaching zero for sufficiently large heterogeneity. Our calibrated dynamic model suggests that the optimal share of surplus innovators appropriate should be at the lower end, consistent with weak intellectual property rights.