Author: Michael L. KatzPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Price discrimination
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
The Welfare Effects of Third-degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Goods Markets
Author: Michael L. KatzPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Price discrimination
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
The Welfare Effects of Third Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Good Markets: the Case of Bargaining
Author: Federal Trade CommissionPublisher: Createspace Independent Pub
ISBN: 9781502751782
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
This book examines the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination by an intermediate good monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power. One of the downstream firms (the "chain store") may have a greater ability than rivals to integrate backward into the supply of the input. In addition to this outside option, the firms' relative bargaining powers depend on their disagreement profits, bargaining weights, and concession costs. If the chain's integration threat is not a credible outside option, and if downstream firms cannot coordinate their bargaining strategies, then price discrimination reduces input prices to all downstream firms.
The Welfare Effects of Third Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Good Markets
Author: Daniel P. O'BrienPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Negotiation
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
The Welfare Effects of Third Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Good Markets
Author: Daniel Patrick O'BrienPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Negotiation
Languages : en
Pages : 33
Book Description
The Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in a Differentiated Oligopoly
Author: Takanori AdachiPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This article examines the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination under oligopolistic competition with horizontal product differentiation. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare: the degree of substitution must be sufficiently greater in the “strong” market (where the discriminatory price is higher than the uniform price) than in the “weak” market (where it is lower). It is verified, however, that consumer surplus is never improved; social welfare improves solely owing to an increase in the firms' profits in the case of linear demands.
Quality Differences, Third-Degree Price Discrimination, and Welfare
Author: Francisco GaleraPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We propose a model with two markets to analyze the welfare implications of price discrimination with quality differences. In each market a local firm that operates in that market only competes against a global firm that operates in both markets. Local firms produce higher-quality goods than the global firm. If the quality levels of the local firms' products are the same, price discrimination is never welfare-decreasing. If they differ, discrimination is welfare-increasing if quantity increases. Because of a positive allocation effect of price discrimination, there are parameter values such that welfare increases while total output decreases with price discrimination.
The Welfare Effects of Forbidding Discriminatory Discounts
Author: Greg Eric ShafferPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Price discrimination
Languages : en
Pages : 29
Book Description
Author: 
Author: David Arthur Malueg
Author: Yong He