Author: Yeon-Koo ChePublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Three Essays on Economic Incentive Mechanisms
Author: Yeon-Koo CheThree Essays on Economics and Incentives
Author: D.R.D. DellerEssays on Financial Incentive Mechanisms Under Repetition on Economics Experiments
Author: Essays on Economic Incentives in Environmental Policy
Author: Isla Rose Globus-HarrisPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 134
Book Description
This dissertation explores environmental economics, focusing on the interaction between incentives and environmental policies. I use microeconomic theory, mechanism design, and empirical economic techniques to examine the importance of considering incentives and adverse selection when formulating environmental policy. Chapter 1 uses microeconomic theory to demonstrate the importance of considering adverse selection and perverse incentives when formulating environmental policy, with a particular focus on environmental trade ratios. Chapter 2 use mechanism design to demonstrate how heterogeneous outside options can be exploited to enhance screening in an environmental subsidy program setting. Chapter 3 uses both economic theory and empirics to measure the extent of an adverse selection problem in an environmental subsidy program.
Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms
Author: Theodore GrovesPublisher: U of Minnesota Press
ISBN: 1452908044
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 410
Book Description
Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session
Policy Incentives and Economic Outcomes
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Microeconomics
Languages : en
Pages : 99
Book Description
This thesis contributes to the understanding of how policy making shapes economic outcomes, and the role of individual decision and incentives in this process. It consists of three chapters, which focus on aspects of this general topic from an applied microeconomic perspective: (i) market mechanisms for environmental policy and their implications for firm investment, (ii) political incentives of pork barrel environmental expenditures, and (iii) strategic interaction in decision making among decentralized levels of government. In the first chapter, entitled Policy Uncertainty and Investment in Low-Carbon Technology, which is joint work with Silvia Albrizio, we investigate how uncertainty over environmental policy affects firms' investment in low-carbon technology in the context of an emission trading scheme. We develop a three period sequential model combining the industry and electricity sectors and encompassing both irreversible and reversible investment possibilities for firms. Additionally, we explicitly model policy uncertainty in the regulator's objective function as well as the market interactions giving rise to an endogenous permit price. We find that uncertainty reduces irreversible investment and that the availability of both reversible and irreversible technologies partially eliminates the positive effect of policy uncertainty on reversible technology found in previous literature. In the second chapter, entitled Pork Barrel as a Signaling Tool: The Case of US Environmental Policy, I investigate whether signaling is a driving force of pre-electoral pork barrel policies. I develop a two-period model of electoral competition where politicians use current policies to signal their preferences to rational, forward-looking voters. There exists an equilibrium where incumbents use pork barrel spending for signaling in majoritarian systems. Results show that pork spending is directed towards ideologically homogeneous groups and is mitigated if the incumbent is a "lame duck" or has a high discount rate. The predictions of the model are tested using data on US State level environmental expenditures. The results support the signaling motive as a central mechanism in generating pork barrel towards the environment. In the third chapter, entitled Interaction in Local Governments' Spending Decisions: Evidence from Portugal, which is joint with Linda Veiga and Miguel Portela, we analyze the sources and the degree of interaction among Portuguese municipalities' expenditure levels by estimating a dynamic panel model, based on jurisdictional reaction functions. The analysis is performed for all 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities from 1986 to 2006, using alternative ways to measure neighborhood. Results indicate that local governments' spending decisions are significantly, and positively, influenced by the actions of neighboring municipalities. Attempts to identify the sources of interaction allow us to conclude that they are due to spillovers that require coordination in expenditure items and to mimicking behavior possibly to attract households and firms.
