Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428990275
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 302
Book Description
The United States Air Force and the culture of innovation 1945-1965
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428990275
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 302
Book Description
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428990275
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 302
Book Description
The United States Air Force and the Culture of Innovation, 1945-1965
Author: Stephen B. Johnson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Book Description
The United States Air Force and the Culture of Innovation
Author: Stephen B. Johnson
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780756739966
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 288
Book Description
In this history issued by the U.S. Air Force, Prof. Stephen B. Johnson demonstrates in fine detail how the application of systems management by the Air Force to its ballistic missiles and computer programs not only produced critical new weapons, but also benefited American industry. For the military, it brought rapid technological progress; for scientists, new products; for engineers, dependability; and for managers, predictable costs. Closely related to the missiles program was the air defense effort, centered at the Mass. Institute of Tech. (MIT) in Boston. This volume also includes a Glossary of Acronyms; Glossary of Terms; Notes on Sources; Archives Listing; Bibliography; and B&W photos.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780756739966
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 288
Book Description
In this history issued by the U.S. Air Force, Prof. Stephen B. Johnson demonstrates in fine detail how the application of systems management by the Air Force to its ballistic missiles and computer programs not only produced critical new weapons, but also benefited American industry. For the military, it brought rapid technological progress; for scientists, new products; for engineers, dependability; and for managers, predictable costs. Closely related to the missiles program was the air defense effort, centered at the Mass. Institute of Tech. (MIT) in Boston. This volume also includes a Glossary of Acronyms; Glossary of Terms; Notes on Sources; Archives Listing; Bibliography; and B&W photos.
The United States Air Force and the Culture of Innovation, 1945-1965
Author: Office of Air Force History
Publisher: Createspace Independent Pub
ISBN: 9781508712794
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 302
Book Description
Professor Stephen B. Johnson demonstrates in fine detail how the application of systems management by the United States Air Force to its ballistic missiles and computer programs not only produced critical new weapons, but also benefited American industry. Systems management harmonized the disparate goals of four interest groups. For the military it brought rapid technological progress; for scientists, new products; for engineers, dependability; and for managers, predictable cost. The process evolved, beginning shortly after the end of World War II, when Gen. Henry H. "Hap" Arnold directed that the Army Air Forces (later the U.S. Air Force) continue its wartime collaboration with the scientific community. This started as a voluntary association, with the establishment of the Scientific Advisory Board and Project RAND. In the early 1950s, the Air Force reorganized its research and development (R&D) function with the creation of Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) and the Air Staff's office of deputy chief of staff for development (DCS/D), which were both aimed at controlling the scientists. The systems management approach evolved out of a jurisdictional conflict between ARDC and its rival, Air Materiel Command (AMC). The latter controlled R&D finances and was determined not to relinquish its prerogatives. Of course, ARDC argued that this was a case of having responsibility without the requisite authority. At first represented by Gen. Bernard A. Schriever's ballistic missiles program, ARDC bypassed traditional organizational structures. Schriever's Western Development Division (WDD), located at Inglewood, California, made its case, based upon the Soviet Union's nuclear threat, to engage in the race to develop longrange ballistic missiles. Ultimately, Schriever's new project management and weapons systems procedures-concurrency-produced a family of missile and space vehicles. However, in bypassing administrative red tape, this development also eliminated some necessary checks and balances that led to a series of flight test failures and cost overruns. Closely related to the missiles program was the air defense effort, centered at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Boston. Dr. Jay Forrester's Project Whirlwind evolved into large-scale, real-time computers. Again, as with the missiles program, once the Cold War waned, the government's emphasis shifted to cost control. When Schriever assumed command of ARDC, he transplanted his successful Inglewood model to all major weapons systems acquisition. Ironically, in the early 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara appropriated Schriever's procedures, using them to wield ever greater centralized control. Dr. Johnson shows that Air Force procedures were not only highly successful in terms of meeting the challenges of the Cold War, but also that their adoption by American industry propelled the nation to international prominence in aerospace and computing. Finally, he argues that while aerospace had experienced somewhat more difficulty adapting to consumer products than did the computer industry, the full implications of systems management were yet to be seen by the end of the Cold War.
