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Author: Wynn C. Stirling Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 1107011744 Category : Computers Languages : en Pages : 251
Book Description
This book describes conditional games, a form of game theory that accommodates multiple stakeholder decision-making scenarios where cooperation and negotiation are significant issues and where notions of concordant group behavior are important. The book extends the concept of a preference ordering that permits stakeholders to modulate their preferences as functions of the preferences of others.
Author: Wynn C. Stirling Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 1107011744 Category : Computers Languages : en Pages : 251
Book Description
This book describes conditional games, a form of game theory that accommodates multiple stakeholder decision-making scenarios where cooperation and negotiation are significant issues and where notions of concordant group behavior are important. The book extends the concept of a preference ordering that permits stakeholders to modulate their preferences as functions of the preferences of others.
Author: Ilhan K. Geckil Publisher: CRC Press ISBN: 158488844X Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 222
Book Description
Useful Tools to Help Solve Decision Making ProblemsApplied Game Theory and Strategic Behavior demonstrates the use of various game theory techniques to address practical business, economic, legal, and public policy issues. It also illustrates the benefits of employing strategic thinking that incorporates the uncertainty surrounding the behavior of
Author: Esa. Saarinen Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 140204108X Category : Language Arts & Disciplines Languages : en Pages : 400
Book Description
This book is a collection of studies applying game-theoretical concepts and ideas to analysing the semantics of natural language and some formal languages. The bulk of the book consists of several papers by Hintikka, Carlson and Saarinen and discusses several of the central problems of the semantics of natural language. The topics covered are the semantics of natural language quantifiers, conditionals, pronouns and anaphora more generally. Hintikka’s famous essay presenting examples of "branching quantifier structures" in English, as well as one formulating his "any-every thesis", are included. The book also includes Hintikka’s closely argued philosophical discussion of the relationships between the new semantical games with the language games of Wittgenstein. Other papers apply the game-theoretical approach to formal languages including tense logics and tense anaphora (Saarinen), deontic logic and Ross’ paradox (Hintikka), and usual predicate logic (Rantala). The latter amounts to an explication of the "impossible possible" worlds as is shown in Hintikka’s concluding paper.
Author: Drew Fudenberg Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 9780262061940 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 304
Book Description
This work explains that equilibrium is the long-run outcome of a process in which non-fully rational players search for optimality over time. The models they e×plore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
Author: Valeriu Ungureanu Publisher: Springer ISBN: 3319751514 Category : Technology & Engineering Languages : en Pages : 352
Book Description
This book presents a comprehensive new, multi-objective and integrative view on traditional game and control theories. Consisting of 15 chapters, it is divided into three parts covering noncooperative games; mixtures of simultaneous and sequential multi-objective games; and multi-agent control of Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg-type games respectively. Can multicriteria optimization, game theory and optimal control be integrated into a unique theory? Are there mathematical models and solution concepts that could constitute the basis of a new paradigm? Is there a common approach and method to solve emerging problems? The book addresses these and other related questions and problems to create the foundation for the Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg Game and Control Theory. It considers a series of simultaneous/Nash and sequential/Stackelberg games, single-criterion and multicriteria/Pareto games, combining Nash and Stackelberg game concepts and Pareto optimization, as well as a range of notions related to system control. In addition, it considers the problems of finding and representing the entire set of solutions. Intended for researches, professors, specialists, and students in the areas of game theory, operational research, applied mathematics, economics, computer science and engineering, it also serves as a textbook for various courses in these fields.
Author: Geir B. Asheim Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 0387262377 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 203
Book Description
During the last decade I have explored the consequences of what I have chosen to call the 'consistent preferences' approach to deductive reasoning in games. To a great extent this work has been done in coop eration with my co-authors Martin Dufwenberg, Andres Perea, and Ylva Sovik, and it has lead to a series of journal articles. This book presents the results of this research program. Since the present format permits a more extensive motivation for and presentation of the analysis, it is my hope that the content will be of interest to a wider audience than the corresponding journal articles can reach. In addition to active researcher in the field, it is intended for graduate students and others that wish to study epistemic conditions for equilibrium and rationalizability concepts in game theory. Structure of the book This book consists of twelve chapters. The main interactions between the chapters are illustrated in Table 0.1. As Table 0.1 indicates, the chapters can be organized into four dif ferent parts. Chapters 1 and 2 motivate the subsequent analysis by introducing the 'consistent preferences' approach, and by presenting ex amples and concepts that are revisited throughout the book. Chapters 3 and 4 present the decision-theoretic framework and the belief operators that are used in later chapters. Chapters 5, 6, 10, and 11 analyze games in the strategic form, while the remaining chapters-Chapters 7, 8, 9, and 12-are concerned with games in the extensive form.
Author: W. Leinfellner Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 9401716544 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 476
Book Description
When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discover ies is not over. The recent advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory.
Author: Adam Brandenburger Publisher: World Scientific ISBN: 981451344X Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 298
Book Description
This volume contains eight papers written by Adam Brandenburger and his co-authors over a period of 25 years. These papers are part of a program to reconstruct game theory in order to make how players reason about a game a central feature of the theory. The program OCo now called epistemic game theory OCo extends the classical definition of a game model to include not only the game matrix or game tree, but also a description of how the players reason about one another (including their reasoning about other players' reasoning). With this richer mathematical framework, it becomes possible to determine the implications of how players reason for how a game is played. Epistemic game theory includes traditional equilibrium-based theory as a special case, but allows for a wide range of non-equilibrium behavior. Sample Chapter(s). Foreword (39 KB). Introduction (132 KB). Chapter 1: An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games (299 KB). Contents: An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games (Adam Brandenburger and H Jerome Keisler); Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge (Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel); Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria (Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel); Intrinsic Correlation in Games (Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg); Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (Robert Aumann and Adam Brandenburger); Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty (Lawrence Blume, Adam Brandenburger, and Eddie Dekel); Admissibility in Games (Adam Brandenburger, Amanda Friedenberg and H Jerome Keisler); Self-Admissible Sets (Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg). Readership: Graduate students and researchers in the fields of game theory, theoretical computer science, mathematical logic and social neuroscience."
Author: Wynn C. Stirling
Author: Wynn C. Stirling
Author: Ilhan K. Geckil
Author: Esa. Saarinen
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Author: Valeriu Ungureanu
Author: Geir B. Asheim
Author: W. Leinfellner
Author: Adam Brandenburger
Author: Andrés Perea
Author: Fernando Vega-Redondo