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Author: Cheawanet Bunchai Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This dissertation comprises of three essays in industrial economics. My first essay analyzes social efficiency of entry into a downstream oligopoly of a vertical market structure, where an upstream supplier sells an essential input to all firms producing downstream. In the downstream markets, a multiproduct firm is both a monopoly in its own product and a leader in a different product market with free entry of followers. We show that in the presence of scale economies, entry is socially insufficient. The insufficiency of entry is due to the fact that entry generates a business-creating effect significantly large enough to dominate a business-stealing effect, regardless of whether the upstream supplier's input pricing strategy is discriminatory or uniform. This suggests that entry regulation as a public policy is socially undesirable in the downstream oligopoly of a vertical market structure. My second essay examines differences in welfare implications between discriminatory and uniform input price regimes in vertically related markets where a multiproduct firm operates downstream in two separate markets: one is a monopoly and the other is an oligopoly with entry of new firms. In the analysis, we analyze how the downstream entry into the oligopolistic market affects social efficiency. In an open economy, whether the input price regime is discriminatory or uniform, entry is always socially excessive in the presence of scale economies. This contrasts with the existing studies in the literature that entry is always socially insufficient in an open economy with the presence of scale economies. Focusing on the scenario where vertically integrated producer (VIP) adopts a non-foreclosure strategy, my third essay shows that downstream entry is socially insufficient despite scale economies and the marginal cost difference between the VIP and its retail competitors. The non-foreclosure equilibrium arises when the VIP's wholesale profit from the sales of an essential input is sufficiently large and the VIP shares the profit with its downstream competitors. For the case of an open economy where the VIP is a foreign firm, downstream entry continues to be socially insufficient. Entry regulation is therefore socially undesirable, but a production subsidy encouraging downstream entry is shown to be a welfare-improving policy.
Author: Cheawanet Bunchai Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This dissertation comprises of three essays in industrial economics. My first essay analyzes social efficiency of entry into a downstream oligopoly of a vertical market structure, where an upstream supplier sells an essential input to all firms producing downstream. In the downstream markets, a multiproduct firm is both a monopoly in its own product and a leader in a different product market with free entry of followers. We show that in the presence of scale economies, entry is socially insufficient. The insufficiency of entry is due to the fact that entry generates a business-creating effect significantly large enough to dominate a business-stealing effect, regardless of whether the upstream supplier's input pricing strategy is discriminatory or uniform. This suggests that entry regulation as a public policy is socially undesirable in the downstream oligopoly of a vertical market structure. My second essay examines differences in welfare implications between discriminatory and uniform input price regimes in vertically related markets where a multiproduct firm operates downstream in two separate markets: one is a monopoly and the other is an oligopoly with entry of new firms. In the analysis, we analyze how the downstream entry into the oligopolistic market affects social efficiency. In an open economy, whether the input price regime is discriminatory or uniform, entry is always socially excessive in the presence of scale economies. This contrasts with the existing studies in the literature that entry is always socially insufficient in an open economy with the presence of scale economies. Focusing on the scenario where vertically integrated producer (VIP) adopts a non-foreclosure strategy, my third essay shows that downstream entry is socially insufficient despite scale economies and the marginal cost difference between the VIP and its retail competitors. The non-foreclosure equilibrium arises when the VIP's wholesale profit from the sales of an essential input is sufficiently large and the VIP shares the profit with its downstream competitors. For the case of an open economy where the VIP is a foreign firm, downstream entry continues to be socially insufficient. Entry regulation is therefore socially undesirable, but a production subsidy encouraging downstream entry is shown to be a welfare-improving policy.
Author: David B. Audretsch Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 9401127956 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 283
Book Description
Empirical Studies in Industrial Organization brings together leading scholars who present state-of-the-art research in the spirit of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm embodied in the work of Leonard W. Weiss. The individual chapters are generally empirically or public policy oriented. A number of them introduce new sources of data that, combined with the application of appropriate econometric techniques, enable new breakthroughs and insights on issues hotly debated in the industrial organization literature. For example, five of the chapters are devoted towards uncovering the link between market concentration and pricing behavior. While theoretical models have produced ambiguous predictions concerning the relationship between concentration and price these chapters, which span a number of different markets and situations, provide unequivocal evidence that a high level of market concentration tends to result in a higher level of prices. Three of the chapters explore the impact of market structure on production efficiency, and three other chapters focus on the role of industrial organization on public policy. Contributors include David B. Audretsch, Richard E. Caves, Mark J. Roberts, F.M. Scherer, John J. Siegfried and Hideki Yamawaki.
Author: Shu Deng Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 179
Book Description
There are three main chapters in the dissertation which fall in the areas of industrial organization and international economics. After the introduction and the literature review, I present two different models that highlight how the degree of substitutability between differentiated products on a market affects a new entrant's entry decisions. I further extend the benchmark model to discuss the implications of the government trade policy on the competition strategies. The last chapter investigates how the bilateral trade flows in various industries between the United States and China respond to Yuan/Dollar exchange rate fluctuations and a few other key variables. In the second chapter, I extend the Singh and Vivies (1984) model and the Hackner (2000) model by allowing for a multi-product duopoly, a domestic incumbent and a foreign entrant, with asymmetric costs in producing two differentiated products: high- and low-quality. If they engage in Cournot competition, in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the foreign entrant will choose to supply both products when two varieties are more heterogeneous. If two varieties are more homogeneous, the foreign entrant tends to supply only one product. After extending the model to consider the tariff imposed on foreign imports, the simulation results suggest that, to increase domestic welfare, the government should allow cost-effective foreign entrants to enter, but keep cost-ineffective ones out of the domestic market. In the third chapter, I provide a thorough analysis of the Bertrand model with a setup that is similar to the Cournot model. When firms compete on prices, the SPNE differs significantly from that of the Cournot model. Depending on the relative marginal cost between two firms, there are circumstances under which the foreign entrant would choose to only enter into the low- or the high-quality market regardless of the degree of substitutability between two varieties. Furthermore, when the domestic government imposes a tariff on the foreign imports, the foreign entrant's entry decision changes with the tariff level. In the last chapter, unlike the existing literature which mainly look at the relationship between the exchange rate and the trade balance at the aggregate level, I attempt to investigate the short-run and the long-run impact of the Yuan/Dollar exchange rate on the US trade balance at the commodity level using a new methodology, the Autoregressive Distributed Lag Bounds Testing approach. As most articles found no short-run and long-run relationship between the exchange rate and the trade balance at the aggregate level ("aggregation bias"), I argue that different commodities may respond to the exchange rate fluctuations differently. Therefore, this study would offer us a better understanding on which US industries are more vulnerable to the Yuan/Dollar exchange rate fluctuations and which ones are strong players against Chinese competitors. In addition, I further explore other possible contributors to the US trade deficit such as income levels, China FDI inflow, and the US FDI outflow.
Author: Cheawanet Bunchai
Author: Cheawanet Bunchai
Author: Leslie D. Manns
Author: Max Matthew Schanzenbach
Author: 
Author: Jonah B. Gelbach
Author: Joshua M. Congdon-Hohman
Author: David B. Audretsch
Author: Souresh Saha
Author: John Enrico DiNardo
Author: Shu Deng