Publisher: Createspace Independent Pub
ISBN: 9781508712794
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 302
Book Description
Professor Stephen B. Johnson demonstrates in fine detail how the application of systems management by the United States Air Force to its ballistic missiles and computer programs not only produced critical new weapons, but also benefited American industry. Systems management harmonized the disparate goals of four interest groups. For the military it brought rapid technological progress; for scientists, new products; for engineers, dependability; and for managers, predictable cost. The process evolved, beginning shortly after the end of World War II, when Gen. Henry H. "Hap" Arnold directed that the Army Air Forces (later the U.S. Air Force) continue its wartime collaboration with the scientific community. This started as a voluntary association, with the establishment of the Scientific Advisory Board and Project RAND. In the early 1950s, the Air Force reorganized its research and development (R&D) function with the creation of Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) and the Air Staff's office of deputy chief of staff for development (DCS/D), which were both aimed at controlling the scientists. The systems management approach evolved out of a jurisdictional conflict between ARDC and its rival, Air Materiel Command (AMC). The latter controlled R&D finances and was determined not to relinquish its prerogatives. Of course, ARDC argued that this was a case of having responsibility without the requisite authority. At first represented by Gen. Bernard A. Schriever's ballistic missiles program, ARDC bypassed traditional organizational structures. Schriever's Western Development Division (WDD), located at Inglewood, California, made its case, based upon the Soviet Union's nuclear threat, to engage in the race to develop longrange ballistic missiles. Ultimately, Schriever's new project management and weapons systems procedures-concurrency-produced a family of missile and space vehicles. However, in bypassing administrative red tape, this development also eliminated some necessary checks and balances that led to a series of flight test failures and cost overruns. Closely related to the missiles program was the air defense effort, centered at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Boston. Dr. Jay Forrester's Project Whirlwind evolved into large-scale, real-time computers. Again, as with the missiles program, once the Cold War waned, the government's emphasis shifted to cost control. When Schriever assumed command of ARDC, he transplanted his successful Inglewood model to all major weapons systems acquisition. Ironically, in the early 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara appropriated Schriever's procedures, using them to wield ever greater centralized control. Dr. Johnson shows that Air Force procedures were not only highly successful in terms of meeting the challenges of the Cold War, but also that their adoption by American industry propelled the nation to international prominence in aerospace and computing. Finally, he argues that while aerospace had experienced somewhat more difficulty adapting to consumer products than did the computer industry, the full implications of systems management were yet to be seen by the end of the Cold War.
The United States Air Force and the Culture of Innovation, 1945-1965
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 300
Book Description
This monograph shows how the application of systems management by the U.S. Air Force to its ballistic missiles and computer programs not only produced critical new weapons, but also benefited U.S. industry. Systems management harmonized the disparate goals of four interest groups. For the military it brought rapid technological progress; for scientists, new products; for engineers, dependability; and for managers, predictable cost. The process evolved, beginning shortly after the end of World War II, when Gen. Henry H. "Hap" Arnold directed that the Army Air Forces continue its wartime collaboration with the scientific community. This started as a voluntary association, with the establishment of the Scientific Advisory Board and Project RAND. In the early 1950s, the Air Force reorganized its research and development function with the creation of Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) and the Air Staff's office of deputy chief of staff for development (DCS/D), which were both aimed at controlling the scientists. The systems management approach evolved out of a jurisdictional conflict between ARDC and its rival, Air Materiel Command (AMC). The latter controlled R & D finances and was determined not to relinquish its prerogatives. But Gen. Bernard A. Schriever's Western Development Division (WDD), located at Inglewood, California, made its case, based upon the Soviet Union's nuclear threat, to engage in the race to develop long-range ballistic missiles. Ultimately, Schriever's new project management and weapons systems procedures produced a family of missile and space vehicles. Closely related to the missiles program was the air defense effort, centered at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Boston. Dr. Jay Forrester's Project Whirlwind evolved into large-scale, real-time computers. When Schriever assumed command of ARDC, he transplanted his successful Inglewood model to all major weapons systems acquisition. An extensive bibliography is included.7.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 300
Book Description
This monograph shows how the application of systems management by the U.S. Air Force to its ballistic missiles and computer programs not only produced critical new weapons, but also benefited U.S. industry. Systems management harmonized the disparate goals of four interest groups. For the military it brought rapid technological progress; for scientists, new products; for engineers, dependability; and for managers, predictable cost. The process evolved, beginning shortly after the end of World War II, when Gen. Henry H. "Hap" Arnold directed that the Army Air Forces continue its wartime collaboration with the scientific community. This started as a voluntary association, with the establishment of the Scientific Advisory Board and Project RAND. In the early 1950s, the Air Force reorganized its research and development function with the creation of Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) and the Air Staff's office of deputy chief of staff for development (DCS/D), which were both aimed at controlling the scientists. The systems management approach evolved out of a jurisdictional conflict between ARDC and its rival, Air Materiel Command (AMC). The latter controlled R & D finances and was determined not to relinquish its prerogatives. But Gen. Bernard A. Schriever's Western Development Division (WDD), located at Inglewood, California, made its case, based upon the Soviet Union's nuclear threat, to engage in the race to develop long-range ballistic missiles. Ultimately, Schriever's new project management and weapons systems procedures produced a family of missile and space vehicles. Closely related to the missiles program was the air defense effort, centered at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Boston. Dr. Jay Forrester's Project Whirlwind evolved into large-scale, real-time computers. When Schriever assumed command of ARDC, he transplanted his successful Inglewood model to all major weapons systems acquisition. An extensive bibliography is included.7.
Global Air Power
Author: John Andreas Olsen
Publisher: Potomac Books, Inc.
ISBN: 1597975559
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 561
Book Description
Presents a regional, national, and global overview of air power; Written by a cadre of military specialists who offer global perspectives; Assesses its cultural as well as military influences
Publisher: Potomac Books, Inc.
ISBN: 1597975559
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 561
Book Description
Presents a regional, national, and global overview of air power; Written by a cadre of military specialists who offer global perspectives; Assesses its cultural as well as military influences
Trillions for Military Technology
Author: J. Alic
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230606873
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 270
Book Description
Trillions for Military Technology explains why the weapons purchased by the U.S. Department of Defense cost so much, why it takes decades to get them into production even as innovation in the civilian economy becomes ever more frenetic, and why some of those weapons don't work very well despite expenditures of many billions of dollars. It also explains what do about these problems. The author argues that the internal politics of the armed services make weapons acquisition almost unmanageable. Solutions require empowering civilian officials and reforms that will bring choice of weapons "into the sunshine" of public debate.
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230606873
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 270
Book Description
Trillions for Military Technology explains why the weapons purchased by the U.S. Department of Defense cost so much, why it takes decades to get them into production even as innovation in the civilian economy becomes ever more frenetic, and why some of those weapons don't work very well despite expenditures of many billions of dollars. It also explains what do about these problems. The author argues that the internal politics of the armed services make weapons acquisition almost unmanageable. Solutions require empowering civilian officials and reforms that will bring choice of weapons "into the sunshine" of public debate.
History of Acquisition in the Dept. of Defense, Vol. II, Adapting to Flexible Response 1960-1968, 2013
Adapting to Flexible Response, 1960-1968
Author: Walter S. Poole
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cold War
Languages : en
Pages : 494
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cold War
Languages : en
Pages : 494
Book Description
History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense
Author: Elliott Vanveltner Converse
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cold War
Languages : en
Pages : 494
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cold War
Languages : en
Pages : 494
Book Description