Author: David Jonathan BrlanPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 206
Book Description
Three Essays in Personnel Economics
Author: David Jonathan BrlanPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 206
Book Description
Three Essays in Time Series and Personnel Economics
Author: Razvan Constantin PascalauPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 190
Book Description
Three Essays on Personnel Economics in Public Education
Author: Jiaxi Li (Economist)Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 145
Book Description
This dissertation consists of three chapters on personnel economics in public education. The first chapter uses a simulation framework to examine the efficiency implications of using proportional evaluation systems. We find that proportionality can be imposed with very limited or no efficiency costs compared to a global system. Our results suggest that given the other benefits offered by a proportional policy, it can be regarded as a viable alternative when educational administrators are developing and designing teacher evaluation systems. The second chapter uses a regression discontinuity design to examine the impacts of the performance ratings under a new and rigorous evaluation system in Tennessee on teacher job satisfaction. The results indicate that the rigorous evaluation and rating system can cause differential job satisfaction between more and less effective teachers such that the assignment of a higher rating makes teachers more satisfied with their jobs. The impact is the strongest at the threshold of the highest rating in the system. The third chapter uses a reduced-form regression discontinuity approach to isolate and identify the "intention to treat" effect of assigning differentiated evaluation ratings on teachers' professional development choices. I find that the assignment of a higher performance rating alone does not affect how teachers would behave in professional development.
Three Essays on Personnel Economics
Author: Sacha KapoorPublisher:
ISBN: 9780494782323
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 258
Book Description
My dissertation focuses on the role of incentives in the workplace. In Chapter 1, I study peer effects in pay-for-individual-performance jobs. Specifically, I explore whether, how, and why coworker performance matters when rewards are based on individual performance. When teamed with high-performing peers, I find that workers are more productive overall. I also find that workers who resign are unaffected by coworker performance in the period after they hand in their resignation notice. The findings suggest peer effects in pay-for-individual-performance jobs reflect reputational concerns about relative performance rather than competitive preferences.In Chapter 2, I present field evidence that sheds new light on incentive provision in multitask jobs. Specifically, I design and conduct a field experiment at a large-scale restaurant, where the pre-existing wage contract encourages workers to carry out their tasks in a way that is not perfectly aligned with the firm's preferences. The experimental treatment pays bonuses to waiters for the number of customers they serve, in addition to their tips for customer service and hourly wages. I compare worker performance under the treatment to that under the pre-existing contract, where workers are rewarded for overemphasizing customer service, to evaluate the effect of a wage contract that encourages undesirable behavior. I find that the average worker earns more, is more productive, and generates higher short-run profits for the firm when paid bonuses for customer volume. Overall, the findings suggest that sharpening wage contracts to deal with incentive problems in multitask jobs has benefits for workers as well as the firm.In Chapter 3, I present joint work (with Arvind N. Magesan at the University of Calgary) on the beauty premium's role in the workplace. Specifically, we investigate whether, how, and why the beauty premium can be explained by the behaviour of workers after they are hired. We find that attractive workers earn more because they transfer effort from tasks that reward looks to tasks that reward effort. We also provide evidence against favorable treatment by customers and the employer as sources for the beauty premium. We conclude that the premium is largely driven by the worker's on-the-job behavior.
Three Essays in Labor Economics
Author: Shintaro YamaguchiThree essays on labor economics
Author: Ivico M. Ahumada-LoboThree Essays in Labor Economics
Author: Till GrossmassThree Essays in Labor Economics
Author: Douglas StaigerPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Employment (Economic theory)
Languages : en
Pages : 144
Book Description
Author: Shiv K. Saini
Author: Cristóbal Huneeus