Author: Maria Cecilia BustamantePublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 94
Book Description
Three Essays in Dynamic Corporate Finance
Author: Maria Cecilia BustamantePublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 94
Book Description
Three Essays on Dynamic Corporate Finance in Continuous Time
Author: Shiqi ChenThree Essays in Dynamic Corporate Finance
Author: Jakub HajdaPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 160
Book Description
Thèse. HEC. 2020.
Three Essays in Dynamic Corporate Finance
Author: Boris NikolovThree Essays in Dynamic Corporate Finance
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
The three essays constituting this thesis focus on financing and cash management policy. The first essay aims to shed light on why firms issue debt so conservatively. In particular, it examines the effects of shareholder and creditor protection on capital structure choices. It starts by building a contingent claims model where financing policy results from a trade-off between tax benefits, contracting costs and agency costs. In this setup, controlling shareholders can divert part of the firms' cash ows as private benefits at the expense of minority share- holders. In addition, shareholders as a class can behave strategically at the time of default leading to deviations from the absolute priority rule. The analysis demonstrates that investor protection is a first order determinant of firms' financing choices and that conflicts of interests between firm claimholders may help explain the level and cross-sectional variation of observed leverage ratios. The second essay focuses on the practical relevance of agency conflicts. De- spite the theoretical development of the literature on agency conflicts and firm policy choices, the magnitude of manager-shareholder conflicts is still an open question. This essay proposes a methodology for quantifying these agency conflicts. To do so, it examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on corporate financing decisions. It builds a dynamic contingent claims model in which managers do not act in the best interest of shareholders, but rather pursue private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Managers have discretion over financing and dividend policies. However, shareholders can remove the manager at a cost. The analysis demonstrates that entrenched managers restructure less frequently and issue less debt than optimal for shareholders. I take the model to the data and use observed financing choices to provide firm-specific estimates of the degree of managerial entrenchment. Using structural econometrics, I find costs of contro.
Three Essays in Corporate Finance
Author: Bernardino Manuel Pereira AdãoPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 292
Book Description
Three Essays in Corporate Finance
Author: Xia (Summer). LiuPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Three Essays in Corporate Finance
Author: Ekaterina VolkovaPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This dissertation explores three different aspects in corporate finance. My first essay explores governance from the side of blockholders. My second essay explores governance from the side of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). And my third essay overview and summarizes recent literature in the IPO field. In Chapter 1, "Blockholder Diversity: Effect of Polyphony on the Power of Monitoring", I investigate how the differences in skill, incentives and preferences between large shareholders in the company affect the power of their monitoring. My findings suggest that diversity between blockholder creates disagreement that have strong negative influence of the power of their governance. Such adverse influence is also reflected in the future dynamics of company value and performance. In Chapter 2 (joint with Michelle Lowry and Roni Michaely) "Information Revelation Through Regulatory Process: Interactions Between the SEC and Companies Ahead of the IPO", we explore the main determinants of extensiveness and focus of SEC review of companies before they go public. In the second part of this chapter we explore what investors could learn from the information disclosed during this review process. In Chapter 3 (joint with Michelle Lowry and Roni Michaely) "Initial Public Offerings: a Synthesis of the Literature and Direction for Future Research" we provide a literature review of recent papers in the IPO field. In addition, we also explore how the main stylized facts behave of the large sample of IPOs between 1972 and 2015.
Three Essays on Corporate Finance
Author: Bo XuThree Essays in Corporate Finance
Author: Hongchao ZengPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic dissertations
Languages : en
Pages : 118
Book Description
This dissertation contains three essays in corporate finance. In the first essay, using the presence of business combination (BC) laws to proxy for the monitoring strength of the takeover market, we examine how an active takeover market affects the level and valuation of corporate cash holdings. After accounting for potential endogeneity of state incorporation, we find that firms incorporated in states without BC laws hold significantly more cash than those incorporated in states with BC laws. We also find that the value of cash holdings used by firms to defend themselves against unwanted takeovers in the presence of an active takeover market is not discounted by investors. Our findings suggest a substitution effect between legal antitakeover protection and firms' use of cash protection. However, there is no evidence that these cash holdings lead to value destruction. Firms may use corporate payouts to signal internal governance quality and avoid a market discount placed on cash holdings. In the second essay, using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), the industry price-cost margin, the number of firms within an industry, and the level of import penetration to gauge the intensity of product market competition, we find that the speed of capital structure adjustment for firms in competitive industries is significantly faster than for firms in non-competitive industries. Further analysis reveals that this effect is driven solely by the capital structure movements of over-levered firms. While over-levered firms in competitive industries face higher levels of investment needs relative to those in non-competitive industries, they are significantly less likely to use debt financing and to deliberately deviate from target. In the third essay, we find that cash has a negative impact on the future market share growth of the old firms, evidence that can better explain the unwillingness of such firms to hold precautionary cash as they face increasingly more volatile cash flows in an imperfect capital market. Furthermore, we show that the relational strength between cash and product market performance evolves in a way that reflects a changing composition of manufacturing firms which progressively tilts toward young firms.