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Author: Takanori Adachi Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper analyses monopolistic third-degree price discrimination in the presence of consumption externalities within two separate markets. Assuming linear inverse demands, we investigate an associated change in social welfare (the sum of the consumers' surpluses and the producer's profit) with the regime change from uniform pricing to price discrimination when both markets are open under either regime. It is shown that social welfare can improve even if total output is unaffected by the regime change. Moreover, it is possible that the sum of the consumers' surpluses also increases.
Author: Takanori Adachi Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper analyses monopolistic third-degree price discrimination in the presence of consumption externalities within two separate markets. Assuming linear inverse demands, we investigate an associated change in social welfare (the sum of the consumers' surpluses and the producer's profit) with the regime change from uniform pricing to price discrimination when both markets are open under either regime. It is shown that social welfare can improve even if total output is unaffected by the regime change. Moreover, it is possible that the sum of the consumers' surpluses also increases.
Author: Takanori Adachi Publisher: Springer Nature ISBN: 981993205X Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 85
Book Description
This book provides an updated overview of the recent progress in the theoretical study of third-degree price discrimination. It is a marketing tactic and is said to be present if the unit price is different across different groups of buyers. Its welfare evaluation is often difficult because it entails two countervailing effects: on one hand, it exploits surplus from consumers who have high willingness-to-pay, but on the other hand, it generates gains from trade from consumers who otherwise would not purchase the good. Recognizing this difficulty, we provide new insights on evaluation of third-degree price discrimination in consideration of network effects and vertical product differentiation. Our analysis is particularly useful for the industries related to information and communication technologies (ICT) because these two elements characterize them. Furthermore, we also study the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination under imperfect competition other than monopoly. At first, it seems that it may complicate the analysis under monopoly. However, we argue that the main thrusts of analysis under monopoly carry over to the case of oligopoly. We also take into account behavioral aspects and their implications for studying third-degree price discrimination. Overall, this book is designed to provide implications for contemporary management and policy issues by advancing theoretical issues in industrial organization.
Author: Youngsun Kwon Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper solves a simple model of third-degree price discrimination assuming two independent linear demands and discusses the effects of price discrimination on monopoly profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. In addition, using a simple model, this paper shows that the probability that price discrimination raises social welfare increases as the preferences or incomes of consumer groups become more heterogeneous. The virtual aggregated demand curve of the price-discriminating monopoly, corresponding to its aggregated marginal revenue curve, is derived. The curve is non-linear and lies above the aggregated demand curve of simple monopoly. The results of this paper may be used to explain to students the effects of third-degree price discrimination on market outcomes.
Author: Takanori Adachi Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This article examines the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination under oligopolistic competition with horizontal product differentiation. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare: the degree of substitution must be sufficiently greater in the “strong” market (where the discriminatory price is higher than the uniform price) than in the “weak” market (where it is lower). It is verified, however, that consumer surplus is never improved; social welfare improves solely owing to an increase in the firms' profits in the case of linear demands.
Author: Babu Nahata Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 10
Book Description
This pedagogical note discusses the differences between second and third-degree price discrimination. The comparison uses four important factors, namely, market segmentation, information about consumers, profit maximization and social welfare. The comparison shows that while market segmentation is a prerequsite for third-degree, it is an equilibrium outcome in second-degree price discrimination. The profit maximization problem is unconstrained under third-degree but it is constrained under second-degree. Both deadweight loss and consumer surplus are positive under third-degree, but they both can be zero under second-degree and the social surplus is maximum.
Author: Achim Ingo Czerny Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 41
Book Description
This paper analyzes third-degree price discrimination of a monopoly airline in the presence of congestion externality when all markets are served. The model features the business-passenger and leisure-passenger markets where business passengers exhibit a higher time valuation, and a less price-elastic demand, than leisure passengers. Our main result is the identification of the time-valuation effect of price discrimination, which can work in the opposite direction as the well-known output effect on welfare. This time-valuation effect clearly explains why discriminating prices can improve welfare even when this is associated with a reduction in aggregate output.
Author: Takanori Adachi
Author: Takanori Adachi
Author: Takanori Adachi
Author: Youngsun Kwon
Author: Takanori Adachi
Author: Babu Nahata
Author: Simon Cowan
Author: Achim Ingo Czerny
Author: Daniel P. O'Brien
Author: Daniel Patrick O'Brien
Author: