Author: Alexandre de Cornière Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a two-sided platform that enables interaction between buyers and sellers. Sellers are heterogenous with respect to their per-interaction benefit, and, under price discrimination, the platform can condition its fee on sellers' type. In a model with linear demand on each side, we show that price discrimination: (i) increases participation on both sides; (ii) enhances total welfare; (iii) may result in a strict Pareto improvement, with both seller types being better-off than under uniform pricing. These results, which are in stark contrast to the traditional analysis of price discrimination, are driven by the existence of cross-group network effects. By improving the firm's ability to monetize seller participation, price discrimination induces the platform to attract more buyers, which then increases seller participation. The Pareto improvement result means that even those sellers who pay a higher price under discrimination can be better-off, due to the increased buyer participation.
Author: Qihong Liu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 49
Book Description
We examine the profitability and welfare implications of targeted price discrimination in two-sided markets. First, we show that equilibrium discriminatory prices exhibit novel features relative to discriminatory prices in one-sided models and uniform prices in two-sided models. Second, we compare the profitability of perfect price discrimination, relative to uniform prices in a two-sided market. The conventional wisdom from one-sided horizontally differentiated markets is that price discrimination hurts the firms and benefits consumers, prisoners' dilemma. We show that price discrimination, in a two-sided market, may actually soften the competition. Our results suggest that the conventional advice that price discrimination is good for competition based on one-sided markets may not carry over to two-sided markets.
Author: Richard Schmalensee Publisher: North Holland ISBN: Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 1002
Book Description
Determinants of firm and market organization; Analysis of market behavior; Empirical methods and results; International issues and comparision; government intervention in the Marketplace.
Author: Federal Trade Commission Publisher: Createspace Independent Pub ISBN: 9781502751782 Category : Social Science Languages : en Pages : 32
Book Description
This book examines the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination by an intermediate good monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power. One of the downstream firms (the "chain store") may have a greater ability than rivals to integrate backward into the supply of the input. In addition to this outside option, the firms' relative bargaining powers depend on their disagreement profits, bargaining weights, and concession costs. If the chain's integration threat is not a credible outside option, and if downstream firms cannot coordinate their bargaining strategies, then price discrimination reduces input prices to all downstream firms.
Author: Kate Ho Publisher: Elsevier ISBN: 0323988873 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 782
Book Description
Handbook of Industrial Organization Volume 4 highlights new advances in the field, with this new volume presenting interesting chapters. Each chapter is written by an international board of authors. Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics series Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields A source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organizations or industrial economists
Author: Youping Li Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This note studies third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets. I show that whether a more efficient downstream firm is charged a higher or lower price than a less efficient firm depends on the shape of the demand function. Different from the case in which final market demand is linear, the usual assumption in the literature, constant elasticity demand, for example, results in a more efficient firm's receiving a discount.
Author: Charles Adams Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 7
Book Description
The paper points up limitations in the standard undergraduate treatment of third-degree price discrimination by monopolists. While such treatments allude to qualitative distinctions between higher and lower priced alternatives, failure to capture those distinctions in underlying cost and demand structures can result in only partial and possibly misleading conclusions about the nature and consequences of price discrimination. Building on earlier work in the derivation of quality-differentiated demand (see SSRN 'https://ssrn.com/abstract=2576773' https://ssrn.com/abstract=2576773 and 'https://ssrn.com/abstract=3107103' https://ssrn.com/abstract=3107103), the paper compares the standard analysis of price discrimination with one that explicitly accounts for monopoly power in manipulating quality choices. The example provided illustrates the potential for substantially greater profits and greater efficiency losses by forcing some groups of consumers into suboptimal quality choices once quality variations are explicitly accounted for.
Author: George Norman Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing ISBN: Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 624
Book Description
This volume brings together significant articles which have appeared between 1971 and 1997, analyzing the application and effects of price discrimination.
Author: Alexandre de Cornière
Author: Qihong Liu
Author: Richard Schmalensee
Author: Yong He
Author: Patrick M. Emerson
Author: Federal Trade Commission
Author: Kate Ho
Author: Youping Li
Author: Charles Adams
Author: George Norman