Author: David Arthur MaluegPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Bounding the Welfare Effects of Third-degree Price Discrimination
Author: David Arthur MaluegThe Welfare Effects of Third Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Good Markets
Author: Daniel P. O'BrienPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Negotiation
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
The Welfare Effects of Third-degree Price Discrimination
Author: The Welfare Effects of Third Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Good Markets: the Case of Bargaining
Author: Federal Trade CommissionPublisher: Createspace Independent Pub
ISBN: 9781502751782
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
This book examines the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination by an intermediate good monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power. One of the downstream firms (the "chain store") may have a greater ability than rivals to integrate backward into the supply of the input. In addition to this outside option, the firms' relative bargaining powers depend on their disagreement profits, bargaining weights, and concession costs. If the chain's integration threat is not a credible outside option, and if downstream firms cannot coordinate their bargaining strategies, then price discrimination reduces input prices to all downstream firms.
The Welfare Effects of Third Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Good Markets
Author: Daniel Patrick O'BrienPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Negotiation
Languages : en
Pages : 33
Book Description
Monopoly Output and Welfare Effects of Third-degree Price Discrimination
Author: Song-Ken HsuPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economic policy
Languages : en
Pages : 26
Book Description
Recent Advances in the Theory of Third-Degree Price Discrimination
Author: Takanori AdachiPublisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 981993205X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 85
Book Description
This book provides an updated overview of the recent progress in the theoretical study of third-degree price discrimination. It is a marketing tactic and is said to be present if the unit price is different across different groups of buyers. Its welfare evaluation is often difficult because it entails two countervailing effects: on one hand, it exploits surplus from consumers who have high willingness-to-pay, but on the other hand, it generates gains from trade from consumers who otherwise would not purchase the good. Recognizing this difficulty, we provide new insights on evaluation of third-degree price discrimination in consideration of network effects and vertical product differentiation. Our analysis is particularly useful for the industries related to information and communication technologies (ICT) because these two elements characterize them. Furthermore, we also study the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination under imperfect competition other than monopoly. At first, it seems that it may complicate the analysis under monopoly. However, we argue that the main thrusts of analysis under monopoly carry over to the case of oligopoly. We also take into account behavioral aspects and their implications for studying third-degree price discrimination. Overall, this book is designed to provide implications for contemporary management and policy issues by advancing theoretical issues in industrial organization.
The Welfare Effects of Third-degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Goods Markets
Author: Michael L. KatzPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Price discrimination
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
The Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in a Differentiated Oligopoly
Author: Takanori AdachiPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This article examines the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination under oligopolistic competition with horizontal product differentiation. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare: the degree of substitution must be sufficiently greater in the “strong” market (where the discriminatory price is higher than the uniform price) than in the “weak” market (where it is lower). It is verified, however, that consumer surplus is never improved; social welfare improves solely owing to an increase in the firms' profits in the case of linear demands.
Author: Iñaki Aguirre