Three Essays on Economic Theory
Author: Junrok ParkPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 155
Book Description
This dissertation contributes to the field of mechanism design and, in particular, to the study of robust mechanisms, which concerns the construction of allocation mechanisms that perform well across a wide range of environments. It consists of two parts. The first part--- Chapters 1 and 2---studies zero-sum games between a profit-maximizing mechanism designer and an information designer with the opposite goal in public good provision setups. They consider distinct yet related setups, yielding distinct economic implications. The second part---Chapter 3---concerns the construction of a double clock auction that implements various designer objectives other than exact efficiency in an exchange environment Chapter 1 studies an informational remedy to a well-known example of market failure: a public good sold by a profit-seeking enterprise. A monopolist sells a public good to a group of buyers who privately observe a signal about their valuation. The public good is sold through an optimal mechanism subject to the ex-post incentive constraints. This paper studies an information design problem, characterizing the regulator's solution, a signal distribution that maximizes the buyers' expected payoffs in an optimal mechanism. It limits the impact of free-riding while imposing indifference on the monopolist so that the public good is always sold with any number of agents. Such desirable properties are achieved through a carefully chosen negative correlation between signals and a lower bound on the total value of trade. Moreover, the monopolist earns a finite expected profit even with infinitely many buyers, thereby completely losing his market power. Chapter 2 devises a robustly optimal mechanism for public good sales. A monopolist seller has a public good to sell to a group of buyers. He has limited knowledge of the buyers' private information: Only the maximal, minimal, and expected valuation of each buyer is known to the seller. We characterize a strong maximin mechanism of public good provision. The maximin mechanism qualitatively depends on the number of agents and the common expected valuation. Buyers report the quantity demanded to the monopolist. If the expected valuation is high relative to the number of buyers, then the veto mechanism, which supplies the public good by the maximal demand, is optimal. In other words, each buyer cannot enjoy more than their own demand report. Buyers are charged an exponential price in their quantity demand. Otherwise, the capped proportional mechanism is optimal. It supplies the public good by the sum of demand reports and each buyer can demand at most some portion of the public good. Chapter 3 (Co-authored with Pavel Andreyanov (HSE) and Tomasz Sadzik (UCLA)) constructs a clock implementation of optimal mechanisms for exchange economies, which are a marketplace where traders enter an initial position for some asset and may end up being a buyer or a seller after the trade. In our clock implementation, the auctioneer runs two clocks simultaneously to each side of the market and traders make a quantity report to each clock separately. Moreover, the auctioneer charges personalized prices, which are a sum of the common clock state and individual taxation, to implement mechanisms whose objective is other than exact efficiencies, such as profit maximization.
Three Essays in Environmental and Development Economics
Author: Solène MassonPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Deforestation in Brazil has been a growing phenomenon since the 1970s', whose acceleration is mainly due to the agricultural expansion and infrastructure development such as roads. In order to reduce incentive to deforest, authorities promoted several sets of environmental conservation programs.Understanding the effects of such policy interventions both on environmental (intensity of deforestation, economic mechanisms) and socio-economic issues (effect on poverty, effect on local population development) is essential if public policies are to be put in place in an efficient way.Nevertheless, access to spatial, economic and social data due to the size of the Brazilian Amazon makes impact evaluation challenging. This thesis is organized around two themes: spatial analysis, impact evaluation analysis. The creation of an original database at an aggregation level that is, as far as we know, very little studied allows us to extend research on both environmental and socio-economic analyses of environmental public policies.
Three essays on random mechanism design
Author: Huaxia ZengPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 163
Book Description
"This dissertation studies a standard voting formulation with randomization. Formally, there is a finite set of voters, a finite set of alternatives and a lottery space over the alternative set. Each voter has a strict preference over alternatives. The domain of preferences contains all admissible preferences. Every voter reports a preference in the domain; a preference profile is generated; and the social lottery then is determined by a Random Social Choice Function (or RSCF). This dissertation focuses on RSCFs which provide every voter incentives to truthfully reveal her preference, and hence follows the formulation of strategy proofness in [26] which requires that the lottery under truth telling (first-order) stochastically dominates the lottery under any misrepresentation according to every voter’s true preference independently of others’ behaviors. Moreover, this dissertation restricts attention to the class of unanimous RSCFs, that is, if the alternative is the best for all voters in a preference profile, it receives probability one. A typical class of unanimous and strategy-proof RSCFs is random dictatorships. A domain is a random dictatorship domain if every unanimous and strategy proof RSCF is a random dictatorship... "-- Author's abstract.
Three Essays in Financial Markets. The Bright Side of Financial Derivatives: Options Trading and Firm Innovation
Author: Iván Blanco Publisher: Ed. Universidad de Cantabria
ISBN: 8481028770
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 90
Book Description
Do financial derivatives enhance or impede innovation? We aim to answer this question by examining the relationship between equity options markets and standard measures of firm innovation. Our baseline results show that firms with more options trading activity generate more patents and patent citations per dollar of R&D invested. We then investigate how more active options markets affect firms' innovation strategy. Our results suggest that firms with greater trading activity pursue a more creative, diverse and risky innovation strategy. We discuss potential underlying mechanisms and show that options appear to mitigate managerial career concerns that would induce managers to take actions that boost short-term performance measures. Finally, using several econometric specifications that try to account for the potential endogeneity of options trading, we argue that the positive effect of options trading on firm innovation is causal.