Author: Karsten FieselerPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 112
Book Description
Three Essays in the Theory of Mechanisms
Author: Karsten FieselerThree Essays in Microeconomic Theory
Author: Tymofiy MylovanovEssays in Mechanism Design
Author: Levent UlkuPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Econometrics
Languages : en
Pages : 71
Book Description
This dissertation consists of three essays in the theory of mechanism design under incomplete information. In the first essay, we analyze an implementation problem in which monetary transfers are feasible, valuations are interdependent and the set of available choices lies in a product space of lattices. This framework is general enough to subsume many interesting examples, including allocation problems with multiple objects. We identify a class of social choice rules which can be implemented in ex post equilibrium. We identify conditions under which ex post efficient social choice rules are implementable using monotone selection theory. The key conditions are extensions of the single crossing property and supermodularity. These conditions can be replaced with more tractable conditions in multiobject allocation problems with either two objects or two agents. I also show that the payments which implement monotone social decision rules coincide with the payments of (1) the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism with private values, and (2) the generalized Vickrey auction introduced by Ausubel [1999] in multiunit allocation problems. The second essay generalizes the analysis of optimal (revenue maximizing) mechanism design for the seller of a single object introduced by Myerson [1981]. We consider a problem in which the seller has several heterogeneous objects and buyers' valuations depend on each other's private information. We analyze two nonnested environments in which incentive constraints can be replaced with more tractable monotonicity conditions. We establish conditions under which these monotonicity conditions can be ignored, and show that several earlier analyses of the optimal mechanism design problem can be unified and generalized. In particular, problems with two complementary goods in Levin [1997] and multiunit auction problems in Maskin and Riley [1989] and Branco [1996] are special cases. The third essay considers the problem of selling internet advertising slots to advertisers. Under suitable conditions, we solve for the payments imposed by an optimal mechanism and show that it can be decentralized via prices using a linear assignment approach. At every configuration of private information, optimal mechanism can be interpreted as a menu consisting of a price for every slot.
Three Essays on the Electoral Mechanism
Author: Sugato DasguptaPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Elections
Languages : en
Pages : 450
Book Description
Three Essays on Mechanism Design and Institutions
Author: Aristotelis BoukourasThe Freud Encyclopedia
Author: Edward ErwinPublisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 9780415936774
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 690
Book Description
First Published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
Three Essays in Public Mechanism Design
Author: Jin KimTheoretical Biology and Complexity
Author: Robert J. RosenPublisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 1483272346
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 223
Book Description
Theoretical Biology and Complexity: Three Essays on the Natural Philosophy of Complex Systems is made up of three short essays—each separately conceived and written, each with distinct thrusts and emphases, but nevertheless closely related in substance and spirit. All three spring from a common concern: to grasp and comprehend the material basis of living systems. The first essay is about the interaction between particles and the consequent observable manifestations. It casts the analysis of the measurement process into an elegant dualism relating modes of description, and explores the consequences of this dualism for what may be called classical physics. The second essay explores the deeper consequences of representing the properties of natural systems through states built up out of observable quantities, and the dynamics that such systems impose on each other through interactions. The final essay argues that traditional modes of system representation, involving fixed sets of states together with imposed dynamical laws, strictly pertains only to an extremely limited class of systems (called simple systems or mechanisms). Systems not in this class are called “complex, and these can only be in some sense approximated, locally and temporally, by simple ones. Such a radical alteration of viewpoint leads to a large number of concrete, practical consequences, some of which are described in the essay.
Abstracts of the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud
Author: Carrie Lee RothgebPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Psychoanalysis
Languages : en
Pages : 242
Book Description
Three Essays in Applied Game Theory
Author: Kwok H. CheungPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Collective bargaining
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description